2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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/*
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2025-02-14 10:24:30 -05:00
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* Copyright (C) 2013-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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2019-01-25 10:15:50 -05:00
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* Copyright (C) 2007-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2002-2007 Tomasz Kojm <tkojm@clamav.net>
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*
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2007-03-31 20:31:04 +00:00
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* CDIFF code (C) 2006 Sensory Networks, Inc.
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2019-01-25 10:15:50 -05:00
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*
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2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
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* Author: Tomasz Kojm <tkojm@clamav.net>
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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2007-03-31 20:31:04 +00:00
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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2006-04-09 19:59:28 +00:00
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
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* MA 02110-1301, USA.
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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*/
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2004-02-06 13:46:08 +00:00
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#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include "clamav-config.h"
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
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#include <zlib.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <locale.h>
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2003-10-20 00:55:11 +00:00
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#include <sys/types.h>
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2004-09-18 19:26:08 +00:00
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
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|
#include <dirent.h>
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2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
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#include <ctype.h>
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2011-05-03 16:16:53 -07:00
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#include <libgen.h>
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
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#ifndef _WIN32
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#endif
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|
|
|
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
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// libclamav
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#include "clamav.h"
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#include "matcher.h"
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#include "cvd.h"
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2021-12-02 15:07:48 -08:00
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#include "dsig.h"
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
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#include "str.h"
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#include "ole2_extract.h"
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#include "htmlnorm.h"
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#include "textnorm.h"
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#include "default.h"
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#include "fmap.h"
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#include "readdb.h"
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#include "others.h"
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#include "pe.h"
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#include "entconv.h"
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
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#include "clamav_rust.h"
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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2021-03-04 19:39:50 -08:00
|
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// common
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
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|
#include "output.h"
|
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#include "optparser.h"
|
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|
#include "misc.h"
|
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|
#include "tar.h"
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
#include "vba.h"
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
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#define MAX_DEL_LOOKAHEAD 5000
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
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2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
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// global variable for the absolute path of the --cvdcertsdir option
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char *g_cvdcertsdir = NULL;
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2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
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// struct s_info info;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
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short recursion = 0, bell = 0;
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short printinfected = 0, printclean = 1;
|
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|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct dblist_s {
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
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|
const char *ext;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
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unsigned int count;
|
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} dblist[] = {
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|
|
|
|
/* special files */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
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{"info", 0},
|
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{"cfg", 0},
|
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|
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{"ign", 0},
|
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{"ign2", 0},
|
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{"ftm", 0},
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
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/* databases */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
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{"db", 1},
|
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{"hdb", 1},
|
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|
|
{"hdu", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"hsb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"hsu", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"mdb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"mdu", 1},
|
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|
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{"msb", 1},
|
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|
|
{"msu", 1},
|
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|
|
{"ndb", 1},
|
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|
{"ndu", 1},
|
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|
|
{"ldb", 1},
|
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|
|
{"ldu", 1},
|
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|
|
{"sdb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"zmd", 1},
|
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|
|
{"rmd", 1},
|
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{"idb", 0},
|
2019-01-18 11:28:14 -05:00
|
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|
{"fp", 1}, // TODO Should count be 0 here? We don't count others like this
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
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|
{"sfp", 0},
|
|
|
|
{"gdb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"pdb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"wdb", 0},
|
|
|
|
{"crb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"cdb", 1},
|
|
|
|
{"imp", 1},
|
2019-01-18 11:28:14 -05:00
|
|
|
// TODO Should we add .ioc, .yar, .yara, and .pwdb so that sigtool will
|
|
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|
// include these sigs in a build (just in case we need this functionality
|
|
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// in the future?)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
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|
|
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|
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{NULL, 0}};
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
static char *getdbname(const char *str, char *dst, int dstlen)
|
2009-03-05 19:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int len = strlen(str);
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(str, ".cvd") || cli_strbcasestr(str, ".cld") || cli_strbcasestr(str, ".cud"))
|
|
|
|
len -= 4;
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (dst) {
|
|
|
|
strncpy(dst, str, MIN(dstlen - 1, len));
|
|
|
|
dst[MIN(dstlen - 1, len)] = 0;
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
dst = (char *)malloc(len + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!dst)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
strncpy(dst, str, len - 4);
|
|
|
|
dst[MIN(dstlen - 1, len - 4)] = 0;
|
2009-03-05 19:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
return dst;
|
2009-03-05 19:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
static int hexdump(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char buffer[FILEBUFF], *pt;
|
|
|
|
int bytes;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((bytes = read(0, buffer, FILEBUFF)) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
pt = cli_str2hex(buffer, bytes);
|
|
|
|
if (write(1, pt, 2 * bytes) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hexdump: Can't write to stdout\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (bytes == -1)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
static int hashpe(const char *filename, unsigned int class, cli_hash_type_t type)
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
int status = -1;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
|
|
|
const char *fmptr;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *engine = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cli_ctx ctx = {0};
|
|
|
|
struct cl_scan_options options = {0};
|
|
|
|
cl_fmap_t *new_map = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int fd = -1;
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare file */
|
|
|
|
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Can't open file %s!\n", filename);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
|
|
|
|
FSTAT(fd, &sb);
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
new_map = fmap_new(fd, 0, sb.st_size, filename, filename);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_map) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Can't create fmap for open file\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* build engine */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(engine = cl_engine_new())) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Can't create new engine\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_AC_ONLY, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_initroots(engine, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: cli_initroots() failed\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
PE, ELF, Mach-O: code cleanup
The header parsing / executable metadata collecting functions for the
PE, ELF, and Mach-O file types were using `int` for the return type.
Mostly they were returning 0 for success and -1, -2, -3, or -4 for
failure. But in some cases they were returning cl_error_t enum values
for failure. Regardless, the function using them was treating 0 as
success and non-zero as failure, which it stored as -1 ... every time.
This commit switches them all to use cl_error_t. I am continuing to
storeo the final result as 0 / -1 in the `peinfo` struct, but outside of
that everything has been made consistent.
While I was working on that, I got a tad side tracked. I noticed that
the target type isn't an enum, or even a set of #defines. So I made an
enum and then changed the code that uses target types to use the enum.
I also removed the `target` parameter from a number of functions that
don't actually use it at all. Some recursion was masking the fact that
it was an unused parameter which is why there was no warning about it.
2022-08-28 18:41:04 -07:00
|
|
|
if (cli_add_content_match_pattern(engine->root[0], "test", "deadbeef", 0, 0, 0, "*", NULL, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Can't parse signature\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cl_engine_compile(engine) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Can't compile engine\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* prepare context */
|
2022-08-18 20:00:33 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.engine = engine;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.evidence = evidence_new();
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ctx.options = &options;
|
2018-07-20 22:28:48 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx.options->parse = ~0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.dconf = (struct cli_dconf *)engine->dconf;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack_size = ctx.engine->max_recursion_level;
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack = calloc(sizeof(recursion_level_t), ctx.recursion_stack_size);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx.recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
// ctx was memset, so recursion_level starts at 0.
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].fmap = new_map;
|
2021-10-03 14:13:55 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].type = CL_TYPE_ANY; // ANY for the top level, because we don't yet know the type.
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].size = new_map->len;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.fmap = ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].fmap;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
fmptr = fmap_need_off_once(ctx.fmap, 0, sb.st_size);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!fmptr) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: fmap_need_off_once failed!\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_debug();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Send to PE-specific hasher */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
switch (class) {
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
case 1:
|
2019-02-04 18:48:22 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = cli_genhash_pe(&ctx, CL_GENHASH_PE_CLASS_SECTION, type, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
case 2:
|
2019-02-04 18:48:22 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = cli_genhash_pe(&ctx, CL_GENHASH_PE_CLASS_IMPTBL, type, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: unknown classification(%u) for pe hash!\n", class);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* THIS MAY BE UNNECESSARY */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_CLEAN:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_VIRUS:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_DEBUG, "hashpe: CL_VIRUS after cli_genhash_pe()!\n");
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_BREAK:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_DEBUG, "hashpe: CL_BREAK after cli_genhash_pe()!\n");
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_EFORMAT:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Not a valid PE file!\n");
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashpe: Other error %d inside cli_genhash_pe.\n", ret);
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Cleanup */
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_map) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(new_map);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx.recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
free(ctx.recursion_stack);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx.evidence) {
|
|
|
|
evidence_free(ctx.evidence);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-10-26 13:19:40 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (-1 != fd) {
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
2016-06-29 18:21:39 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
static int hashsig(const struct optstruct *opts, unsigned int class, cli_hash_type_t type)
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *hash;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (opts->filename) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; opts->filename[i]; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (CLAMSTAT(opts->filename[i], &sb) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
perror("hashsig");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashsig: Can't access file %s\n", opts->filename[i]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if ((sb.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG) {
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((class == 0) && (hash = cli_hashfile(opts->filename[i], NULL, type))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s:%u:%s\n", hash, (unsigned int)sb.st_size, basename(opts->filename[i]));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hash);
|
|
|
|
} else if ((class > 0) && (hashpe(opts->filename[i], class, type) == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
/* intentionally empty - printed in cli_genhash_pe() */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashsig: Can't generate hash for %s\n", opts->filename[i]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-09-18 19:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
} else { /* stream */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (class > 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashsig: Can't generate requested hash for input stream\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hash = cli_hashstream(stdin, NULL, type);
|
|
|
|
if (!hash) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "hashsig: Can't generate hash for input stream\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", hash);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hash);
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-24 16:11:50 -07:00
|
|
|
static int fuzzy_img_file(char *filename)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int status = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int target_fd = -1;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *fuzzy_hash_calc_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *mem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
image_fuzzy_hash_t hash = {0};
|
|
|
|
STATBUF st;
|
|
|
|
ssize_t bytes_read;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((target_fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "%s: Can't open file: %s\n", basename(filename), cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (FSTAT(target_fd, &st)) {
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "%s: fstat() failed: %s\n", basename(filename), cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == (mem = malloc((size_t)st.st_size))) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "%s: Malloc failed, buffer size: %zu\n", basename(filename), (size_t)st.st_size);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bytes_read = read(target_fd, mem, (size_t)st.st_size);
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_read == -1) {
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "%s: Failed to read file: %s\n", basename(filename), cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
2022-03-24 16:11:50 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_read < (ssize_t)st.st_size) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "%s: Read fewer bytes than expected. The file may have been modified while attempting to process it.\n", basename(filename));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!fuzzy_hash_calculate_image(mem, (size_t)st.st_size, hash.hash, 8, &fuzzy_hash_calc_error)) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "%s: Failed to calculate image fuzzy hash: %s\n",
|
|
|
|
basename(filename),
|
|
|
|
ffierror_fmt(fuzzy_hash_calc_error));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char hashstr[17];
|
|
|
|
snprintf(hashstr, 17, "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
|
|
|
|
hash.hash[0], hash.hash[1], hash.hash[2], hash.hash[3],
|
|
|
|
hash.hash[4], hash.hash[5], hash.hash[6], hash.hash[7]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s: %s\n", basename(filename), hashstr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != mem) {
|
|
|
|
free(mem);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != fuzzy_hash_calc_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(fuzzy_hash_calc_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (target_fd != -1) {
|
|
|
|
close(target_fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int fuzzy_img(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int status = 0;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!opts->filename) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "You must provide one or more files to generate a hash.");
|
|
|
|
status = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; opts->filename[i]; i++) {
|
|
|
|
ret = fuzzy_img_file(opts->filename[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
// report failure if any of the files fail
|
|
|
|
status = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
static cli_ctx *convenience_ctx(int fd, const char *filepath)
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
cli_ctx *ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *engine = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cl_fmap_t *new_map = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* build engine */
|
|
|
|
engine = cl_engine_new();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == engine) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: engine initialization failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_AC_ONLY, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_initroots(engine, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: cli_initroots() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_add_content_match_pattern(engine->root[0], "test", "deadbeef", 0, 0, 0, "*", NULL, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: Can't parse signature\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_engine_compile(engine)) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: failed to compile engine.");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* fake input fmap */
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
new_map = fmap_new(fd, 0, 0, NULL, filepath);
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_map) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: fmap failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* prepare context */
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(cli_ctx));
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: ctx allocation failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->engine = (const struct cl_engine *)engine;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->evidence = evidence_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->dconf = (struct cli_dconf *)engine->dconf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack_size = ctx->engine->max_recursion_level;
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack = calloc(sizeof(recursion_level_t), ctx->recursion_stack_size);
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx->recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ctx was calloc'd, so recursion_level starts at 0.
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap = new_map;
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].type = CL_TYPE_ANY; // ANY for the top level, because we don't yet know the type.
