2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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/*
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2025-02-14 10:24:30 -05:00
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* Copyright (C) 2013-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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2019-01-25 10:15:50 -05:00
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* Copyright (C) 2007-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.
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2008-02-08 17:50:44 +00:00
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*
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2008-04-02 15:24:51 +00:00
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* Authors: Tomasz Kojm, Trog
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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2007-03-31 20:31:04 +00:00
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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2006-04-09 19:59:28 +00:00
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
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* MA 02110-1301, USA.
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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*
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*/
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2004-02-06 13:46:08 +00:00
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#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include "clamav-config.h"
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
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#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <unistd.h>
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2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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2009-09-24 16:21:51 +02:00
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#include <dirent.h>
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libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
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#include <stdbool.h>
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2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
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#ifndef _WIN32
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <time.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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2009-09-24 16:21:51 +02:00
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#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <pwd.h>
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2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include <errno.h>
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2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
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#include "target.h"
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2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
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2004-11-13 14:47:20 +00:00
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#include <sys/param.h>
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2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
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#endif
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2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
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#ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_H
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2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
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#include <malloc.h>
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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2013-10-25 10:17:22 -04:00
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#ifdef CL_THREAD_SAFE
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#include <pthread.h>
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#endif
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2014-02-07 12:22:44 -05:00
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#include <libxml/parser.h>
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Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
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#ifndef _WIN32
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#include <dlfcn.h>
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#endif
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2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
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#include "clamav.h"
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#include "others.h"
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2008-07-18 17:57:27 +00:00
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#include "regex/regex.h"
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2008-11-13 19:06:42 +00:00
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#include "matcher-ac.h"
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2015-08-21 12:43:26 -04:00
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#include "matcher-pcre.h"
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2008-12-29 17:55:30 +00:00
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#include "default.h"
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2009-07-14 18:57:03 +02:00
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#include "scanners.h"
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2009-09-07 18:01:43 +03:00
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#include "bytecode.h"
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2010-10-18 14:32:15 +03:00
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#include "bytecode_api_impl.h"
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2013-11-27 14:23:03 +00:00
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#include "cache.h"
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2015-06-01 14:32:04 -04:00
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#include "readdb.h"
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2013-10-25 10:17:22 -04:00
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#include "stats.h"
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libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
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#include "json_api.h"
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
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#include "mpool.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
#include "libgen.h"
|
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|
#endif
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-07 13:44:03 -07:00
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#include "clamav_rust.h"
|
2021-10-18 14:56:09 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
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|
cl_unrar_error_t (*cli_unrar_open)(const char *filename, void **hArchive, char **comment, uint32_t *comment_size, uint8_t debug_flag);
|
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|
cl_unrar_error_t (*cli_unrar_peek_file_header)(void *hArchive, unrar_metadata_t *file_metadata);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
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cl_unrar_error_t (*cli_unrar_extract_file)(void *hArchive, const char *destPath, char *outputBuffer);
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
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cl_unrar_error_t (*cli_unrar_skip_file)(void *hArchive);
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void (*cli_unrar_close)(void *hArchive);
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2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
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int have_rar = 0;
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2018-02-21 15:00:59 -05:00
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static int is_rar_inited = 0;
|
2008-11-13 02:11:21 +00:00
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Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
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#define PASTE2(a, b) a #b
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|
#define PASTE(a, b) PASTE2(a, b)
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-08 12:03:54 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
static void *load_module(const char *name, const char *featurename)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
HMODULE rhandle = NULL;
|
2024-07-24 11:39:11 -04:00
|
|
|
char modulename[512];
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
CMake: Add CTest support to match Autotools checks
An ENABLE_TESTS CMake option is provided so that users can disable
testing if they don't want it. Instructions for how to use this
included in the INSTALL.cmake.md file.
If you run `ctest`, each testcase will write out a log file to the
<build>/unit_tests directory.
As with Autotools' make check, the test files are from test/.split
and unit_tests/.split files, but for CMake these are generated at
build time instead of at test time.
On Posix systems, sets the LD_LIBRARY_PATH so that ClamAV-compiled
libraries can be loaded when running tests.
On Windows systems, CTest will identify and collect all library
dependencies and assemble a temporarily install under the
build/unit_tests directory so that the libraries can be loaded when
running tests.
The same feature is used on Windows when using CMake to install to
collect all DLL dependencies so that users don't have to install them
manually afterwards.
