2022-10-04 19:10:30 -07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compilation: gcc -Wall ex1.c -o ex1 -lclamav
|
|
|
|
*
|
2025-02-14 10:24:30 -05:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2013-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
|
2022-10-04 19:10:30 -07:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2007-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.
|
|
|
|
* Author: Tomasz Kojm <tkojm@clamav.net>
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
|
|
|
* (at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
|
|
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
|
|
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
|
|
|
|
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
|
|
|
|
* MA 02110-1301, USA.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
#include <unistd.h>
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <clamav.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef O_BINARY
|
|
|
|
#define O_BINARY 0
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Exit codes: 0 is success. See `cl_error_t` enum from clamav.h.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *filename;
|
|
|
|
const char *destination_directory;
|
FIPS & FIPS-like limits on hash algs for cryptographic uses
ClamAV will not function when using a FIPS-enabled OpenSSL 3.x.
This is because ClamAV uses MD5 and SHA1 algorithms for a variety of
purposes including matching for malware detection, matching to prevent
false positives on known-clean files, and for verification of MD5-based
RSA digital signatures for determining CVD (signature database archive)
authenticity.
Interestingly, FIPS had been intentionally bypassed when creating hashes
based whole buffers and whole files (by descriptor or `FILE`-pointer):
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/commit/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b
Note: this bypassed FIPS the 1.x way with:
`EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);`
It was NOT disabled when using `cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` /
`cl_finish_hash()`. That likely worked by coincidence in that the hash
was already calculated most of the time. It certainly would have made
use of those functions if the hash had not been calculated prior:
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/blob/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b/libclamav/matcher.c#L743
Regardless, bypassing FIPS entirely is not the correct solution.
The FIPS restrictions against using MD5 and SHA1 are valid, particularly
when verifying CVD digital siganatures, but also I think when using a
hash to determine if the file is known-clean (i.e. the "clean cache" and
also MD5-based and SHA1-based FP signatures).
This commit extends the work to bypass FIPS using the newer 3.x method:
`md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, alg, "-fips");`
It does this for the legacy `cl_hash*()` functions including
`cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` / `cl_finish_hash()`.
It also introduces extended versions that allow the caller to choose if
they want to bypass FIPS:
- `cl_hash_data_ex()`
- `cl_hash_init_ex()`
- `cl_update_hash_ex()`
- `cl_finish_hash_ex()`
- `cl_hash_destroy_ex()`
- `cl_hash_file_fd_ex()`
See the `flags` parameter for each.
Ironically, this commit does NOT use the new functions at this time.
The rational is that ClamAV may need MD5, SHA1, and SHA-256 hashes of
the same files both for determining if the file is malware, and for
determining if the file is clean.
So instead, this commit will do a checks when:
1. Creating a new ClamAV scanning engine. If FIPS-mode enabled, it will
automatically toggle the "FIPS limits" engine option.
When loading signatures, if the engine "FIPS limits" option is enabled,
then MD5 and SHA1 FP signatures will be skipped.
2. Before verifying a CVD (e.g. also for loading, unpacking when
verification enabled).
If "FIPS limits" or FIPS-mode are enabled, then the legacy MD5-based RSA
method is disabled.
Note: This commit also refactors the interface for `cl_cvdverify_ex()`
and `cl_cvdunpack_ex()` so they take a `flags` parameters, rather than a
single `bool`. As these functions are new in this version, it does not
break the ABI.
The cache was already switched to use SHA2-256, so that's not a concern
for checking FIPS-mode / FIPS limits options.
This adds an option for `freshclam.conf` and `clamd.conf`:
FIPSCryptoHashLimits yes
And an equivalent command-line option for `clamscan` and `sigtool`:
--fips-limits
You may programmatically enable FIPS-limits for a ClamAV engine like this:
```C
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_FIPS_LIMITS, 1);
```
CLAM-2792
2025-07-01 20:41:47 -04:00
|
|
|
uint32_t dboptions = 0;
|
2022-10-04 19:10:30 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (argc) {
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
filename = argv[1];
|
|
|
|
destination_directory = ".";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
filename = argv[1];
|
|
|
|
destination_directory = argv[2];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(argv[1], "--no-verify") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
filename = argv[2];
|
|
|
|
destination_directory = argv[3];
|
FIPS & FIPS-like limits on hash algs for cryptographic uses
ClamAV will not function when using a FIPS-enabled OpenSSL 3.x.
This is because ClamAV uses MD5 and SHA1 algorithms for a variety of
purposes including matching for malware detection, matching to prevent
false positives on known-clean files, and for verification of MD5-based
RSA digital signatures for determining CVD (signature database archive)
authenticity.
Interestingly, FIPS had been intentionally bypassed when creating hashes
based whole buffers and whole files (by descriptor or `FILE`-pointer):
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/commit/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b
Note: this bypassed FIPS the 1.x way with:
`EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);`
It was NOT disabled when using `cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` /
`cl_finish_hash()`. That likely worked by coincidence in that the hash
was already calculated most of the time. It certainly would have made
use of those functions if the hash had not been calculated prior:
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/blob/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b/libclamav/matcher.c#L743
Regardless, bypassing FIPS entirely is not the correct solution.
The FIPS restrictions against using MD5 and SHA1 are valid, particularly
when verifying CVD digital siganatures, but also I think when using a
hash to determine if the file is known-clean (i.e. the "clean cache" and
also MD5-based and SHA1-based FP signatures).