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].size = new_map->len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->fmap = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->options = calloc(1, sizeof(struct cl_scan_options));
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx->options) {
|
|
|
|
printf("convenience_ctx: scan options allocation failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->options->general |= CL_SCAN_GENERAL_HEURISTICS;
|
|
|
|
ctx->options->parse = ~(0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != status) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_map) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(new_map);
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->options) {
|
|
|
|
free(ctx->options);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
free(ctx->recursion_stack);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine) {
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void destroy_ctx(cli_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
/* Clean up any fmaps */
|
|
|
|
while (ctx->recursion_level > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap);
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_level -= 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->recursion_stack[0].fmap) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(ctx->recursion_stack[0].fmap);
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[0].fmap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(ctx->recursion_stack);
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->engine) {
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_free((struct cl_engine *)ctx->engine);
|
|
|
|
ctx->engine = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->options) {
|
|
|
|
free(ctx->options);
|
|
|
|
ctx->options = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx->evidence) {
|
|
|
|
evidence_free(ctx->evidence);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int htmlnorm(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
2022-12-16 13:36:17 -08:00
|
|
|
cli_ctx *ctx = NULL;
|
2003-10-31 02:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-07 15:18:29 -08:00
|
|
|
if ((fd = open(optget(opts, "html-normalise")->strarg, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY)) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "htmlnorm: Can't open file %s\n", optget(opts, "html-normalise")->strarg);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-11-01 03:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != (ctx = convenience_ctx(fd, optget(opts, "html-normalise")->strarg))) {
|
2022-12-16 13:36:17 -08:00
|
|
|
html_normalise_map(ctx, ctx->fmap, ".", NULL, NULL);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(ctx->fmap);
|
2009-08-31 06:16:12 +02:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "fmap failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
2003-11-01 03:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-04-07 10:25:06 -07:00
|
|
|
destroy_ctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
static int asciinorm(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *fname;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *norm_buff;
|
|
|
|
struct text_norm_state state;
|
|
|
|
size_t map_off;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fmap_t *map;
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
int fd, ofd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fname = optget(opts, "ascii-normalise")->strarg;
|
2020-12-07 15:18:29 -08:00
|
|
|
fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "asciinorm: Can't open file %s\n", fname);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(norm_buff = malloc(ASCII_FILE_BUFF_LENGTH))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "asciinorm: Can't allocate memory\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(map = fmap_new(fd, 0, 0, fname, fname))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "fmap: Could not map fd %d\n", fd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
free(norm_buff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (map->len > MAX_ASCII_FILE_SIZE) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "asciinorm: File size of %zu too large\n", map->len);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
free(norm_buff);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(map);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-07 15:18:29 -08:00
|
|
|
ofd = open("./normalised_text", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
if (ofd == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "asciinorm: Can't open file ./normalised_text\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
free(norm_buff);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(map);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
text_normalize_init(&state, norm_buff, ASCII_FILE_BUFF_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
map_off = 0;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (map_off != map->len) {
|
|
|
|
size_t written;
|
|
|
|
if (!(written = text_normalize_map(&state, map, map_off))) break;
|
|
|
|
map_off += written;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write(ofd, norm_buff, state.out_pos) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "asciinorm: Can't write to file ./normalised_text\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
close(ofd);
|
|
|
|
free(norm_buff);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(map);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
text_normalize_reset(&state);
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
close(ofd);
|
|
|
|
free(norm_buff);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(map);
|
2015-07-07 16:46:19 -04:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int utf16decode(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2006-10-25 16:04:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
const char *fname;
|
|
|
|
char *newname, buff[512], *decoded;
|
|
|
|
int fd1, fd2, bytes;
|
2006-10-25 16:04:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
fname = optget(opts, "utf16-decode")->strarg;
|
2020-12-07 15:18:29 -08:00
|
|
|
if ((fd1 = open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY)) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "utf16decode: Can't open file %s\n", fname);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-10-25 16:04:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
newname = malloc(strlen(fname) + 7);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!newname) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "utf16decode: Can't allocate memory\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd1);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-10-25 16:04:22 +00:00
|
|
|
sprintf(newname, "%s.ascii", fname);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-07 15:18:29 -08:00
|
|
|
if ((fd2 = open(newname, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)) < 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "utf16decode: Can't create file %s\n", newname);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(newname);
|
|
|
|
close(fd1);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((bytes = read(fd1, buff, sizeof(buff))) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
decoded = cli_utf16toascii(buff, bytes);
|
|
|
|
if (decoded) {
|
|
|
|
if (write(fd2, decoded, strlen(decoded)) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "utf16decode: Can't write to file %s\n", newname);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
close(fd1);
|
|
|
|
close(fd2);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newname);
|
|
|
|
free(newname);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-10-25 16:04:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(newname);
|
|
|
|
close(fd1);
|
|
|
|
close(fd2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
static char *sha2_256_file(const char *file, unsigned int *size)
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FILE *fh;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i, bytes;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char digest[32], buffer[FILEBUFF];
|
|
|
|
char *sha;
|
|
|
|
void *ctx;
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx = cl_hash_init("sha2-256");
|
2014-02-13 13:05:50 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(ctx))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(fh = fopen(file, "rb"))) {
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sha2_256_file: Can't open file %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_hash_destroy(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (size)
|
|
|
|
*size = 0;
|
|
|
|
while ((bytes = fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), fh))) {
|
|
|
|
cl_update_hash(ctx, buffer, bytes);
|
|
|
|
if (size)
|
|
|
|
*size += bytes;
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-02-28 12:12:30 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_finish_hash(ctx, digest);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
sha = (char *)malloc(65);
|
|
|
|
if (!sha) {
|
2013-02-13 11:33:40 -08:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
|
|
|
|
sprintf(sha + i * 2, "%02x", digest[i]);
|
2013-02-13 11:33:40 -08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
return sha;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
static int writeinfo(const char *dbname, const char *builder, const char *header, const struct optstruct *opts, char *const *dblist2, unsigned int dblist2cnt)
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FILE *fh;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i, bytes;
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
char file[4096], *pt, dbfile[4096];
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned char digest[32], buffer[FILEBUFF];
|
|
|
|
void *ctx;
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s.info", dbname);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!access(file, R_OK)) {
|
|
|
|
if (unlink(file) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't unlink %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(fh = fopen(file, "wb+"))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't create file %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fprintf(fh, "%s\n", header) < 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't write to %s\n", file);
|
2014-02-13 13:05:50 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (dblist2cnt) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < dblist2cnt; i++) {
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = sha2_256_file(dblist2[i], &bytes))) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't generate SHA2-256 for %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fprintf(fh, "%s:%u:%s\n", dblist2[i], bytes, pt) < 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't write to info file\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!dblist2cnt || optget(opts, "hybrid")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; dblist[i].ext; i++) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(dbfile, sizeof(dbfile), "%s.%s", dbname, dblist[i].ext);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(dblist[i].ext, "info") && !access(dbfile, R_OK)) {
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = sha2_256_file(dbfile, &bytes))) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't generate SHA2-256 for %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fprintf(fh, "%s:%u:%s\n", dbfile, bytes, pt) < 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't write to info file\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!optget(opts, "unsigned")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
rewind(fh);
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx = cl_hash_init("sha2-256");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((bytes = fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), fh)))
|
|
|
|
cl_update_hash(ctx, buffer, bytes);
|
|
|
|
cl_finish_hash(ctx, digest);
|
2021-12-02 15:07:48 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = cli_getdsig(optget(opts, "server")->strarg, builder, digest, 32, 3))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "writeinfo: Can't get digital signature from remote server\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fh, "DSIG:%s\n", pt);
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
static int diffdirs(const char *old, const char *new, const char *patch);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
static int verifydiff(const struct optstruct *opts, const char *diff, const char *cvd, const char *incdir);
|
2006-10-14 21:12:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-15 19:20:05 +01:00
|
|
|
static int qcompare(const void *a, const void *b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return strcmp(*(char *const *)a, *(char *const *)b);
|
2011-02-15 19:20:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
char *createTempDir(const struct optstruct *opts);
|
|
|
|
void removeTempDir(const struct optstruct *opts, char *dir)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!optget(opts, "leave-temps")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
cli_rmdirs(dir);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Determine the name of the sign file based on the target file name.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the target file name ends with '.cvd', '.cud', or '.cld' then the sign file name will be
|
|
|
|
* 'name-version.cvd.sign', 'name-version.cud.sign', or 'name-version.cld.sign' respectively.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the target file name does not end with '.cvd', '.cud', or '.cld' then the sign file name will be
|
|
|
|
* 'target.sign'.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The sign file name will be placed in the same directory as the target file.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the target file is a CVD file, the version number will be extracted from the CVD file.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for the sign file name.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param target The target file name.
|
|
|
|
* @return char*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static char *get_sign_file_name(char *target)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *sign_file_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *dir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *cvd_open_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t cvd_version = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *cvd_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cvd_t *cvd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *target_dup = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cvd_type cvd_type = CVD_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
|
|
|
|
const char *cvd_extension = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// If the target filename ends with '.cvd',
|
|
|
|
// the sign file name will be 'name-version.cvd.sign'
|
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(target, ".cvd")) {
|
|
|
|
cvd_type = CVD_TYPE_CVD;
|
|
|
|
cvd_extension = "cvd";
|
|
|
|
} else if (cli_strbcasestr(target, ".cld")) {
|
|
|
|
cvd_type = CVD_TYPE_CLD;
|
|
|
|
cvd_extension = "cld";
|
|
|
|
} else if (cli_strbcasestr(target, ".cud")) {
|
|
|
|
cvd_type = CVD_TYPE_CUD;
|
|
|
|
cvd_extension = "cud";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cvd_type != CVD_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
|
|
// Signing a signature archive. We need to open the CVD file to get the version to use in the .sign file name.
|
|
|
|
cvd = cvd_open(target, &cvd_open_error);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == cvd) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "get_sign_file_name: Failed to open CVD file '%s': %s\n", target, ffierror_fmt(cvd_open_error));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cvd_version = cvd_get_version(cvd);
|
|
|
|
cvd_name = cvd_get_name(cvd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// get the directory from the target filename
|
|
|
|
target_dup = strdup(target);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == target_dup) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "get_sign_file_name: Failed to duplicate target filepath.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dir = dirname(target_dup);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == dir) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "get_sign_file_name: Failed to get directory from target filename.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sign_file_name = calloc(1, strlen(dir) + 1 + strlen(cvd_name) + 1 + (3 * sizeof(uint32_t) + 2) + 1 + strlen(cvd_extension) + strlen(".sign") + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == sign_file_name) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "get_sign_file_name: Memory allocation error.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sprintf(sign_file_name, "%s/%s-%u.%s.sign", dir, cvd_name, cvd_version, cvd_extension);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// sign file name will just be the target filename with an added '.sign' extension
|
|
|
|
sign_file_name = malloc(strlen(target) + strlen(".sign") + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == sign_file_name) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "get_sign_file_name: Memory allocation error.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strcpy(sign_file_name, target);
|
|
|
|
strcat(sign_file_name, ".sign");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != cvd_name) {
|
|
|
|
ffi_cstring_free(cvd_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != cvd) {
|
|
|
|
cvd_free(cvd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != target_dup) {
|
|
|
|
free(target_dup);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != cvd_open_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(cvd_open_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sign_file_name;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int sign(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
const struct optstruct *opt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *target = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *sign_file_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *signing_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char **certs = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t certs_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool sign_result = false;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *sign_file_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool append = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
target = optget(opts, "sign")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == target) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: No target file specified.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "To sign a file with sigtool, you must specify a target file and use the --key and --cert options.\n");
|