Each of the CTest tests are run using a custom wrapper around Python's
unittest framework, which is also responsible for finding and inserting
valgrind into the valgrind tests on Posix systems.
Unlike with Autotools, the CMake CTest Valgrind-tests are enabled by
default, if Valgrind can be found. There's no need to set VG=1.
CTest's memcheck module is NOT supported, because we use Python to
orchestrate our tests.
Added a bunch of Windows compatibility changes to the unit tests.
These were primarily changing / to PATHSEP and making adjustments
to use Win32 C headers and ifdef out the POSIX ones which aren't
available on Windows. Also disabled a bunch of tests on Win32
that don't work on Windows, notably the mmap ones and FD-passing
(i.e. FILEDES) ones.
Add JSON_C_HAVE_INTTYPES_H definition to clamav-config.h to eliminate
warnings on Windows where json.h is included after inttypes.h because
json-c's inttypes replacement relies on it.
This is a it of a hack and may be removed if json-c fixes their
inttypes header stuff in the future.
Add preprocessor definitions on Windows to disable MSVC warnings about
CRT secure and nonstandard functions. While there may be a better
solution, this is needed to be able to see other more serious warnings.
Add missing file comment block and copyright statement for clamsubmit.c.
Also change json-c/json.h include filename to json.h in clamsubmit.c.
The directory name is not required.
Changed the hash table data integer type from long, which is poorly
defined, to size_t -- which is capable of storing a pointer. Fixed a
bunch of casts regarding this variable to eliminate warnings.
Fixed two bugs causing utf8 encoding unit tests to fail on Windows:
- The in_size variable should be the number of bytes, not the character
count. This was was causing the SHIFT_JIS (japanese codepage) to UTF8
transcoding test to only transcode half the bytes.
- It turns out that the MultiByteToWideChar() API can't transcode
UTF16-BE to UTF16-LE. The solution is to just iterate over the buffer
and flip the bytes on each uint16_t. This but was causing the UTF16-BE
to UTF8 tests to fail.
I also split up the utf8 transcoding tests into separate tests so I
could see all of the failures instead of just the first one.
Added a flags parameter to the unit test function to open testfiles
because it turns out that on Windows if a file contains the \r\n it will
replace it with just \n if you opened the file as a text file instead of
as binary. However, if we open the CBC files as binary, then a bunch of
bytecode tests fail. So I've changed the tests to open the CBC files in
the bytecode tests as text files and open all other files as binary.
Ported the feature tests from shell scripts to Python using a modified
version of our QA test-framework, which is largely compatible and will
allow us to migrate some QA tests into this repo. I'd like to add GitHub
Actions pipelines in the future so that all public PR's get some testing
before anyone has to manually review them.
The clamd --log option was missing from the help string, though it
definitely works. I've added it in this commit.
It appears that clamd.c was never clang-format'd, so this commit also
reformats clamd.c.
Some of the check_clamd tests expected the path returned by clamd to
match character for character with original path sent to clamd. However,
as we now evaluate real paths before a scan, the path returned by clamd
isn't going to match the relative (and possibly symlink-ridden) path
passed to clamdscan. I fixed this test by changing the test to search
for the basename: <signature> FOUND within the response instead of
matching the exact path.
Autotools: Link check_clamd with libclamav so we can use our utility
functions in check_clamd.c.
2020-08-25 23:14:23 -07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
* For Windows, just try a standard LoadLibraryA() with each of the different possible suffixes.
|
CMake: Add CTest support to match Autotools checks
An ENABLE_TESTS CMake option is provided so that users can disable
testing if they don't want it. Instructions for how to use this
included in the INSTALL.cmake.md file.
If you run `ctest`, each testcase will write out a log file to the
<build>/unit_tests directory.
As with Autotools' make check, the test files are from test/.split
and unit_tests/.split files, but for CMake these are generated at
build time instead of at test time.
On Posix systems, sets the LD_LIBRARY_PATH so that ClamAV-compiled
libraries can be loaded when running tests.
On Windows systems, CTest will identify and collect all library
dependencies and assemble a temporarily install under the
build/unit_tests directory so that the libraries can be loaded when
running tests.
The same feature is used on Windows when using CMake to install to
collect all DLL dependencies so that users don't have to install them
manually afterwards.
Each of the CTest tests are run using a custom wrapper around Python's
unittest framework, which is also responsible for finding and inserting
valgrind into the valgrind tests on Posix systems.