This commit extends the work to bypass FIPS using the newer 3.x method:
`md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, alg, "-fips");`
It does this for the legacy `cl_hash*()` functions including
`cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` / `cl_finish_hash()`.
It also introduces extended versions that allow the caller to choose if
they want to bypass FIPS:
- `cl_hash_data_ex()`
- `cl_hash_init_ex()`
- `cl_update_hash_ex()`
- `cl_finish_hash_ex()`
- `cl_hash_destroy_ex()`
- `cl_hash_file_fd_ex()`
See the `flags` parameter for each.
Ironically, this commit does NOT use the new functions at this time.
The rational is that ClamAV may need MD5, SHA1, and SHA-256 hashes of
the same files both for determining if the file is malware, and for
determining if the file is clean.
So instead, this commit will do a checks when:
1. Creating a new ClamAV scanning engine. If FIPS-mode enabled, it will
automatically toggle the "FIPS limits" engine option.
When loading signatures, if the engine "FIPS limits" option is enabled,
then MD5 and SHA1 FP signatures will be skipped.
2. Before verifying a CVD (e.g. also for loading, unpacking when
verification enabled).
If "FIPS limits" or FIPS-mode are enabled, then the legacy MD5-based RSA
method is disabled.
Note: This commit also refactors the interface for `cl_cvdverify_ex()`
and `cl_cvdunpack_ex()` so they take a `flags` parameters, rather than a
single `bool`. As these functions are new in this version, it does not
break the ABI.
The cache was already switched to use SHA2-256, so that's not a concern
for checking FIPS-mode / FIPS limits options.
This adds an option for `freshclam.conf` and `clamd.conf`:
FIPSCryptoHashLimits yes
And an equivalent command-line option for `clamscan` and `sigtool`:
--fips-limits
You may programmatically enable FIPS-limits for a ClamAV engine like this:
```C
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_FIPS_LIMITS, 1);
```
CLAM-2792
2025-07-01 20:41:47 -04:00
|
|
|
dboptions = CL_DB_UNSIGNED;
|
2022-10-04 19:10:30 -07:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
printf("Usage: %s [--no-verify] file [destination_directory]\n", argv[0]);
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
printf("Usage: %s [--no-verify] file [destination_directory]\n", argv[0]);
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
// Note: using NULL for certs_directory will disable external digital signature verification.
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS & FIPS-like limits on hash algs for cryptographic uses
ClamAV will not function when using a FIPS-enabled OpenSSL 3.x.
This is because ClamAV uses MD5 and SHA1 algorithms for a variety of
purposes including matching for malware detection, matching to prevent
false positives on known-clean files, and for verification of MD5-based
RSA digital signatures for determining CVD (signature database archive)
authenticity.
Interestingly, FIPS had been intentionally bypassed when creating hashes
based whole buffers and whole files (by descriptor or `FILE`-pointer):
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/commit/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b
Note: this bypassed FIPS the 1.x way with:
`EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);`
It was NOT disabled when using `cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` /
`cl_finish_hash()`. That likely worked by coincidence in that the hash
was already calculated most of the time. It certainly would have made
use of those functions if the hash had not been calculated prior:
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/blob/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b/libclamav/matcher.c#L743
Regardless, bypassing FIPS entirely is not the correct solution.
The FIPS restrictions against using MD5 and SHA1 are valid, particularly
when verifying CVD digital siganatures, but also I think when using a
hash to determine if the file is known-clean (i.e. the "clean cache" and
also MD5-based and SHA1-based FP signatures).
This commit extends the work to bypass FIPS using the newer 3.x method:
`md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, alg, "-fips");`
It does this for the legacy `cl_hash*()` functions including
`cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` / `cl_finish_hash()`.
It also introduces extended versions that allow the caller to choose if
they want to bypass FIPS:
- `cl_hash_data_ex()`
- `cl_hash_init_ex()`
- `cl_update_hash_ex()`
- `cl_finish_hash_ex()`
- `cl_hash_destroy_ex()`
- `cl_hash_file_fd_ex()`
See the `flags` parameter for each.
Ironically, this commit does NOT use the new functions at this time.
The rational is that ClamAV may need MD5, SHA1, and SHA-256 hashes of
the same files both for determining if the file is malware, and for
determining if the file is clean.
So instead, this commit will do a checks when:
1. Creating a new ClamAV scanning engine. If FIPS-mode enabled, it will
automatically toggle the "FIPS limits" engine option.
When loading signatures, if the engine "FIPS limits" option is enabled,
then MD5 and SHA1 FP signatures will be skipped.
2. Before verifying a CVD (e.g. also for loading, unpacking when
verification enabled).
If "FIPS limits" or FIPS-mode are enabled, then the legacy MD5-based RSA
method is disabled.
Note: This commit also refactors the interface for `cl_cvdverify_ex()`
and `cl_cvdunpack_ex()` so they take a `flags` parameters, rather than a
single `bool`. As these functions are new in this version, it does not
break the ABI.
The cache was already switched to use SHA2-256, so that's not a concern
for checking FIPS-mode / FIPS limits options.
This adds an option for `freshclam.conf` and `clamd.conf`:
FIPSCryptoHashLimits yes
And an equivalent command-line option for `clamscan` and `sigtool`:
--fips-limits
You may programmatically enable FIPS-limits for a ClamAV engine like this:
```C
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_FIPS_LIMITS, 1);
```
CLAM-2792
2025-07-01 20:41:47 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = cl_cvdunpack_ex(filename, destination_directory, NULL, dboptions);
|
2022-10-04 19:10:30 -07:00
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
printf("ERROR: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (int)ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|