2025-03-29 20:38:08 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "For example: sigtool --sign myfile.cvd --key /path/to/private.key --cert /path/to/public.crt --cert /path/to/intermediate.crt --cert /path/to/root-ca.crt\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sign_file_name = get_sign_file_name(target);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == sign_file_name) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: Failed to determine sign file name from target: %s\n", target);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
signing_key = optget(opts, "key")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == target) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: No private key specified.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "To sign a file with sigtool, you must specify a target file and use the --key and --cert options.\n");
|
2025-03-29 20:38:08 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "For example: sigtool --sign myfile.cvd --key /path/to/private.key --cert /path/to/public.crt --cert /path/to/intermediate.crt --cert /path/to/root-ca.crt\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
opt = optget(opts, "cert");
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == opt) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: No signing or intermediate certificates specified.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "To sign a file with sigtool, you must specify a target file and use the --key and --cert options.\n");
|
2025-03-29 20:38:08 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "For example: sigtool --sign myfile.cvd --key /path/to/private.key --cert /path/to/public.crt --cert /path/to/intermediate.crt --cert /path/to/root-ca.crt\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (opt) {
|
|
|
|
if (!opt->strarg) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: The --cert option requires a path value to a signing or intermediate certificate.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "To sign a file with sigtool, you must specify a target file and use the --key and --cert options.\n");
|
2025-03-29 20:38:08 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "For example: sigtool --sign myfile.cvd --key /path/to/private.key --cert /path/to/public.crt --cert /path/to/intermediate.crt --cert /path/to/root-ca.crt\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
certs_count += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
certs = realloc(certs, certs_count * sizeof(char *));
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == certs) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: Memory allocation error.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
certs[certs_count - 1] = opt->strarg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
opt = opt->nextarg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "append")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
append = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sign_result = codesign_sign_file(
|
|
|
|
target,
|
|
|
|
sign_file_name,
|
|
|
|
signing_key,
|
|
|
|
(const char **)certs,
|
|
|
|
certs_count,
|
|
|
|
append,
|
|
|
|
&sign_file_error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sign_result) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "sign: Failed to sign file '%s': %s\n", target, ffierror_fmt(sign_file_error));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "sign: Successfully signed file '%s', and placed the signature in '%s'\n", target, sign_file_name);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != sign_file_name) {
|
|
|
|
free(sign_file_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != certs) {
|
|
|
|
free(certs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != sign_file_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(sign_file_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int verify(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
char *target = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *sign_file_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *signer_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
bool verify_result = false;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *verify_file_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *verifier = NULL;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *new_verifier_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
target = optget(opts, "verify")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == target) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verify: No target file specified.\n");
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "To verify a file signed with sigtool, you must specify a target file. "
|
|
|
|
"You may also override the default certificates directory using --cvdcertsdir. "
|
|
|
|
"For example: sigtool --verify myfile.cvd --cvdcertsdir /path/to/certs/\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sign_file_name = get_sign_file_name(target);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == sign_file_name) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verify: Failed to determine sign file name.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!codesign_verifier_new(g_cvdcertsdir, &verifier, &new_verifier_error)) {
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verify: Failed to create verifier: %s\n", ffierror_fmt(new_verifier_error));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
verify_result = codesign_verify_file(
|
|
|
|
target,
|
|
|
|
sign_file_name,
|
|
|
|
verifier,
|
|
|
|
&signer_name,
|
|
|
|
&verify_file_error);
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_result) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verify: Failed to verify file '%s': %s\n", target, ffierror_fmt(verify_file_error));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "verify: Successfully verified file '%s' with signature '%s', signed by '%s'\n", target, sign_file_name, signer_name);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != signer_name) {
|
|
|
|
ffi_cstring_free(signer_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != sign_file_name) {
|
|
|
|
free(sign_file_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != verify_file_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(verify_file_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != verifier) {
|
|
|
|
codesign_verifier_free(verifier);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_verifier_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(new_verifier_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int build(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int ret, bc = 0, hy = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t bytes;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i, sigs = 0, oldsigs = 0, entries = 0, version, real_header, fl, maxentries;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF foo;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buffer[FILEBUFF];
|
2022-03-02 02:34:05 +03:00
|
|
|
char *tarfile, header[513], smbuff[32], builder[33], *pt, olddb[512];
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
char patch[50], broken[57], dbname[32], dbfile[4096];
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
const char *newcvd, *localdbdir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *engine;
|
|
|
|
FILE *cvd, *fh;
|
|
|
|
gzFile tar;
|
|
|
|
time_t timet;
|
|
|
|
struct tm *brokent;
|
|
|
|
struct cl_cvd *oldcvd;
|
|
|
|
char **dblist2 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int dblist2cnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
DIR *dd;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dent;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define FREE_LS(x) \
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < dblist2cnt; i++) \
|
|
|
|
free(x[i]); \
|
2011-02-15 19:20:05 +01:00
|
|
|
free(x);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!optget(opts, "server")->enabled && !optget(opts, "unsigned")->enabled) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: --server is required for --build\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "datadir")->active)
|
|
|
|
localdbdir = optget(opts, "datadir")->strarg;
|
2010-06-08 16:34:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CLAMSTAT("COPYING", &foo) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: COPYING file not found in current working directory.\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
getdbname(optget(opts, "build")->strarg, dbname, sizeof(dbname));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(dbname, "bytecode"))
|
|
|
|
bc = 1;
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "hybrid")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
hy = 1;
|
2016-07-14 17:31:04 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(engine = cl_engine_new())) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't initialize antivirus engine\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return 50;
|
2008-11-12 16:19:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != g_cvdcertsdir) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = cl_engine_set_str(engine, CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR, g_cvdcertsdir))) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "cli_engine_set_str(CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR) failed: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = cl_load(".", engine, &sigs, CL_DB_STDOPT | CL_DB_PUA | CL_DB_SIGNED))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't load database: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-12 16:19:43 +00:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!sigs) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: There are no signatures in database files\n");
|
2003-10-31 02:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (bc || hy) {
|
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(".")) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't open current directory\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd))) {
|
|
|
|
if (dent->d_ino) {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".cbc")) {
|
|
|
|
dblist2 = (char **)realloc(dblist2, (dblist2cnt + 1) * sizeof(char *));
|
|
|
|
if (!dblist2) { /* dblist2 leaked but we don't really care */
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Memory allocation error\n");
|
2014-09-23 10:51:03 -04:00
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dblist2[dblist2cnt] = strdup(dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
if (!dblist2[dblist2cnt]) {
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Memory allocation error\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dblist2cnt++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
entries += dblist2cnt;
|
|
|
|
if (dblist2 != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
qsort(dblist2, dblist2cnt, sizeof(char *), qcompare);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!access("last.hdb", R_OK)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!dblist2cnt) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: dblist2 == NULL (no .cbc files?)\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dblist2 = (char **)realloc(dblist2, (dblist2cnt + 1) * sizeof(char *));
|
|
|
|
if (!dblist2) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Memory allocation error\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dblist2[dblist2cnt] = strdup("last.hdb");
|
|
|
|
if (!dblist2[dblist2cnt]) {
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Memory allocation error\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dblist2cnt++;
|
|
|
|
entries += countlines("last.hdb");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!bc || hy) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; dblist[i].ext; i++) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(dbfile, sizeof(dbfile), "%s.%s", dbname, dblist[i].ext);
|
|
|
|
if (dblist[i].count && !access(dbfile, R_OK))
|
|
|
|
entries += countlines(dbfile);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (entries != sigs)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "build: Signatures in %s db files: %u, loaded by libclamav: %u\n", dbname, entries, sigs);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
maxentries = optget(opts, "max-bad-sigs")->numarg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (maxentries) {
|
|
|
|
if (!entries || (sigs > entries && sigs - entries >= maxentries)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Bad number of signatures in database files\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-10-31 02:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/* try to read cvd header of current database */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (opts->filename) {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(opts->filename[0], ".cvd") || cli_strbcasestr(opts->filename[0], ".cld") || cli_strbcasestr(opts->filename[0], ".cud")) {
|
|
|
|
strncpy(olddb, opts->filename[0], sizeof(olddb));
|
|
|
|
olddb[sizeof(olddb) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Not a CVD/CLD/CUD file\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-03 23:39:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
pt = freshdbdir();
|
|
|
|
snprintf(olddb, sizeof(olddb), "%s" PATHSEP "%s.cvd", localdbdir ? localdbdir : pt, dbname);
|
|
|
|
if (access(olddb, R_OK))
|
|
|
|
snprintf(olddb, sizeof(olddb), "%s" PATHSEP "%s.cld", localdbdir ? localdbdir : pt, dbname);
|
|
|
|
if (access(olddb, R_OK))
|
|
|
|
snprintf(olddb, sizeof(olddb), "%s" PATHSEP "%s.cud", localdbdir ? localdbdir : pt, dbname);
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
2007-02-03 23:39:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(oldcvd = cl_cvdhead(olddb)) && !optget(opts, "unsigned")->enabled) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "build: CAN'T READ CVD HEADER OF CURRENT DATABASE %s (wait 3 s)\n", olddb);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
sleep(3);
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (oldcvd) {
|
|
|
|
version = oldcvd->version + 1;
|
|
|
|
oldsigs = oldcvd->sigs;
|
|
|
|
cl_cvdfree(oldcvd);
|
2014-02-02 17:09:31 -05:00
|
|
|
} else if (optget(opts, "cvd-version")->numarg != 0) {
|
|
|
|
version = optget(opts, "cvd-version")->numarg;
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Version number: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (scanf("%u", &version) == EOF) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: scanf() failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Total sigs: %u\n", sigs);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (sigs > oldsigs)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "New sigs: %u\n", sigs - oldsigs);
|
2006-07-27 13:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
strcpy(header, "ClamAV-VDB:");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* time */
|
|
|
|
time(&timet);
|
|
|
|
brokent = localtime(&timet);
|
|
|
|
setlocale(LC_TIME, "C");
|
|
|
|
strftime(smbuff, sizeof(smbuff), "%d %b %Y %H-%M %z", brokent);
|
|
|
|
strcat(header, smbuff);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* version */
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), ":%u:", version);
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* number of signatures */
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), "%u:", sigs);
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* functionality level */
|
2013-09-11 11:32:49 -04:00
|
|
|
fl = (unsigned int)(optget(opts, "flevel")->numarg);
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), "%u:", fl);
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
real_header = strlen(header);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add fake MD5 and dsig (for writeinfo) */
|
|
|
|
strcat(header, "X:X:");
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((pt = getenv("SIGNDUSER"))) {
|
|
|
|
strncpy(builder, pt, sizeof(builder));
|
|
|
|
builder[sizeof(builder) - 1] = '\0';
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Builder name: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (scanf("%32s", builder) == EOF) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't get builder name\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add builder */
|
|
|
|
strcat(header, builder);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add current time */
|
2023-08-07 16:47:55 -07:00
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), ":" STDu64, (uint64_t)timet);
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (writeinfo(dbname, builder, header, opts, dblist2, dblist2cnt) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't generate info file\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-22 09:16:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
header[real_header] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(tarfile = cli_gentemp("."))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't generate temporary name for tarfile\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((tar = gzopen(tarfile, "wb9f")) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't open file %s for writing\n", tarfile);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tar_addfile(-1, tar, "COPYING") == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't add COPYING to tar archive\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
gzclose(tar);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (bc || hy) {
|
|
|
|
if (!hy && tar_addfile(-1, tar, "bytecode.info") == -1) {
|
|
|
|
gzclose(tar);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < dblist2cnt; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (tar_addfile(-1, tar, dblist2[i]) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
gzclose(tar);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!bc || hy) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; dblist[i].ext; i++) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(dbfile, sizeof(dbfile), "%s.%s", dbname, dblist[i].ext);
|
|
|
|
if (!access(dbfile, R_OK)) {
|
|
|
|
if (tar_addfile(-1, tar, dbfile) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
gzclose(tar);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
gzclose(tar);
|
2010-02-01 19:26:05 +01:00
|
|
|
FREE_LS(dblist2);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* MD5 + dsig */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(fh = fopen(tarfile, "rb"))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't open file %s for reading\n", tarfile);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = cli_hashstream(fh, buffer, CLI_HASH_MD5))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't generate MD5 checksum for %s\n", tarfile);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-12-16 17:49:52 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check if the MD5 starts with 00. If it does, we'll return CL_ELAST_ERROR. The caller may try again for better luck.
|
|
|
|
// This is to avoid a bug in hash verification with ClamAV 1.1 -> 1.4. The bug was fixed in 1.5.0.
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Remove this workaround when no one is using those versions.