Unlike with Autotools, the CMake CTest Valgrind-tests are enabled by
default, if Valgrind can be found. There's no need to set VG=1.
CTest's memcheck module is NOT supported, because we use Python to
orchestrate our tests.
Added a bunch of Windows compatibility changes to the unit tests.
These were primarily changing / to PATHSEP and making adjustments
to use Win32 C headers and ifdef out the POSIX ones which aren't
available on Windows. Also disabled a bunch of tests on Win32
that don't work on Windows, notably the mmap ones and FD-passing
(i.e. FILEDES) ones.
Add JSON_C_HAVE_INTTYPES_H definition to clamav-config.h to eliminate
warnings on Windows where json.h is included after inttypes.h because
json-c's inttypes replacement relies on it.
This is a it of a hack and may be removed if json-c fixes their
inttypes header stuff in the future.
Add preprocessor definitions on Windows to disable MSVC warnings about
CRT secure and nonstandard functions. While there may be a better
solution, this is needed to be able to see other more serious warnings.
Add missing file comment block and copyright statement for clamsubmit.c.
Also change json-c/json.h include filename to json.h in clamsubmit.c.
The directory name is not required.
Changed the hash table data integer type from long, which is poorly
defined, to size_t -- which is capable of storing a pointer. Fixed a
bunch of casts regarding this variable to eliminate warnings.
Fixed two bugs causing utf8 encoding unit tests to fail on Windows:
- The in_size variable should be the number of bytes, not the character
count. This was was causing the SHIFT_JIS (japanese codepage) to UTF8
transcoding test to only transcode half the bytes.
- It turns out that the MultiByteToWideChar() API can't transcode
UTF16-BE to UTF16-LE. The solution is to just iterate over the buffer
and flip the bytes on each uint16_t. This but was causing the UTF16-BE
to UTF8 tests to fail.
I also split up the utf8 transcoding tests into separate tests so I
could see all of the failures instead of just the first one.
Added a flags parameter to the unit test function to open testfiles
because it turns out that on Windows if a file contains the \r\n it will
replace it with just \n if you opened the file as a text file instead of
as binary. However, if we open the CBC files as binary, then a bunch of
bytecode tests fail. So I've changed the tests to open the CBC files in
the bytecode tests as text files and open all other files as binary.
Ported the feature tests from shell scripts to Python using a modified
version of our QA test-framework, which is largely compatible and will
allow us to migrate some QA tests into this repo. I'd like to add GitHub
Actions pipelines in the future so that all public PR's get some testing
before anyone has to manually review them.
The clamd --log option was missing from the help string, though it
definitely works. I've added it in this commit.
It appears that clamd.c was never clang-format'd, so this commit also
reformats clamd.c.
Some of the check_clamd tests expected the path returned by clamd to
match character for character with original path sent to clamd. However,
as we now evaluate real paths before a scan, the path returned by clamd
isn't going to match the relative (and possibly symlink-ridden) path
passed to clamdscan. I fixed this test by changing the test to search
for the basename: <signature> FOUND within the response instead of
matching the exact path.
Autotools: Link check_clamd with libclamav so we can use our utility
functions in check_clamd.c.
2020-08-25 23:14:23 -07:00
|
|
|
* For more information on the DLL search order, see:
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order
|
CMake: Add CTest support to match Autotools checks
An ENABLE_TESTS CMake option is provided so that users can disable
testing if they don't want it. Instructions for how to use this
included in the INSTALL.cmake.md file.
If you run `ctest`, each testcase will write out a log file to the
<build>/unit_tests directory.
As with Autotools' make check, the test files are from test/.split
and unit_tests/.split files, but for CMake these are generated at
build time instead of at test time.
On Posix systems, sets the LD_LIBRARY_PATH so that ClamAV-compiled
libraries can be loaded when running tests.
On Windows systems, CTest will identify and collect all library
dependencies and assemble a temporarily install under the
build/unit_tests directory so that the libraries can be loaded when
running tests.
The same feature is used on Windows when using CMake to install to
collect all DLL dependencies so that users don't have to install them
manually afterwards.
Each of the CTest tests are run using a custom wrapper around Python's
unittest framework, which is also responsible for finding and inserting
valgrind into the valgrind tests on Posix systems.
Unlike with Autotools, the CMake CTest Valgrind-tests are enabled by
default, if Valgrind can be found. There's no need to set VG=1.
CTest's memcheck module is NOT supported, because we use Python to
orchestrate our tests.