|
|
|
|
if (pt[0] == '0' && pt[1] == '0') {
|
|
|
|
// print out the pt hash
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "The tar.gz MD5 starts with 00, which will fail to verify in ClamAV 1.1 -> 1.4: %s\n", pt);
|
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
return CL_ELAST_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
rewind(fh);
|
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), "%s:", pt);
|
2004-09-01 14:14:21 +00:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!optget(opts, "unsigned")->enabled) {
|
2021-12-02 15:07:48 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = cli_getdsig(optget(opts, "server")->strarg, builder, buffer, 16, 1))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't get digital signature from remote server\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), "%s:", pt);
|
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
2011-05-10 21:29:49 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), "X:");
|
2003-10-20 00:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* add builder */
|
2006-06-28 13:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
strcat(header, builder);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* add current time */
|
2023-08-07 16:47:55 -07:00
|
|
|
sprintf(header + strlen(header), ":" STDu64, (uint64_t)timet);
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/* fill up with spaces */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (strlen(header) < sizeof(header) - 1)
|
|
|
|
strcat(header, " ");
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* build the final database */
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
newcvd = optget(opts, "build")->strarg;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(cvd = fopen(newcvd, "wb"))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't create final database %s\n", newcvd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fwrite(header, 1, 512, cvd) != 512) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't write to %s\n", newcvd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
fclose(cvd);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newcvd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((bytes = fread(buffer, 1, FILEBUFF, fh)) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (fwrite(buffer, 1, bytes, cvd) != bytes) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't write to %s\n", newcvd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
fclose(cvd);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newcvd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
fclose(cvd);
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (unlink(tarfile) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "build: Can't unlink %s\n", tarfile);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unlink(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newcvd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
free(tarfile);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Created %s\n", newcvd);
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!oldcvd || optget(opts, "no-cdiff")->enabled) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Skipping .cdiff creation\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-03-05 19:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/* generate patch */
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = createTempDir(opts))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(olddb, pt, true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't unpack CVD file %s\n", olddb);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, pt);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newcvd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strncpy(olddb, pt, sizeof(olddb));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
olddb[sizeof(olddb) - 1] = '\0';
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = createTempDir(opts))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(newcvd, pt, true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "build: Can't unpack CVD file %s\n", newcvd);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, pt);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
cli_rmdirs(olddb);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newcvd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-05 19:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
snprintf(patch, sizeof(patch), "%s-%u.script", dbname, version);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = diffdirs(olddb, pt, patch);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, pt);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
|
|
cli_rmdirs(olddb);
|
|
|
|
unlink(newcvd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = verifydiff(opts, patch, NULL, olddb);
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
cli_rmdirs(olddb);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(broken, sizeof(broken), "%s.broken", patch);
|
|
|
|
if (rename(patch, broken)) {
|
|
|
|
unlink(patch);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Generated file is incorrect, removed");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Generated file is incorrect, renamed to %s\n", broken);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "unsigned")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!script2cdiff(patch, builder, optget(opts, "server")->strarg)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
2006-10-14 21:12:04 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int unpack(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char name[512], *dbdir;
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
const char *localdbdir = NULL;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "datadir")->active)
|
|
|
|
localdbdir = optget(opts, "datadir")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "unpack-current")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
dbdir = freshdbdir();
|
|
|
|
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s" PATHSEP "%s.cvd", localdbdir ? localdbdir : dbdir, optget(opts, "unpack-current")->strarg);
|
|
|
|
if (access(name, R_OK)) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s" PATHSEP "%s.cld", localdbdir ? localdbdir : dbdir, optget(opts, "unpack-current")->strarg);
|
|
|
|
if (access(name, R_OK)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "unpack: Couldn't find %s CLD/CVD database in %s\n", optget(opts, "unpack-current")->strarg, localdbdir ? localdbdir : dbdir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dbdir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(dbdir);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
strncpy(name, optget(opts, "unpack")->strarg, sizeof(name));
|
|
|
|
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (cl_cvdverify_ex(name, g_cvdcertsdir) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "unpack: %s is not a valid CVD\n", name);
|
2014-10-06 19:03:24 -04:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(name, ".", true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "unpack: Can't unpack file %s\n", name);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-12-02 22:48:56 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int cvdinfo(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
struct cl_cvd *cvd;
|
|
|
|
char *pt;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pt = optget(opts, "info")->strarg;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((cvd = cl_cvdhead(pt)) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "cvdinfo: Can't read/parse CVD header of %s\n", pt);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "File: %s\n", pt);
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
pt = strchr(cvd->time, '-');
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!pt) {
|
2013-02-20 10:37:57 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_cvdfree(cvd);
|
2013-02-19 17:19:41 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
*pt = ':';
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Build time: %s\n", cvd->time);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Version: %u\n", cvd->version);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Signatures: %u\n", cvd->sigs);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Functionality level: %u\n", cvd->fl);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Builder: %s\n", cvd->builder);
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pt = optget(opts, "info")->strarg;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(pt, ".cvd")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "MD5: %s\n", cvd->md5);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Digital signature: %s\n", cvd->dsig);
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
cl_cvdfree(cvd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(pt, ".cud"))
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Verification: Unsigned container\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if ((ret = cl_cvdverify(pt))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "cvdinfo: Verification: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2011-09-27 16:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Verification OK.\n");
|
2011-09-27 16:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2003-09-29 11:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
static int listdb(const struct optstruct *opts, const char *filename, const regex_t *regex);
|
2003-10-20 00:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
static int listdir(const struct optstruct *opts, const char *dirname, const regex_t *regex)
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
DIR *dd;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dent;
|
|
|
|
char *dbfile;
|
2003-10-20 00:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(dirname)) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdir: Can't open directory %s\n", dirname);
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-10-20 00:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd))) {
|
|
|
|
if (dent->d_ino) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") && strcmp(dent->d_name, "..") &&
|
|
|
|
(cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".db") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".hdb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".hdu") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".hsb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".hsu") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".mdb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".mdu") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".msb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".msu") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".ndb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".ndu") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".ldb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".ldu") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".sdb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".zmd") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".rmd") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".cdb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".cbc") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".cld") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".cvd") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".crb") ||
|
|
|
|
cli_strbcasestr(dent->d_name, ".imp"))) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dbfile = (char *)malloc(strlen(dent->d_name) + strlen(dirname) + 2);
|
|
|
|
if (!dbfile) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdir: Can't allocate memory for dbfile\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sprintf(dbfile, "%s" PATHSEP "%s", dirname, dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (listdb(opts, dbfile, regex) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Error listing database %s\n", dbfile);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dbfile);
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(dbfile);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-12-02 22:48:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-10-20 00:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2003-10-31 02:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
static int listdb(const struct optstruct *opts, const char *filename, const regex_t *regex)
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FILE *fh;
|
|
|
|
char *buffer, *pt, *start, *dir;
|
|
|
|
const char *dbname, *pathsep = PATHSEP;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int line = 0;
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((fh = fopen(filename, "rb")) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Can't open file %s\n", filename);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-24 14:08:49 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!(buffer = (char *)malloc(CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE + 1))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Can't allocate memory for buffer\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check for CVD file */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!fgets(buffer, 12, fh)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: fgets failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rewind(fh);
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(buffer, "ClamAV-VDB:", 11)) {
|
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(dir = createTempDir(opts))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(filename, dir, true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Can't unpack CVD file %s\n", filename);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, dir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
/* list extracted directory */
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (listdir(opts, dir, regex) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Can't list directory %s\n", filename);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, dir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, dir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dir);
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(dbname = strrchr(filename, *pathsep))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Invalid filename %s\n", filename);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-09-15 19:01:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbname++;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".db")) { /* old style database */
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-24 14:08:49 -07:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(buffer, CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE, fh)) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (regex) {
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_regexec(regex, buffer, 0, NULL, 0))
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "[%s] %s\n", dbname, buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
line++;
|
2016-04-18 10:28:32 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (buffer && buffer[0] == '#')
|
2016-04-18 10:28:32 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
pt = strchr(buffer, '=');
|
|
|
|
if (!pt) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Malformed pattern line %u (file %s)\n", line, filename);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
start = buffer;
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((pt = strstr(start, " (Clam)")))
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", start);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-05 15:13:12 -05:00
|
|
|
} else if (cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".crb")) {
|
2021-06-24 14:08:49 -07:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(buffer, CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE, fh)) {
|
2013-03-05 15:13:12 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-05 15:13:12 -05:00
|
|
|
if (buffer[0] == '#')
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (regex) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cli_regexec(regex, buffer, 0, NULL, 0))
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "[%s] %s\n", dbname, buffer);
|
2013-03-05 15:13:12 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
line++;
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", buffer);
|
2013-03-05 15:13:12 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else if (cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".hdb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".hdu") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".mdb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".mdu") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".hsb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".hsu") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".msb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".msu") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".imp")) { /* hash database */
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-24 14:08:49 -07:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(buffer, CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE, fh)) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (regex) {
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_regexec(regex, buffer, 0, NULL, 0))
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "[%s] %s\n", dbname, buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
line++;
|
2016-04-18 10:28:32 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (buffer && buffer[0] == '#')
|
2016-04-18 10:28:32 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start = cli_strtok(buffer, 2, ":");
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!start) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Malformed pattern line %u (file %s)\n", line, filename);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((pt = strstr(start, " (Clam)")))
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
2004-08-31 18:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", start);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(start);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else if (cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".ndb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".ndu") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".ldb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".ldu") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".sdb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".zmd") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".rmd") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".cdb")) {
|
2004-09-17 23:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-24 14:08:49 -07:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(buffer, CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE, fh)) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (regex) {
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_regexec(regex, buffer, 0, NULL, 0))
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "[%s] %s\n", dbname, buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
line++;
|
2008-07-26 16:59:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (buffer && buffer[0] == '#')
|
2016-04-18 10:28:32 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".ldb") || cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".ldu"))
|
|
|
|
pt = strchr(buffer, ';');
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
pt = strchr(buffer, ':');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pt) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "listdb: Malformed pattern line %u (file %s)\n", line, filename);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((pt = strstr(buffer, " (Clam)")))
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (cli_strbcasestr(filename, ".cbc")) {
|
2021-06-24 14:08:49 -07:00
|
|
|
if (fgets(buffer, CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE, fh) && fgets(buffer, CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE, fh)) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
pt = strchr(buffer, ';');
|
|
|
|
if (!pt) { /* not a real sig */
|
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (regex) {
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_regexec(regex, buffer, 0, NULL, 0)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "[%s BYTECODE] %s", dbname, buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", buffer);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-16 10:12:17 +02:00
|
|
|
static int listsigs(const struct optstruct *opts, int mode)
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
const char *name;
|
|
|
|
char *dbdir;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
|
|
|
regex_t reg;
|
|
|
|
const char *localdbdir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "datadir")->active)
|
|
|
|
localdbdir = optget(opts, "datadir")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mode == 0) {
|
|
|
|
name = optget(opts, "list-sigs")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
if (access(name, R_OK) && localdbdir)
|
|
|
|
name = localdbdir;
|
|
|
|
if (CLAMSTAT(name, &sb) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "--list-sigs: Can't get status of %s\n", name);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mprintf_stdout = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, OPT_DATADIR)) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
dbdir = freshdbdir();
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = listdir(opts, localdbdir ? localdbdir : dbdir, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dbdir);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = listdir(opts, name, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = listdb(opts, name, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:12:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-01-26 14:15:04 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_regcomp(®, optget(opts, "find-sigs")->strarg, REG_EXTENDED | REG_NOSUB) != 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "--find-sigs: Can't compile regex\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mprintf_stdout = 1;
|
|
|
|
dbdir = freshdbdir();
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = listdir(opts, localdbdir ? localdbdir : dbdir, ®);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(dbdir);
|
|
|
|
cli_regfree(®);
|
2005-01-26 14:15:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
char *createTempDir(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
const struct optstruct *opt;
|
|
|
|
const char *tempdir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (opts && ((opt = optget(opts, "tempdir"))->enabled)) {
|
|
|
|
tempdir = opt->strarg;
|
2008-02-21 15:22:36 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
tempdir = cli_gettmpdir();
|
2008-02-21 15:22:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = (char *)cli_gentemp_with_prefix(tempdir, "sigtool");
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == ret) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't create temporary directory name.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (mkdir(ret, 0700)) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't create temporary directory for scan: %s.\n", tempdir);
|
|
|
|
free((char *)ret);
|
|
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool setTempDir(struct cl_engine *engine, const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool bRet = false;
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
const char *tempdir = createTempDir(opts);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == tempdir) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = cl_engine_set_str(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR, tempdir))) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "cli_engine_set_str(CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR) failed: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2009-08-31 07:07:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bRet = true;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (tempdir) {
|
|
|
|
free((char *)tempdir);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return bRet;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void scanfile(const char *filename, struct cl_engine *engine, const struct optstruct *opts, struct cl_scan_options *options)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
int fd = -1;
|
|
|
|
const char *virname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *real_filename = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long int blocks = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == filename || NULL == engine || NULL == opts || NULL == options) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_INFO, "scanfile: Invalid args.\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_realpath((const char *)filename, &real_filename);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != ret) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_DEBUG, "Failed to determine real filename of %s.\n", filename);
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_DEBUG, "Quarantine of the file may fail if file path contains symlinks.\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
filename = real_filename;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((fd = safe_open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY)) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_WARNING, "Can't open file %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (CL_CLEAN != cl_scandesc_callback(fd, filename, &virname, &blocks, engine, options, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Error parsing '%s'\n", filename);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != real_filename) {
|
|
|
|
free(real_filename);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vba_callback(const unsigned char *const metaString, const size_t metaStringLen, void *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(context);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == metaString) {
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < metaStringLen; i++) {
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
if ('\r' == metaString[i]) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
printf("%c", metaString[i]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-02-01 01:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
static int vbadump(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cl_scan_options options;
|
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *engine = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit rlim;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *filename = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-11-26 15:01:19 -08:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize scan options struct */
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
memset(&options, 0, sizeof(struct cl_scan_options));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = cl_init(CL_INIT_DEFAULT))) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't initialize libclamav: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
|
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(engine = cl_engine_new())) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't initialize antivirus engine\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_clcb_vba(engine, vba_callback);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!setTempDir(engine, opts)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = cl_engine_compile(engine)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Database initialization error: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
|
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (rlim.rlim_cur < (rlim_t)cl_engine_get_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_MAX_FILESIZE, NULL))
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_WARNING, "System limit for file size is lower than engine->maxfilesize\n");
|
|
|
|
if (rlim.rlim_cur < (rlim_t)cl_engine_get_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCANSIZE, NULL))
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_WARNING, "System limit for file size is lower than engine->maxscansize\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_WARNING, "Cannot obtain resource limits for file size\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
options.general |= CL_SCAN_GENERAL_COLLECT_METADATA;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Have the engine unpack everything so that we don't miss anything. We'll clean it up later.*/
|
|
|
|
options.parse = ~0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Need to explicitly set this to always keep temps, since we are scanning extracted ooxml/ole2 files
|
|
|
|
* from our scan directory to print all the vba content. Remove it later if leave-temps was not
|
|
|
|
* specified */
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_KEEPTMP, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
filename = optget(opts, "vba")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == filename) {
|
|
|
|
filename = optget(opts, "vba-hex")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scanfile(filename, engine, opts, &options);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, engine->tmpdir);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* free the engine */
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
|
|
|
static int comparesha(const char *diff)
|
2008-07-02 11:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char info[32], buff[FILEBUFF], *sha, *pt, *name;
|
|
|
|
const char *tokens[3];
|
|
|
|
FILE *fh;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0, tokens_count;
|
2008-07-02 11:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
|
|
|
name = strdup(diff);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: strdup() failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(pt = strrchr(name, '-')) || !isdigit(pt[1])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Invalid diff name\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(name);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((pt = strrchr(name, *PATHSEP)))
|
|
|
|
pt++;
|
2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
|
|
|
else
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
pt = name;
|
2008-07-02 11:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-16 15:54:12 +01:00
|
|
|
snprintf(info, sizeof(info), "%s.info", pt);
|
|
|
|
free(name);
|
2008-07-02 11:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(fh = fopen(info, "rb"))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Can't open %s\n", info);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), fh) || strncmp(buff, "ClamAV-VDB", 10)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Incorrect info file %s\n", info);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), fh)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buff);
|
|
|
|
tokens_count = cli_strtokenize(buff, ':', 3, tokens);
|
|
|
|
if (tokens_count != 3) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[0], "DSIG"))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Incorrect format of %s\n", info);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(sha = sha2_256_file(tokens[0], NULL))) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Can't generate SHA2-256 for %s\n", buff);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(sha, tokens[2])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: %s has incorrect checksum\n", buff);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
free(sha);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(sha);
|
2008-07-02 11:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fclose(fh);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int rundiff(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2006-06-15 13:57:42 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned short mode;
|
|
|
|
const char *diff;
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
FFIError *cdiff_apply_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
void *verifier = NULL;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *new_verifier_error = NULL;
|
2006-06-15 13:57:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
diff = optget(opts, "run-cdiff")->strarg;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (strstr(diff, ".cdiff")) {
|
|
|
|
mode = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strstr(diff, ".script")) {
|
|
|
|
mode = 0;
|
2006-10-14 21:12:04 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "rundiff: Incorrect file name (no .cdiff/.script extension)\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-10-14 21:12:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-15 13:57:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!codesign_verifier_new(g_cvdcertsdir, &verifier, &new_verifier_error)) {
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("rundiff: Failed to create a new code-signature verifier: %s\n", ffierror_fmt(new_verifier_error));
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-15 13:57:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cdiff_apply(
|
|
|
|
diff,
|
|
|
|
verifier,
|
|
|
|
mode,
|
|
|
|
&cdiff_apply_error)) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "rundiff: Error applying '%s': %s\n",
|
|
|
|
diff, ffierror_fmt(cdiff_apply_error));
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
// success. compare the SHA2-256 checksums of the files
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = comparesha(diff);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != verifier) {
|
|
|
|
codesign_verifier_free(verifier);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_verifier_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(new_verifier_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != cdiff_apply_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(cdiff_apply_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-02 11:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 13:57:42 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
static int maxlinelen(const char *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int fd, bytes, n = 0, nmax = 0, i;
|
|
|
|
char buff[512];
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-07 15:18:29 -08:00
|
|
|
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY)) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "maxlinelen: Can't open file %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while ((bytes = read(fd, buff, 512)) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++, ++n) {
|
|
|
|
if (buff[i] == '\n') {
|
|
|
|
if (n > nmax)
|
|
|
|
nmax = n;
|
|
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (bytes == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "maxlinelen: Can't read file %s\n", file);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-13 13:12:48 -08:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
2011-08-03 15:42:29 +02:00
|
|
|
return nmax + 1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
static int compare(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, FILE *diff)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FILE *old, *new;
|
|
|
|
char *obuff, *nbuff, *tbuff, *pt, *omd5, *nmd5;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int oline = 0, tline, found, i, badxchg = 0;
|
|
|
|
int l1 = 0, l2;
|
|
|
|
long opos;
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!access(oldpath, R_OK) && (omd5 = cli_hashfile(oldpath, NULL, CLI_HASH_MD5))) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(nmd5 = cli_hashfile(newpath, NULL, CLI_HASH_MD5))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "compare: Can't get MD5 checksum of %s\n", newpath);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(omd5);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(omd5, nmd5)) {
|
|
|
|
free(omd5);
|
|
|
|
free(nmd5);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(omd5);
|
|
|
|
free(nmd5);
|
|
|
|
l1 = maxlinelen(oldpath);
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
l2 = maxlinelen(newpath);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (l1 == -1 || l2 == -1)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
l1 = MAX(l1, l2) + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
obuff = malloc(l1);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!obuff) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "compare: Can't allocate memory for 'obuff'\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nbuff = malloc(l1);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!nbuff) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "compare: Can't allocate memory for 'nbuff'\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(obuff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbuff = malloc(l1);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!tbuff) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "compare: Can't allocate memory for 'tbuff'\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(obuff);
|
|
|
|
free(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (l1 > CLI_DEFAULT_LSIG_BUFSIZE)
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "#LSIZE %u\n", l1 + 32);
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "OPEN %s\n", newpath);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(new = fopen(newpath, "rb"))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "compare: Can't open file %s for reading\n", newpath);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(obuff);
|
|
|
|
free(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
free(tbuff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-10-27 21:02:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-11-12 18:17:05 +01:00
|
|
|
old = fopen(oldpath, "rb");
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(nbuff, l1, new)) {
|
|
|
|
i = strlen(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
if (i >= 2 && (nbuff[i - 1] == '\r' || (nbuff[i - 1] == '\n' && nbuff[i - 2] == '\r'))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "compare: New %s file contains lines terminated with CRLF or CR\n", newpath);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (old)
|
|
|
|
fclose(old);
|
|
|
|
fclose(new);
|
|
|
|
free(obuff);
|
|
|
|
free(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
free(tbuff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
if (!old) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "ADD %s\n", nbuff);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (fgets(obuff, l1, old)) {
|
|
|
|
oline++;
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(obuff);
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(nbuff, obuff)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tline = 0;
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
opos = ftell(old);
|
|
|
|
while (fgets(tbuff, l1, old)) {
|
|
|
|
tline++;
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(tbuff);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tline > MAX_DEL_LOOKAHEAD)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tbuff, nbuff)) {
|
|
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fseek(old, opos, SEEK_SET);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (found) {
|
|
|
|
strncpy(tbuff, obuff, l1);
|
|
|
|
tbuff[l1 - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tline; i++) {
|
|
|
|
tbuff[MIN(16, l1 - 1)] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((pt = strchr(tbuff, ' ')))
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "DEL %u %s\n", oline + i, tbuff);
|
|
|
|
if (!fgets(tbuff, l1, old))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oline += tline;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!*obuff || *obuff == ' ') {
|
|
|
|
badxchg = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
obuff[MIN(16, l1 - 1)] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((pt = strchr(obuff, ' ')))
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "XCHG %u %s %s\n", oline, obuff, nbuff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
fclose(old);
|
|
|
|
old = NULL;
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "ADD %s\n", nbuff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (old) {
|
|
|
|
if (!badxchg) {
|
|
|
|
while (fgets(obuff, l1, old)) {
|
|
|
|
oline++;
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(obuff);
|
|
|
|
obuff[MIN(16, l1 - 1)] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((pt = strchr(obuff, ' ')))
|
|
|
|
*pt = 0;
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "DEL %u %s\n", oline, obuff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fclose(old);
|
2006-07-18 10:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "CLOSE\n");
|
2010-07-19 18:50:38 +02:00
|
|
|
free(obuff);
|
|
|
|
free(tbuff);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (badxchg) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "UNLINK %s\n", newpath);
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "OPEN %s\n", newpath);
|
|
|
|
rewind(new);
|
|
|
|
while (fgets(nbuff, l1, new)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "ADD %s\n", nbuff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "CLOSE\n");
|
2011-01-10 18:57:11 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(nbuff);
|
|
|
|
fclose(new);
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-07 12:50:20 +02:00
|
|
|
static int compareone(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!opts->filename) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: --compare requires two arguments\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2011-12-07 12:50:20 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return compare(optget(opts, "compare")->strarg, opts->filename[0], stdout);
|
2011-12-07 12:50:20 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static int dircopy(const char *src, const char *dest)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
DIR *dd;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dent;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
|
|
|
char spath[512], dpath[512];
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CLAMSTAT(dest, &sb) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
if (mkdir(dest, 0755)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
/* mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dircopy: Can't create temporary directory %s\n", dest); */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(src)) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
/* mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dircopy: Can't open directory %s\n", src); */
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd))) {
|
|
|
|
if (dent->d_ino) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dent->d_name, ".."))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
snprintf(spath, sizeof(spath), "%s" PATHSEP "%s", src, dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(dpath, sizeof(dpath), "%s" PATHSEP "%s", dest, dent->d_name);
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (filecopy(spath, dpath) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
/* mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dircopy: Can't copy %s to %s\n", spath, dpath); */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_rmdirs(dest);
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-03 18:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
static int verifydiff(const struct optstruct *opts, const char *diff, const char *cvd, const char *incdir)
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
char *tempdir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char cwd[512];
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned short mode;
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
FFIError *cdiff_apply_error = NULL;
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *verifier = NULL;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *new_verifier_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool created_temp_dir = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t cl_ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *real_diff = NULL;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strstr(diff, ".cdiff")) {
|
|
|
|
mode = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strstr(diff, ".script")) {
|
|
|
|
mode = 0;
|
2006-10-14 21:12:04 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Incorrect file name (no .cdiff/.script extension)\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2006-10-14 21:12:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(tempdir = createTempDir(opts))) {
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
created_temp_dir = true;
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cvd) {
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(cvd, tempdir, true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Can't unpack CVD file %s\n", cvd);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (dircopy(incdir, tempdir) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Can't copy dir %s to %s\n", incdir, tempdir);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: getcwd() failed\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_ret = cli_realpath((const char *)diff, &real_diff);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_ret) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Failed to determine real filename of %s: %s\n", diff, cl_strerror(cl_ret));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
diff = real_diff;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (chdir(tempdir) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Can't chdir to %s\n", tempdir);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!codesign_verifier_new(g_cvdcertsdir, &verifier, &new_verifier_error)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("verifydiff: Failed to create a new code-signature verifier: %s\n", ffierror_fmt(new_verifier_error));
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cdiff_apply(
|
|
|
|
diff,
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
verifier,
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mode,
|
|
|
|
&cdiff_apply_error)) {
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "verifydiff: Can't apply %s: %s\n", diff, ffierror_fmt(cdiff_apply_error));
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (chdir(cwd) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "verifydiff: Can't chdir to %s\n", cwd);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-21 23:02:15 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = comparesha(diff);
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (chdir(cwd) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "verifydiff: Can't chdir to %s\n", cwd);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (0 == ret) {
|
|
|
|
if (cvd) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Verification: %s correctly applies to %s\n", diff, cvd);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Verification: %s correctly applies to the previous version\n", diff);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (created_temp_dir) {
|
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, tempdir);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != tempdir) {
|
|
|
|
free(tempdir);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != cdiff_apply_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(cdiff_apply_error);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != real_diff) {
|
|
|
|
free(real_diff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != verifier) {
|
|
|
|
codesign_verifier_free(verifier);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_verifier_error) {
|
|
|
|
ffierror_free(new_verifier_error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-21 16:24:24 -07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Match a given "signature" in the file fd and return the offset.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The "signature" may be a subsignature to include things like a PCRE special
|
|
|
|
* subsignature.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param sig
|
|
|
|
* @param offset
|
|
|
|
* @param fd
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void matchsig(char *sig, const char *offset, int fd)
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
struct cli_ac_result *acres = NULL, *res;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int matches = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *engine = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cli_ctx ctx = {0};
|
|
|
|
struct cl_scan_options options = {0};
|
|
|
|
cl_fmap_t *new_map = NULL;
|
2021-04-21 16:24:24 -07:00
|
|
|
struct cli_lsig_tdb tdb = {0};
|
2018-07-20 22:28:48 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "SUBSIG: %s\n", sig);
|
2014-09-11 12:27:52 -04:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Prepare file */
|
|
|
|
lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
|
|
|
|
FSTAT(fd, &sb);
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
new_map = fmap_new(fd, 0, sb.st_size, NULL, NULL);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_map) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* build engine */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(engine = cl_engine_new())) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "matchsig: Can't create new engine\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_AC_ONLY, 1);
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_initroots(engine, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "matchsig: cli_initroots() failed\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
PE, ELF, Mach-O: code cleanup
The header parsing / executable metadata collecting functions for the
PE, ELF, and Mach-O file types were using `int` for the return type.
Mostly they were returning 0 for success and -1, -2, -3, or -4 for
failure. But in some cases they were returning cl_error_t enum values
for failure. Regardless, the function using them was treating 0 as
success and non-zero as failure, which it stored as -1 ... every time.
This commit switches them all to use cl_error_t. I am continuing to
storeo the final result as 0 / -1 in the `peinfo` struct, but outside of
that everything has been made consistent.
While I was working on that, I got a tad side tracked. I noticed that
the target type isn't an enum, or even a set of #defines. So I made an
enum and then changed the code that uses target types to use the enum.
I also removed the `target` parameter from a number of functions that
don't actually use it at all. Some recursion was masking the fact that
it was an unused parameter which is why there was no warning about it.
2022-08-28 18:41:04 -07:00
|
|
|
if (readdb_parse_ldb_subsignature(engine->root[0], "test", sig, "*", NULL, 0, 0, 1, &tdb) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "matchsig: Can't parse signature\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cl_engine_compile(engine) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "matchsig: Can't compile engine\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-18 20:00:33 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.engine = engine;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.evidence = evidence_new();
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ctx.options = &options;
|
2018-07-20 22:28:48 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx.options->parse = ~0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.dconf = (struct cli_dconf *)engine->dconf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack_size = ctx.engine->max_recursion_level;
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack = calloc(sizeof(recursion_level_t), ctx.recursion_stack_size);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx.recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ctx was memset, so recursion_level starts at 0.