Added a bunch of Windows compatibility changes to the unit tests.
These were primarily changing / to PATHSEP and making adjustments
to use Win32 C headers and ifdef out the POSIX ones which aren't
available on Windows. Also disabled a bunch of tests on Win32
that don't work on Windows, notably the mmap ones and FD-passing
(i.e. FILEDES) ones.
Add JSON_C_HAVE_INTTYPES_H definition to clamav-config.h to eliminate
warnings on Windows where json.h is included after inttypes.h because
json-c's inttypes replacement relies on it.
This is a it of a hack and may be removed if json-c fixes their
inttypes header stuff in the future.
Add preprocessor definitions on Windows to disable MSVC warnings about
CRT secure and nonstandard functions. While there may be a better
solution, this is needed to be able to see other more serious warnings.
Add missing file comment block and copyright statement for clamsubmit.c.
Also change json-c/json.h include filename to json.h in clamsubmit.c.
The directory name is not required.
Changed the hash table data integer type from long, which is poorly
defined, to size_t -- which is capable of storing a pointer. Fixed a
bunch of casts regarding this variable to eliminate warnings.
Fixed two bugs causing utf8 encoding unit tests to fail on Windows:
- The in_size variable should be the number of bytes, not the character
count. This was was causing the SHIFT_JIS (japanese codepage) to UTF8
transcoding test to only transcode half the bytes.
- It turns out that the MultiByteToWideChar() API can't transcode
UTF16-BE to UTF16-LE. The solution is to just iterate over the buffer
and flip the bytes on each uint16_t. This but was causing the UTF16-BE
to UTF8 tests to fail.
I also split up the utf8 transcoding tests into separate tests so I
could see all of the failures instead of just the first one.
Added a flags parameter to the unit test function to open testfiles
because it turns out that on Windows if a file contains the \r\n it will
replace it with just \n if you opened the file as a text file instead of
as binary. However, if we open the CBC files as binary, then a bunch of
bytecode tests fail. So I've changed the tests to open the CBC files in
the bytecode tests as text files and open all other files as binary.
Ported the feature tests from shell scripts to Python using a modified
version of our QA test-framework, which is largely compatible and will
allow us to migrate some QA tests into this repo. I'd like to add GitHub
Actions pipelines in the future so that all public PR's get some testing
before anyone has to manually review them.
The clamd --log option was missing from the help string, though it
definitely works. I've added it in this commit.
It appears that clamd.c was never clang-format'd, so this commit also
reformats clamd.c.
Some of the check_clamd tests expected the path returned by clamd to
match character for character with original path sent to clamd. However,
as we now evaluate real paths before a scan, the path returned by clamd
isn't going to match the relative (and possibly symlink-ridden) path
passed to clamdscan. I fixed this test by changing the test to search
for the basename: <signature> FOUND within the response instead of
matching the exact path.
Autotools: Link check_clamd with libclamav so we can use our utility
functions in check_clamd.c.
2020-08-25 23:14:23 -07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("searching for %s\n", featurename);
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
snprintf(modulename, sizeof(modulename), "%s%s", name, LT_MODULE_EXT);
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
rhandle = LoadLibraryA(modulename);
|
CMake: Add CTest support to match Autotools checks
An ENABLE_TESTS CMake option is provided so that users can disable
testing if they don't want it. Instructions for how to use this
included in the INSTALL.cmake.md file.
If you run `ctest`, each testcase will write out a log file to the
<build>/unit_tests directory.
As with Autotools' make check, the test files are from test/.split
and unit_tests/.split files, but for CMake these are generated at
build time instead of at test time.
On Posix systems, sets the LD_LIBRARY_PATH so that ClamAV-compiled
libraries can be loaded when running tests.
On Windows systems, CTest will identify and collect all library
dependencies and assemble a temporarily install under the
build/unit_tests directory so that the libraries can be loaded when
running tests.
The same feature is used on Windows when using CMake to install to
collect all DLL dependencies so that users don't have to install them
manually afterwards.
Each of the CTest tests are run using a custom wrapper around Python's
unittest framework, which is also responsible for finding and inserting
valgrind into the valgrind tests on Posix systems.
Unlike with Autotools, the CMake CTest Valgrind-tests are enabled by
default, if Valgrind can be found. There's no need to set VG=1.
CTest's memcheck module is NOT supported, because we use Python to
orchestrate our tests.