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].fmap = new_map;
|
2021-10-03 14:13:55 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].type = CL_TYPE_ANY; // ANY for the top level, because we don't yet know the type.
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].size = new_map->len;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.fmap = ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].fmap;
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
(void)cli_scan_fmap(&ctx, CL_TYPE_ANY, false, NULL, AC_SCAN_VIR, &acres);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
res = acres;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (res) {
|
|
|
|
matches++;
|
|
|
|
res = res->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (matches) {
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: check offsets automatically */
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "MATCH: ** YES%s ** (%u %s:", offset ? "/CHECK OFFSET" : "", matches, matches > 1 ? "matches at offsets" : "match at offset");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
res = acres;
|
|
|
|
while (res) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " %u", (unsigned int)res->offset);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
res = res->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, ")\n");
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "MATCH: ** NO **\n");
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (acres) {
|
|
|
|
res = acres;
|
|
|
|
acres = acres->next;
|
|
|
|
free(res);
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_map) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(new_map);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx.recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
free(ctx.recursion_stack);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx.evidence) {
|
|
|
|
evidence_free(ctx.evidence);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-10-26 13:19:40 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-25 17:23:33 +01:00
|
|
|
static char *decodehexstr(const char *hex, unsigned int *dlen)
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *str16;
|
|
|
|
char *decoded;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i, p = 0, wildcard = 0, len = strlen(hex) / 2;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
str16 = cli_hex2ui(hex);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!str16)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (str16[i] & CLI_MATCH_WILDCARD)
|
|
|
|
wildcard++;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-11-23 23:18:59 +01:00
|
|
|
decoded = calloc(len + 1 + wildcard * 32, sizeof(char));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!decoded) {
|
2013-02-13 14:02:12 -08:00
|
|
|
free(str16);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexstr: Can't allocate memory for decoded\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (str16[i] & CLI_MATCH_WILDCARD) {
|
|
|
|
switch (str16[i] & CLI_MATCH_WILDCARD) {
|
|
|
|
case CLI_MATCH_IGNORE:
|
|
|
|
p += sprintf(decoded + p, "{WILDCARD_IGNORE}");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case CLI_MATCH_NIBBLE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
p += sprintf(decoded + p, "{WILDCARD_NIBBLE_HIGH:0x%x}", str16[i] & 0x00f0);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case CLI_MATCH_NIBBLE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
p += sprintf(decoded + p, "{WILDCARD_NIBBLE_LOW:0x%x}", str16[i] & 0x000f);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexstr: Unknown wildcard (0x%x@%u)\n", str16[i] & CLI_MATCH_WILDCARD, i);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
free(str16);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
decoded[p] = str16[i];
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dlen)
|
|
|
|
*dlen = p;
|
2013-02-13 14:02:12 -08:00
|
|
|
free(str16);
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return decoded;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-22 18:09:50 -04:00
|
|
|
inline static char *get_paren_end(char *hexstr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *pt;
|
|
|
|
int level = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pt = hexstr;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (*pt != '\0') {
|
|
|
|
if (*pt == '(') {
|
|
|
|
level++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (*pt == ')') {
|
|
|
|
if (!level)
|
|
|
|
return pt;
|
|
|
|
level--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pt++;
|
2015-07-22 18:09:50 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
static char *decodehexspecial(const char *hex, unsigned int *dlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *pt, *start, *hexcpy, *decoded, *h, *e, *c, op, lop;
|
2019-02-27 00:47:38 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned int len = 0, hlen, negative;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int level;
|
|
|
|
char *buff;
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-13 14:41:54 -08:00
|
|
|
hexcpy = NULL;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
buff = NULL;
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hexcpy = strdup(hex);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!hexcpy) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: strdup(hex) failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pt = strchr(hexcpy, '(');
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!pt) {
|
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
return decodehexstr(hex, dlen);
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
buff = calloc(strlen(hex) + 512, sizeof(char));
|
|
|
|
if (!buff) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Can't allocate memory for buff\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
start = hexcpy;
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
negative = 0;
|
|
|
|
*pt++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!start) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Unexpected EOL\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pt >= hexcpy + 2) {
|
|
|
|
if (pt[-2] == '!') {
|
|
|
|
negative = 1;
|
|
|
|
pt[-2] = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(decoded = decodehexstr(start, &hlen))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed (1): %s\n", pt);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&buff[len], decoded, hlen);
|
|
|
|
len += hlen;
|
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(start = get_paren_end(pt))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Missing closing parenthesis\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*start++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!strlen(pt)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Empty block\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(pt, "B")) {
|
|
|
|
if (!*start) {
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{NOT_BOUNDARY_RIGHT}");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{BOUNDARY_RIGHT}");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if (pt - 1 == hexcpy) {
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{NOT_BOUNDARY_LEFT}");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{BOUNDARY_LEFT}");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(pt, "L")) {
|
|
|
|
if (!*start) {
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{NOT_LINE_MARKER_RIGHT}");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{LINE_MARKER_RIGHT}");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if (pt - 1 == hexcpy) {
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{NOT_LINE_MARKER_LEFT}");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{LINE_MARKER_LEFT}");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(pt, "W")) {
|
|
|
|
if (!*start) {
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{NOT_WORD_MARKER_RIGHT}");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{WORD_MARKER_RIGHT}");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if (pt - 1 == hexcpy) {
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{NOT_WORD_MARKER_LEFT}");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{WORD_MARKER_LEFT}");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!strlen(pt)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Empty block\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: analyze string alternative for typing */
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{EXCLUDING_STRING_ALTERNATIVE:");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{STRING_ALTERNATIVE:");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
level = 0;
|
|
|
|
h = e = pt;
|
|
|
|
op = '\0';
|
|
|
|
while ((level >= 0) && (e = strpbrk(h, "()|"))) {
|
|
|
|
lop = op;
|
|
|
|
op = *e;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*e++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (op != '(' && lop != ')' && !strlen(h)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Empty string alternative block\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
// mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "decodehexspecial: %s\n", h);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(c = cli_hex2str(h))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed (3): %s\n", h);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&buff[len], c, strlen(h) / 2);
|
|
|
|
len += strlen(h) / 2;
|
|
|
|
free(c);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
|
|
case '(':
|
|
|
|
level++;
|
|
|
|
negative = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (e >= pt + 2) {
|
|
|
|
if (e[-2] == '!') {
|
|
|
|
negative = 1;
|
|
|
|
e[-2] = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (negative)
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{EXCLUDING_STRING_ALTERNATIVE:");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += sprintf(buff + len, "{STRING_ALTERNATIVE:");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ')':
|
|
|
|
level--;
|
|
|
|
buff[len++] = '}';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case '|':
|
|
|
|
buff[len++] = '|';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
h = e;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(c = cli_hex2str(h))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed (4): %s\n", h);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&buff[len], c, strlen(h) / 2);
|
|
|
|
len += strlen(h) / 2;
|
|
|
|
free(c);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buff[len++] = '}';
|
|
|
|
if (level != 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodehexspecial: Invalid string alternative nesting\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while ((pt = strchr(start, '(')));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (start) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(decoded = decodehexstr(start, &hlen))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed (2)\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(buff);
|
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&buff[len], decoded, hlen);
|
|
|
|
len += hlen;
|
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (dlen)
|
|
|
|
*dlen = len;
|
2009-11-30 21:18:04 +01:00
|
|
|
return buff;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-23 23:18:59 +01:00
|
|
|
static int decodehex(const char *hexsig)
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *pt, *hexcpy, *start, *n, *decoded, *wild;
|
|
|
|
int asterisk = 0;
|
2022-03-24 16:11:50 -07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int i, j, hexlen, dlen, parts = 0;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int mindist = 0, maxdist = 0, error = 0;
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
ssize_t bytes_written;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hexlen = strlen(hexsig);
|
2014-09-11 12:27:52 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((wild = strchr(hexsig, '/'))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
/* ^offset:trigger-logic/regex/options$ */
|
|
|
|
char *trigger, *regex, *regex_end, *cflags;
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
size_t tlen = wild - hexsig, rlen = 0, clen;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check for trigger */
|
|
|
|
if (!tlen) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "pcre without logical trigger\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* locate end of regex for options start, locate options length */
|
|
|
|
if ((regex_end = strchr(wild + 1, '/')) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "missing regex expression terminator /\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-10-27 14:15:18 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* gotta make sure we treat escaped slashes */
|
2021-04-08 19:16:11 -07:00
|
|
|
for (i = tlen + 1; i < hexlen; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (hexsig[i] == '/' && hexsig[i - 1] != '\\') {
|
2020-10-27 14:15:18 -04:00
|
|
|
rlen = i - tlen - 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-08 19:16:11 -07:00
|
|
|
if (i == hexlen) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "missing regex expression terminator /\n");
|
2020-10-27 14:15:18 -04:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
clen = hexlen - tlen - rlen - 2; /* 2 from regex boundaries '/' */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the trigger statement */
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
trigger = calloc(tlen + 1, sizeof(char));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!trigger) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "cannot allocate memory for trigger string\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strncpy(trigger, hexsig, tlen);
|
|
|
|
trigger[tlen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the regex expression */
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
regex = calloc(rlen + 1, sizeof(char));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!regex) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "cannot allocate memory for regex expression\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(trigger);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strncpy(regex, hexsig + tlen + 1, rlen);
|
|
|
|
regex[rlen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the compile flags */
|
|
|
|
if (clen) {
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
cflags = calloc(clen + 1, sizeof(char));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cflags) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "cannot allocate memory for compile flags\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(trigger);
|
|
|
|
free(regex);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strncpy(cflags, hexsig + tlen + rlen + 2, clen);
|
|
|
|
cflags[clen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cflags = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* print components of regex subsig */
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> TRIGGER: %s\n", trigger);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> REGEX: %s\n", regex);
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> CFLAGS: %s\n", cflags != NULL ? cflags : "null");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(trigger);
|
|
|
|
free(regex);
|
|
|
|
if (cflags)
|
|
|
|
free(cflags);
|
2024-03-25 10:32:38 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(hexsig, '{') || strchr(hexsig, '[')) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(hexcpy = strdup(hexsig)))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hexlen; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (hexsig[i] == '{' || hexsig[i] == '[' || hexsig[i] == '*')
|
|
|
|
parts++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parts)
|
|
|
|
parts++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start = pt = hexcpy;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i <= parts; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (i != parts) {
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < strlen(start); j++) {
|
|
|
|
if (start[j] == '{' || start[j] == '[') {
|
|
|
|
asterisk = 0;
|
|
|
|
pt = start + j;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (start[j] == '*') {
|
|
|
|
asterisk = 1;
|
|
|
|
pt = start + j;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pt++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mindist && maxdist) {
|
|
|
|
if (mindist == maxdist)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "{WILDCARD_ANY_STRING(LENGTH==%u)}", mindist);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "{WILDCARD_ANY_STRING(LENGTH>=%u&&<=%u)}", mindist, maxdist);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else if (mindist)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "{WILDCARD_ANY_STRING(LENGTH>=%u)}", mindist);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (maxdist)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "{WILDCARD_ANY_STRING(LENGTH<=%u)}", maxdist);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(decoded = decodehexspecial(start, &dlen))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
bytes_written = write(1, decoded, dlen);
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_written != dlen) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "Failed to print all decoded bytes\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i == parts)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (asterisk)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "{WILDCARD_ANY_STRING}");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mindist = maxdist = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (asterisk) {
|
|
|
|
start = pt;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(start = strchr(pt, '}')) && !(start = strchr(pt, ']'))) {
|
|
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*start++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pt) {
|
|
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strchr(pt, '-')) {
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(pt) || (mindist = maxdist = atoi(pt)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if ((n = cli_strtok(pt, 0, "-"))) {
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(n) || (mindist = atoi(n)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
|
|
free(n);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(n);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((n = cli_strtok(pt, 1, "-"))) {
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(n) || (maxdist = atoi(n)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
|
|
free(n);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(n);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((n = cli_strtok(pt, 2, "-"))) { /* strict check */
|
|
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
|
|
free(n);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(hexcpy);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(hexsig, '*')) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hexlen; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (hexsig[i] == '*')
|
|
|
|
parts++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parts)
|
|
|
|
parts++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i <= parts; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if ((pt = cli_strtok(hexsig, i - 1, "*")) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't extract part %u of partial signature\n", i);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(decoded = decodehexspecial(pt, &dlen))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
bytes_written = write(1, decoded, dlen);
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_written != dlen) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "Failed to print all decoded bytes\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
|
|
|
if (i < parts)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "{WILDCARD_ANY_STRING}");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(pt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(decoded = decodehexspecial(hexsig, &dlen))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Decoding failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-04-07 19:51:04 -07:00
|
|
|
bytes_written = write(1, decoded, dlen);
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_written != dlen) {
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "Failed to print all decoded bytes\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(decoded);
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2009-11-23 23:18:59 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 17:30:14 -04:00
|
|
|
static int decodesigmod(const char *sigmod)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-02-27 00:47:38 -05:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < strlen(sigmod); i++) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (sigmod[i]) {
|
|
|
|
case 'i':
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "NOCASE");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'f':
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FULLWORD");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'w':
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "WIDE");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'a':
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ASCII");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "UNKNOWN");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-21 17:30:14 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2015-07-21 17:30:14 -04:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-29 13:00:15 -05:00
|
|
|
static int decodecdb(char **tokens)
|
2016-01-06 14:57:48 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-02-27 00:47:38 -05:00
|
|
|
int sz = 0;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *range[2];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tokens)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "VIRUS NAME: %s\n", tokens[0]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "CONTAINER TYPE: %s\n", (strcmp(tokens[1], "*") ? tokens[1] : "ANY"));
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "CONTAINER SIZE: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(tokens[2])) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[2], "*")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ANY\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(tokens[2], '-')) {
|
2020-05-07 14:12:17 -04:00
|
|
|
sz = cli_strtokenize(tokens[2], '-', 2, (const char **)range);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (sz != 2 || !cli_isnumber(range[0]) || !cli_isnumber(range[1])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid container size range\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "WITHIN RANGE %s to %s\n", range[0], range[1]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid container size\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", tokens[2]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILENAME REGEX: %s\n", tokens[3]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "COMPRESSED FILESIZE: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(tokens[4])) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[4], "*")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ANY\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(tokens[4], '-')) {
|
2020-05-07 14:12:17 -04:00
|
|
|
sz = cli_strtokenize(tokens[4], '-', 2, (const char **)range);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (sz != 2 || !cli_isnumber(range[0]) || !cli_isnumber(range[1])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid container size range\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "WITHIN RANGE %s to %s\n", range[0], range[1]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid compressed filesize\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", tokens[4]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "UNCOMPRESSED FILESIZE: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(tokens[5])) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[5], "*")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ANY\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(tokens[5], '-')) {
|
2020-05-07 14:12:17 -04:00
|
|
|
sz = cli_strtokenize(tokens[5], '-', 2, (const char **)range);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (sz != 2 || !cli_isnumber(range[0]) || !cli_isnumber(range[1])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid container size range\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "WITHIN RANGE %s to %s\n", range[0], range[1]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid uncompressed filesize\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", tokens[5]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ENCRYPTION: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(tokens[6])) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[6], "*")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "IGNORED\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid encryption flag\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", (atoi(tokens[6]) ? "YES" : "NO"));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE POSITION: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(tokens[7])) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[7], "*")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ANY\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(tokens[7], '-')) {
|
2020-05-07 14:12:17 -04:00
|
|
|
sz = cli_strtokenize(tokens[7], '-', 2, (const char **)range);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (sz != 2 || !cli_isnumber(range[0]) || !cli_isnumber(range[1])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid container size range\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "WITHIN RANGE %s to %s\n", range[0], range[1]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid file position\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "%s\n", tokens[7]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[1], "CL_TYPE_ZIP") || !strcmp(tokens[1], "CL_TYPE_RAR")) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(tokens[8], "*")) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "CRC SUM: ANY\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
errno = 0;
|
|
|
|
sz = (int)strtol(tokens[8], NULL, 16);
|
|
|
|
if (!sz && errno) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid cyclic redundancy check sum\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "CRC SUM: %d\n", sz);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-01-06 14:57:48 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-30 19:30:08 -04:00
|
|
|
static int decodeftm(char **tokens, int tokens_count)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE TYPE NAME: %s\n", tokens[3]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE SIGNATURE TYPE: %s\n", tokens[0]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE MAGIC OFFSET: %s\n", tokens[1]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE MAGIC HEX: %s\n", tokens[2]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE MAGIC DECODED:\n");
|
2016-03-30 19:30:08 -04:00
|
|
|
decodehex(tokens[2]);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE TYPE REQUIRED: %s\n", tokens[4]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FILE TYPE DETECTED: %s\n", tokens[5]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (tokens_count == 7)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FTM FLEVEL: >=%s\n", tokens[6]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (tokens_count == 8)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FTM FLEVEL: %s..%s\n", tokens[6], tokens[7]);
|
2016-03-30 19:30:08 -04:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
static int decodesig(char *sig, int fd)
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *pt;
|
|
|
|
char *tokens[68], *subtokens[4], *subhex;
|
|
|
|
int tokens_count, subtokens_count, subsigs, i, bc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*sig == '[') {
|
|
|
|
if (!(pt = strchr(sig, ']'))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid input\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sig = &pt[2];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strchr(sig, ';')) { /* lsig */
|
|
|
|
tokens_count = cli_ldbtokenize(sig, ';', 67 + 1, (const char **)tokens, 2);
|
|
|
|
if (tokens_count < 4) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid or not supported signature format\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "VIRUS NAME: %s\n", tokens[0]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (strlen(tokens[0]) && strstr(tokens[0], ".{") && tokens[0][strlen(tokens[0]) - 1] == '}')
|
|
|
|
bc = 1;
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "TDB: %s\n", tokens[1]);
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "LOGICAL EXPRESSION: %s\n", tokens[2]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
subsigs = cli_ac_chklsig(tokens[2], tokens[2] + strlen(tokens[2]), NULL, NULL, NULL, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (subsigs == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Broken logical expression\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subsigs++;
|
|
|
|
if (subsigs > 64) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Too many subsignatures\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!bc && subsigs != tokens_count - 3) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: The number of subsignatures (==%u) doesn't match the IDs in the logical expression (==%u)\n", tokens_count - 3, subsigs);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tokens_count - 3; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (i >= subsigs)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " * BYTECODE SUBSIG\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " * SUBSIG ID %d\n", i);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subtokens_count = cli_ldbtokenize(tokens[3 + i], ':', 4, (const char **)subtokens, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!subtokens_count) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid or not supported subsignature format\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((subtokens_count % 2) == 0)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> OFFSET: %s\n", subtokens[0]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> OFFSET: ANY\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (subtokens_count == 3) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> SIGMOD:");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
decodesigmod(subtokens[2]);
|
|
|
|
} else if (subtokens_count == 4) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> SIGMOD:");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
decodesigmod(subtokens[3]);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> SIGMOD: NONE\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subhex = (subtokens_count % 2) ? subtokens[0] : subtokens[1];
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> DECODED SUBSIGNATURE:\n");
|
2015-07-21 17:30:14 -04:00
|
|
|
decodehex(subhex);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " +-> ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
matchsig(subhex, subhex, fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (strchr(sig, ':')) { /* ndb or cdb or ftm*/
|
|
|
|
tokens_count = cli_strtokenize(sig, ':', 12 + 1, (const char **)tokens);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tokens_count > 9 && tokens_count < 13) { /* cdb*/
|
|
|
|
return decodecdb(tokens);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-06 14:57:48 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-30 19:30:08 -04:00
|
|
|
if (tokens_count > 5 && tokens_count < 9) { /* ftm */
|
|
|
|
long ftmsigtype;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *end;
|
2016-03-30 19:30:08 -04:00
|
|
|
ftmsigtype = strtol(tokens[0], &end, 10);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (end == tokens[0] + 1 && (ftmsigtype == 0 || ftmsigtype == 1 || ftmsigtype == 4))
|
2016-03-30 19:30:08 -04:00
|
|
|
return decodeftm(tokens, tokens_count);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (tokens_count < 4 || tokens_count > 6) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid or not supported signature format\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "TOKENS COUNT: %u\n", tokens_count);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "VIRUS NAME: %s\n", tokens[0]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (tokens_count == 5)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FUNCTIONALITY LEVEL: >=%s\n", tokens[4]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (tokens_count == 6)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FUNCTIONALITY LEVEL: %s..%s\n", tokens[4], tokens[5]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_isnumber(tokens[1])) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid target type\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "TARGET TYPE: ");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
switch (atoi(tokens[1])) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ANY FILE\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "PE\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "OLE2\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "HTML\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "MAIL\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 5:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "GRAPHICS\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 6:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "ELF\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 7:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "NORMALIZED ASCII TEXT\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "DISASM DATA\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 9:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "MACHO\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 10:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "PDF\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 11:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "FLASH\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 12:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "JAVA CLASS\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "decodesig: Invalid target type\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "OFFSET: %s\n", tokens[2]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (fd == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "DECODED SIGNATURE:\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
decodehex(tokens[3]);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
matchsig(tokens[3], strcmp(tokens[2], "*") ? tokens[2] : NULL, fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if ((pt = strchr(sig, '='))) {
|
|
|
|
*pt++ = 0;
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "VIRUS NAME: %s\n", sig);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (fd == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "DECODED SIGNATURE:\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
decodehex(pt);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
matchsig(pt, NULL, fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "decodesig: Not supported signature format\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-23 23:18:59 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int decodesigs(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char buffer[32769];
|
2009-11-23 23:18:59 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fflush(stdin);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), stdin)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (!strlen(buffer))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (decodesig(buffer, -1) == -1)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-11-23 23:18:59 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-11-19 17:58:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
static int testsigs(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char buffer[32769];
|
|
|
|
FILE *sigs;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0, fd;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!opts->filename) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "--test-sigs requires two arguments\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sigs = fopen(optget(opts, "test-sigs")->strarg, "rb");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!sigs) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "testsigs: Can't open file %s\n", optget(opts, "test-sigs")->strarg);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fd = open(opts->filename[0], O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "testsigs: Can't open file %s\n", optget(opts, "test-sigs")->strarg);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(sigs);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), sigs)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_chomp(buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (!strlen(buffer))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (decodesig(buffer, fd) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-09 23:32:34 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
fclose(sigs);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
static int diffdirs(const char *old, const char *new, const char *patch)
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FILE *diff;
|
|
|
|
DIR *dd;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dent;
|
|
|
|
char cwd[512], path[1024];
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "diffdirs: getcwd() failed\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-02-19 00:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(diff = fopen(patch, "wb"))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "diffdirs: Can't open %s for writing\n", patch);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (chdir(new) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "diffdirs: Can't chdir to %s\n", new);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(diff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(new)) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "diffdirs: Can't open directory %s\n", new);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(diff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd))) {
|
|
|
|
if (dent->d_ino) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dent->d_name, ".."))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s" PATHSEP "%s", old, dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
if (compare(path, dent->d_name, diff) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
if (chdir(cwd) == -1)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "diffdirs: Can't chdir to %s\n", cwd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(diff);
|
|
|
|
unlink(patch);
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-02 11:54:26 +00:00
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check for removed files */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(old)) == NULL) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "diffdirs: Can't open directory %s\n", old);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
fclose(diff);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-07-02 11:54:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd))) {
|
|
|
|
if (dent->d_ino) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dent->d_name, ".."))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2008-07-02 11:54:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s" PATHSEP "%s", new, dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
if (access(path, R_OK))
|
|
|
|
fprintf(diff, "UNLINK %s\n", dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-02 11:54:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fclose(diff);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Generated diff file %s\n", patch);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (chdir(cwd) == -1)
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "diffdirs: Can't chdir to %s\n", cwd);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int makediff(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
char *odir, *ndir, name[PATH_MAX], broken[PATH_MAX + 8], dbname[PATH_MAX];
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
struct cl_cvd *cvd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int oldver, newver;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!opts->filename) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: --diff requires two arguments\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(cvd = cl_cvdhead(opts->filename[0]))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: Can't read CVD header from %s\n", opts->filename[0]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newver = cvd->version;
|
2025-07-13 23:04:00 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_cvdfree(cvd);
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(cvd = cl_cvdhead(optget(opts, "diff")->strarg))) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: Can't read CVD header from %s\n", optget(opts, "diff")->strarg);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oldver = cvd->version;
|
2025-07-13 23:04:00 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_cvdfree(cvd);
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (oldver + 1 != newver) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: The old CVD must be %u\n", newver - 1);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(odir = createTempDir(opts))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(optget(opts, "diff")->strarg, odir, true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: Can't unpack CVD file %s\n", optget(opts, "diff")->strarg);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, odir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(odir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!(ndir = createTempDir(opts))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != cl_cvdunpack_ex(opts->filename[0], ndir, true, NULL)) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "makediff: Can't unpack CVD file %s\n", opts->filename[0]);
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, odir);
|
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, ndir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(odir);
|
|
|
|
free(ndir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-15 17:59:52 +01:00
|
|
|
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s-%u.script", getdbname(opts->filename[0], dbname, sizeof(dbname)), newver);
|
2006-07-27 12:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = diffdirs(odir, ndir, name);
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, odir);
|
|
|
|
removeTempDir(opts, ndir);
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
free(odir);
|
|
|
|
free(ndir);
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (ret == -1)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
if (verifydiff(opts, name, optget(opts, "diff")->strarg, NULL) == -1) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
snprintf(broken, sizeof(broken), "%s.broken", name);
|
|
|
|
if (rename(name, broken)) {
|
|
|
|
unlink(name);
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Generated file is incorrect, removed");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Generated file is incorrect, renamed to %s\n", broken);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 22:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
static int dumpcerts(const struct optstruct *opts)
|
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
int status = -1;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
char *filename = NULL;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *engine = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cli_ctx ctx = {0};
|
|
|
|
struct cl_scan_options options = {0};
|
|
|
|
int fd = -1;
|
|
|
|
cl_fmap_t *new_map = NULL;
|
2018-09-14 14:39:47 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
logg_file = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
filename = optget(opts, "print-certs")->strarg;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!filename) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: No filename!\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare file */
|
|
|
|
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: Can't open file %s!\n", filename);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
|
|
|
|
FSTAT(fd, &sb);
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
new_map = fmap_new(fd, 0, sb.st_size, filename, filename);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_map) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: Can't create fmap for open file\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* build engine */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(engine = cl_engine_new())) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: Can't create new engine\n");
|
2021-10-26 13:19:40 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_AC_ONLY, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_initroots(engine, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: cli_initroots() failed\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
PE, ELF, Mach-O: code cleanup
The header parsing / executable metadata collecting functions for the
PE, ELF, and Mach-O file types were using `int` for the return type.