Added a bunch of Windows compatibility changes to the unit tests.
These were primarily changing / to PATHSEP and making adjustments
to use Win32 C headers and ifdef out the POSIX ones which aren't
available on Windows. Also disabled a bunch of tests on Win32
that don't work on Windows, notably the mmap ones and FD-passing
(i.e. FILEDES) ones.
Add JSON_C_HAVE_INTTYPES_H definition to clamav-config.h to eliminate
warnings on Windows where json.h is included after inttypes.h because
json-c's inttypes replacement relies on it.
This is a it of a hack and may be removed if json-c fixes their
inttypes header stuff in the future.
Add preprocessor definitions on Windows to disable MSVC warnings about
CRT secure and nonstandard functions. While there may be a better
solution, this is needed to be able to see other more serious warnings.
Add missing file comment block and copyright statement for clamsubmit.c.
Also change json-c/json.h include filename to json.h in clamsubmit.c.
The directory name is not required.
Changed the hash table data integer type from long, which is poorly
defined, to size_t -- which is capable of storing a pointer. Fixed a
bunch of casts regarding this variable to eliminate warnings.
Fixed two bugs causing utf8 encoding unit tests to fail on Windows:
- The in_size variable should be the number of bytes, not the character
count. This was was causing the SHIFT_JIS (japanese codepage) to UTF8
transcoding test to only transcode half the bytes.
- It turns out that the MultiByteToWideChar() API can't transcode
UTF16-BE to UTF16-LE. The solution is to just iterate over the buffer
and flip the bytes on each uint16_t. This but was causing the UTF16-BE
to UTF8 tests to fail.
I also split up the utf8 transcoding tests into separate tests so I
could see all of the failures instead of just the first one.
Added a flags parameter to the unit test function to open testfiles
because it turns out that on Windows if a file contains the \r\n it will
replace it with just \n if you opened the file as a text file instead of
as binary. However, if we open the CBC files as binary, then a bunch of
bytecode tests fail. So I've changed the tests to open the CBC files in
the bytecode tests as text files and open all other files as binary.
Ported the feature tests from shell scripts to Python using a modified
version of our QA test-framework, which is largely compatible and will
allow us to migrate some QA tests into this repo. I'd like to add GitHub
Actions pipelines in the future so that all public PR's get some testing
before anyone has to manually review them.
The clamd --log option was missing from the help string, though it
definitely works. I've added it in this commit.
It appears that clamd.c was never clang-format'd, so this commit also
reformats clamd.c.
Some of the check_clamd tests expected the path returned by clamd to
match character for character with original path sent to clamd. However,
as we now evaluate real paths before a scan, the path returned by clamd
isn't going to match the relative (and possibly symlink-ridden) path
passed to clamdscan. I fixed this test by changing the test to search
for the basename: <signature> FOUND within the response instead of
matching the exact path.
Autotools: Link check_clamd with libclamav so we can use our utility
functions in check_clamd.c.
2020-08-25 23:14:23 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == rhandle) {
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
char *err = NULL;
|
CMake: Add CTest support to match Autotools checks
An ENABLE_TESTS CMake option is provided so that users can disable
testing if they don't want it. Instructions for how to use this
included in the INSTALL.cmake.md file.
If you run `ctest`, each testcase will write out a log file to the
<build>/unit_tests directory.
As with Autotools' make check, the test files are from test/.split
and unit_tests/.split files, but for CMake these are generated at
build time instead of at test time.
On Posix systems, sets the LD_LIBRARY_PATH so that ClamAV-compiled
libraries can be loaded when running tests.
On Windows systems, CTest will identify and collect all library
dependencies and assemble a temporarily install under the
build/unit_tests directory so that the libraries can be loaded when
running tests.
The same feature is used on Windows when using CMake to install to
collect all DLL dependencies so that users don't have to install them
manually afterwards.
Each of the CTest tests are run using a custom wrapper around Python's
unittest framework, which is also responsible for finding and inserting
valgrind into the valgrind tests on Posix systems.
Unlike with Autotools, the CMake CTest Valgrind-tests are enabled by
default, if Valgrind can be found. There's no need to set VG=1.
CTest's memcheck module is NOT supported, because we use Python to
orchestrate our tests.
Added a bunch of Windows compatibility changes to the unit tests.
These were primarily changing / to PATHSEP and making adjustments
to use Win32 C headers and ifdef out the POSIX ones which aren't
available on Windows. Also disabled a bunch of tests on Win32
that don't work on Windows, notably the mmap ones and FD-passing
(i.e. FILEDES) ones.
Add JSON_C_HAVE_INTTYPES_H definition to clamav-config.h to eliminate
warnings on Windows where json.h is included after inttypes.h because
json-c's inttypes replacement relies on it.
This is a it of a hack and may be removed if json-c fixes their
inttypes header stuff in the future.
Add preprocessor definitions on Windows to disable MSVC warnings about
CRT secure and nonstandard functions. While there may be a better
solution, this is needed to be able to see other more serious warnings.
Add missing file comment block and copyright statement for clamsubmit.c.
Also change json-c/json.h include filename to json.h in clamsubmit.c.
The directory name is not required.
Changed the hash table data integer type from long, which is poorly
defined, to size_t -- which is capable of storing a pointer. Fixed a
bunch of casts regarding this variable to eliminate warnings.
Fixed two bugs causing utf8 encoding unit tests to fail on Windows:
- The in_size variable should be the number of bytes, not the character
count. This was was causing the SHIFT_JIS (japanese codepage) to UTF8
transcoding test to only transcode half the bytes.
- It turns out that the MultiByteToWideChar() API can't transcode
UTF16-BE to UTF16-LE. The solution is to just iterate over the buffer
and flip the bytes on each uint16_t. This but was causing the UTF16-BE
to UTF8 tests to fail.
I also split up the utf8 transcoding tests into separate tests so I
could see all of the failures instead of just the first one.
Added a flags parameter to the unit test function to open testfiles
because it turns out that on Windows if a file contains the \r\n it will
replace it with just \n if you opened the file as a text file instead of
as binary. However, if we open the CBC files as binary, then a bunch of
bytecode tests fail. So I've changed the tests to open the CBC files in
the bytecode tests as text files and open all other files as binary.
Ported the feature tests from shell scripts to Python using a modified
version of our QA test-framework, which is largely compatible and will
allow us to migrate some QA tests into this repo. I'd like to add GitHub
Actions pipelines in the future so that all public PR's get some testing
before anyone has to manually review them.
The clamd --log option was missing from the help string, though it
definitely works. I've added it in this commit.
It appears that clamd.c was never clang-format'd, so this commit also
reformats clamd.c.
Some of the check_clamd tests expected the path returned by clamd to
match character for character with original path sent to clamd. However,
as we now evaluate real paths before a scan, the path returned by clamd
isn't going to match the relative (and possibly symlink-ridden) path
passed to clamdscan. I fixed this test by changing the test to search
for the basename: <signature> FOUND within the response instead of
matching the exact path.
Autotools: Link check_clamd with libclamav so we can use our utility
functions in check_clamd.c.
2020-08-25 23:14:23 -07:00
|
|
|
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
DWORD lasterr = GetLastError();
|
|
|
|
if (0 < lasterr) {
|
|
|
|
FormatMessageA(
|
|
|
|
FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM | FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
lasterr,
|
|
|
|
MAKELANGID(LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_DEFAULT),
|
|
|
|
(LPTSTR)&err,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == err) {
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Cannot LoadLibraryA %s: Unknown error - %s support unavailable\n", name, featurename);
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Cannot LoadLibraryA %s: %s - %s support unavailable\n", name, err, featurename);
|
|
|
|
LocalFree(err);
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s support loaded from %s\n", featurename, modulename);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (void *)rhandle;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void *load_module(const char *name, const char *featurename)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const char *suffixes[] = {
|
|
|
|
LT_MODULE_EXT "." LIBCLAMAV_FULLVER,
|
|
|
|
PASTE(LT_MODULE_EXT ".", LIBCLAMAV_MAJORVER),
|
|
|
|
LT_MODULE_EXT,
|
|
|
|
"." LT_LIBEXT};
|
|
|
|
void *rhandle = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *tokenized_library_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *ld_library_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const char *err;
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-24 11:39:11 -04:00
|
|
|
char modulename[512];
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First try using LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable for the path.