Mostly they were returning 0 for success and -1, -2, -3, or -4 for
failure. But in some cases they were returning cl_error_t enum values
for failure. Regardless, the function using them was treating 0 as
success and non-zero as failure, which it stored as -1 ... every time.
This commit switches them all to use cl_error_t. I am continuing to
storeo the final result as 0 / -1 in the `peinfo` struct, but outside of
that everything has been made consistent.
While I was working on that, I got a tad side tracked. I noticed that
the target type isn't an enum, or even a set of #defines. So I made an
enum and then changed the code that uses target types to use the enum.
I also removed the `target` parameter from a number of functions that
don't actually use it at all. Some recursion was masking the fact that
it was an unused parameter which is why there was no warning about it.
2022-08-28 18:41:04 -07:00
|
|
|
if (cli_add_content_match_pattern(engine->root[0], "test", "deadbeef", 0, 0, 0, "*", NULL, 0) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: Can't parse signature\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cl_engine_compile(engine) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: Can't compile engine\n");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-16 15:42:35 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_PE_DUMPCERTS, 1);
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_debug();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* prepare context */
|
2022-08-18 20:00:33 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.engine = engine;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.evidence = evidence_new();
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ctx.options = &options;
|
2018-07-20 22:28:48 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx.options->parse = ~0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.dconf = (struct cli_dconf *)engine->dconf;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack_size = ctx.engine->max_recursion_level;
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack = calloc(sizeof(recursion_level_t), ctx.recursion_stack_size);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx.recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
// ctx was memset, so recursion_level starts at 0.
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].fmap = new_map;
|
2021-10-03 14:13:55 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].type = CL_TYPE_ANY; // ANY for the top level, because we don't yet know the type.
|
|
|
|
ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].size = new_map->len;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.fmap = ctx.recursion_stack[ctx.recursion_level].fmap;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-18 16:04:46 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = cli_check_auth_header(&ctx, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
2019-02-12 15:10:04 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_VERIFIED:
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_VIRUS:
|
2019-02-12 15:10:04 -05:00
|
|
|
// These shouldn't happen, since sigtool doesn't load in any sigs
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-02-04 18:48:22 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EVERIFY:
|
2019-02-12 15:10:04 -05:00
|
|
|
// The Authenticode header was parsed successfully but there were
|
2021-05-27 13:15:52 -07:00
|
|
|
// no applicable trust/block rules
|
2019-02-12 15:10:04 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_BREAK:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_DEBUG, "dumpcerts: No Authenticode signature detected\n");
|
2019-02-04 18:48:22 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EFORMAT:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: An error occurred when parsing the file\n");
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "dumpcerts: Other error %d inside cli_check_auth_header.\n", ret);
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Cleanup */
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != new_map) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
fmap_free(new_map);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx.recursion_stack) {
|
|
|
|
free(ctx.recursion_stack);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != ctx.evidence) {
|
|
|
|
evidence_free(ctx.evidence);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-10-26 13:19:40 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │  └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │  └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
|   └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_engine_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (-1 != fd) {
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
2013-03-07 19:37:37 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-03-05 22:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static void help(void)
|
2004-02-01 01:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Clam AntiVirus: Signature Tool %s\n", get_version());
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " By The ClamAV Team: https://www.clamav.net/about.html#credits\n");
|
2025-02-14 10:24:30 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " (C) 2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " sigtool [options]\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --help -h Show this help\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --version -V Print version number and exit\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --quiet Be quiet, output only error messages\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --debug Enable debug messages\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --stdout Write to stdout instead of stderr. Does not affect 'debug' messages.\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --tempdir=DIRECTORY Create temporary files in DIRECTORY\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --leave-temps[=yes/no(*)] Do not remove temporary files\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --datadir=DIR Use DIR as default database directory\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Commands for working with signatures:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --list-sigs[=FILE] -l[FILE] List signature names\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --find-sigs=REGEX -fREGEX Find signatures matching REGEX\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --decode-sigs Decode signatures from stdin\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --test-sigs=DATABASE TARGET_FILE Test signatures from DATABASE against \n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " TARGET_FILE\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Commands to generate signatures:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --md5 [FILES] Generate MD5 hash from stdin\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " or MD5 sigs for FILES\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --sha1 [FILES] Generate SHA1 hash from stdin\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " or SHA1 sigs for FILES\n");
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --sha2-256 [FILES] Generate SHA2-256 hash from stdin\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " or SHA2-256 sigs for FILES\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --mdb [FILES] Generate .mdb (section hash) sigs\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --imp [FILES] Generate .imp (import table hash) sigs\n");
|
2022-03-24 16:11:50 -07:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --fuzzy-img FILE(S) Generate image fuzzy hash for each file\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Commands to normalize files, so you can write more generic signatures:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --html-normalise=FILE Create normalised parts of HTML file\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --ascii-normalise=FILE Create normalised text file from ascii source\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --utf16-decode=FILE Decode UTF16 encoded files\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Assorted commands to aid file analysis:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --vba=FILE Extract VBA/Word6 macro code\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --vba-hex=FILE Extract Word6 macro code with hex values\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --print-certs=FILE Print Authenticode details from a PE\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --hex-dump Convert data from stdin to a hex\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " string and print it on stdout\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Commands for working with CVD signature database archives:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --info=FILE -i FILE Print CVD database archive information\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --build=NAME [cvd] -b NAME Build a CVD file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " The following options augment --build.\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --max-bad-sigs=NUMBER Maximum number of mismatched signatures\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " When building a CVD. Default: 3000\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --flevel=FLEVEL Specify a custom flevel.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Default: %u\n", cl_retflevel());
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --cvd-version=NUMBER Specify the version number to use for\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " the build. Default is to use the value+1\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " from the current CVD in --datadir.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " If no datafile is found the default\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " behaviour is to prompt for a version\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " number, this switch will prevent the\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " prompt. NOTE: If a CVD is found in the\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --datadir its version+1 is used and\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " this value is ignored.\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --no-cdiff Don't generate .cdiff file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " If not specified, --build will try to\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " create a cdiff by comparing with the\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " current CVD in --datadir\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " If no datafile is found the default\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " behaviour is to skip making a CDIFF.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --hybrid Create a hybrid (standard and bytecode)\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " database file\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --unsigned Create unsigned database file (.cud)\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --server=ADDR ClamAV Signing Service address\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --unpack=FILE -u FILE Unpack a CVD/CLD file\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --unpack-current=SHORTNAME Unpack local CVD/CLD into cwd\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Commands for working with CDIFF patch files:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --diff=OLD NEW -d OLD NEW Create diff for OLD and NEW CVDs\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --compare=OLD NEW -c OLD NEW Show diff between OLD and NEW files in\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " cdiff format\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --run-cdiff=FILE -r FILE Execute update script FILE in cwd\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --verify-cdiff=DIFF CVD/CLD Verify DIFF against CVD/CLD\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Commands creating and verifying .sign detached digital signatures:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --sign FILE Sign a file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " The resulting .sign file name will\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " be in the form: dbname-version.cvd.sign\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " or FILE.sign for non-CVD targets.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " It will be created next to the target file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " If a .sign file already exists, then the\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " new signature will be appended to file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --key /path/to/private.key Specify a signing key.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --cert /path/to/private.key Specify a signing cert.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " May be used more than once to add\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " intermediate and root certificates.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --append Use to add a signature line to an existing .sign file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " Otherwise an existing .sign file will be overwritten.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --verify FILE Find and verify a detached digital\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " signature for the given file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " The digital signature file name must\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " be in the form: dbname-version.cvd.sign\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " or FILE.sign for non-CVD targets.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " It must be found next to the target file.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " --cvdcertsdir DIRECTORY Specify a directory containing the root\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " CA cert needed to verify the signature.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " If not provided, then sigtool will look in the default directory.n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "Environment Variables:\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " SIGNDUSER The username to authenticate with the signing server when building a\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " signed CVD database.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " SIGNDPASS The password to authenticate with the signing server when building a\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " signed CVD database.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " CVD_CERTS_DIR Specify a directory containing the root CA cert needed\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " to verify detached CVD digital signatures.\n");
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, " If not provided, then sigtool will look in the default directory.\n");
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "\n");
|
2004-02-01 01:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
struct optstruct *opts;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF sb;
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
const char *cvdcertsdir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF statbuf;
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-25 22:42:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (check_flevel())
|
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
2010-05-10 17:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = cl_init(CL_INIT_DEFAULT)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't initialize libclamav: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2010-06-10 12:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-04-12 22:49:17 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Rust logging initialization */
|
|
|
|
if (!clrs_log_init()) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Unexpected problem occurred while setting up rust logging... continuing without rust logging. \
|
|
|
|
Please submit an issue to https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
opts = optparse(NULL, argc, argv, 1, OPT_SIGTOOL, 0, NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!opts) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "Can't parse command line options\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "quiet")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
mprintf_quiet = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "stdout")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
mprintf_stdout = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "debug")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
cl_debug();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "version")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
print_version(NULL);
|
|
|
|
optfree(opts);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "help")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
optfree(opts);
|
|
|
|
help();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
// Evaluate the absolute path for cvdcertsdir in case we change directories later.
|
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir = optget(opts, "cvdcertsdir")->strarg;
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == cvdcertsdir) {
|
|
|
|
// If not set, check the environment variable.
|
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir = getenv("CVD_CERTS_DIR");
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == cvdcertsdir) {
|
|
|
|
// If not set, use the default path.
|
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir = OPT_CERTSDIR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Command line option must override the engine defaults
|
|
|
|
// (which would've used the env var or hardcoded path)
|
|
|
|
if (LSTAT(cvdcertsdir, &statbuf) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"ClamAV CA certificates directory is missing: %s"
|
|
|
|
" - It should have been provided as a part of installation.\n",
|
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Convert certs dir to real path.
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_realpath((const char *)cvdcertsdir, &g_cvdcertsdir);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != ret) {
|
|
|
|
logg(LOGG_ERROR, "Failed to determine absolute path of '%s' for the CVD certs directory.\n", cvdcertsdir);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (optget(opts, "hex-dump")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = hexdump();
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "md5")->enabled)
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = hashsig(opts, 0, CLI_HASH_MD5);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "sha1")->enabled)
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = hashsig(opts, 0, CLI_HASH_SHA1);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "sha2-256")->enabled || optget(opts, "sha256")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = hashsig(opts, 0, CLI_HASH_SHA2_256);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "mdb")->enabled)
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = hashsig(opts, 1, CLI_HASH_MD5);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "imp")->enabled)
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = hashsig(opts, 2, CLI_HASH_MD5);
|
2022-03-24 16:11:50 -07:00
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "fuzzy-img")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = fuzzy_img(opts);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "html-normalise")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = htmlnorm(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "ascii-normalise")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = asciinorm(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "utf16-decode")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = utf16decode(opts);
|
2024-12-16 17:49:52 -05:00
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "build")->enabled) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = build(opts);
|
2024-12-16 17:49:52 -05:00
|
|
|
if (ret == CL_ELAST_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
// build() returns CL_ELAST_ERROR the hash starts with 00. This will fail to verify with ClamAV 1.1 -> 1.4.
|
|
|
|
// Retry the build again to get new hashes.
|
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_WARNING, "Retrying the build for a chance at a better hash.\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = build(opts);
|
|
|
|
}
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
} else if (optget(opts, "sign")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = sign(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "verify")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = verify(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "unpack")->enabled)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = unpack(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "unpack-current")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = unpack(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "info")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = cvdinfo(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "list-sigs")->active)
|
|
|
|
ret = listsigs(opts, 0);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "find-sigs")->active)
|
|
|
|
ret = listsigs(opts, 1);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "decode-sigs")->active)
|
|
|
|
ret = decodesigs();
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "test-sigs")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = testsigs(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "vba")->enabled || optget(opts, "vba-hex")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = vbadump(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "diff")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = makediff(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "compare")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = compareone(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "print-certs")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = dumpcerts(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "run-cdiff")->enabled)
|
|
|
|
ret = rundiff(opts);
|
|
|
|
else if (optget(opts, "verify-cdiff")->enabled) {
|
|
|
|
if (!opts->filename) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_ERROR, "--verify-cdiff requires two arguments\n");
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (CLAMSTAT(opts->filename[0], &sb) == -1) {
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
mprintf(LOGG_INFO, "--verify-cdiff: Can't get status of %s\n", opts->filename[0]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = verifydiff(opts, optget(opts, "verify-cdiff")->strarg, NULL, opts->filename[0]);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
else
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = verifydiff(opts, optget(opts, "verify-cdiff")->strarg, opts->filename[0], NULL);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-18 15:59:29 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
help();
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-02 11:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
optfree(opts);
|
2019-03-26 15:09:52 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-15 11:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret ? 1 : 0;
|
2004-01-21 08:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|