|
|
|
|
* We do this first because LD_LIBRARY_PATH is intended as an option to override the installed library path.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We don't do this for Windows because Windows doesn't have an equivalent to LD_LIBRARY_PATH
|
|
|
|
* and because LoadLibraryA() will search the executable's folder, which works for the unit tests.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2025-02-04 10:32:12 -06:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _AIX
|
|
|
|
ld_library_path = getenv("LIBPATH");
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
ld_library_path = getenv("LD_LIBRARY_PATH");
|
2025-02-04 10:32:12 -06:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != ld_library_path && strlen(ld_library_path) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_LIBRARY_PATHS 10
|
|
|
|
size_t token_index;
|
|
|
|
size_t tokens_count;
|
|
|
|
const char *tokens[MAX_LIBRARY_PATHS];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* LD_LIBRARY_PATH may be a colon-separated list of directories.
|
|
|
|
* Tokenize the list and try to load the library from each directory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tokenized_library_path = strdup(ld_library_path);
|
|
|
|
tokens_count = cli_strtokenize(tokenized_library_path, ':', MAX_LIBRARY_PATHS, tokens);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (token_index = 0; token_index < tokens_count; token_index++) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("searching for %s, LD_LIBRARY_PATH: %s\n", featurename, tokens[token_index]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(suffixes) / sizeof(suffixes[0]); i++) {
|
2025-02-04 10:32:12 -06:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _AIX
|
|
|
|
snprintf(modulename, sizeof(modulename),
|
|
|
|
"%s%s(%s%s.%d)",
|
|
|
|
name, ".a", name, LT_MODULE_EXT, LIBCLAMAV_MAJORVER);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
snprintf(modulename, sizeof(modulename),
|
|
|
|
"%s" PATHSEP "%s%s",
|
|
|
|
tokens[token_index], name, suffixes[i]);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
rhandle = dlopen(modulename, RTLD_NOW);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != rhandle) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s support loaded from %s\n", featurename, modulename);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("searching for %s: %s not found\n", featurename, modulename);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Search in "<prefix>/lib" checking with each of the different possible suffixes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("searching for %s, user-searchpath: %s\n", featurename, SEARCH_LIBDIR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(suffixes) / sizeof(suffixes[0]); i++) {
|
2025-02-04 10:32:12 -06:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _AIX
|
|
|
|
snprintf(modulename, sizeof(modulename),
|
|
|
|
"%s%s(%s%s.%d)",
|
2025-03-26 19:39:55 -04:00
|
|
|
name, ".a", name, LT_MODULE_EXT, LIBCLAMAV_MAJORVER);
|
2025-02-04 10:32:12 -06:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
snprintf(modulename, sizeof(modulename),
|
|
|
|
"%s" PATHSEP "%s%s",
|
|
|
|
SEARCH_LIBDIR, name, suffixes[i]);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
rhandle = dlopen(modulename, RTLD_NOW);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != rhandle) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s support loaded from %s\n", featurename, modulename);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("searching for %s: %s not found\n", featurename, modulename);
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
err = dlerror();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == err) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Cannot dlopen %s: Unknown error - %s support unavailable\n", name, featurename);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Cannot dlopen %s: %s - %s support unavailable\n", name, err, featurename);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(tokenized_library_path);
|
|
|
|
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
return (void *)rhandle;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2024-05-03 10:37:58 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void *get_module_function(HMODULE handle, const char *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
void *procAddress = NULL;
|
|
|
|
procAddress = GetProcAddress(handle, name);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == procAddress) {
|
|
|
|
char *err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DWORD lasterr = GetLastError();
|
|
|
|
if (0 < lasterr) {
|
|
|
|
FormatMessageA(
|
|
|
|
FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM | FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
lasterr,
|
|
|
|
MAKELANGID(LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_DEFAULT),
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
2024-03-20 12:21:40 -04:00
|
|
|
(LPSTR)&err,
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == err) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Failed to get function \"%s\": Unknown error.\n", name);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Failed to get function \"%s\": %s\n", name, err);
|
|
|
|
LocalFree(err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return procAddress;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else // !_WIN32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void *get_module_function(void *handle, const char *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
void *procAddress = NULL;
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
procAddress = dlsym(handle, name);
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == procAddress) {
|
|
|
|
const char *err = dlerror();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == err) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Failed to get function \"%s\": Unknown error.\n", name);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Failed to get function \"%s\": %s\n", name, err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return procAddress;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif // !_WIN32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void rarload(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifndef UNRAR_LINKED
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
HMODULE rhandle = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
void *rhandle = NULL;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-03-31 12:29:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (is_rar_inited) return;
|
2018-02-21 15:00:59 -05:00
|
|
|
is_rar_inited = 1;
|
2009-03-31 12:29:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (have_rar) return;
|
2018-09-14 11:47:52 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2020-11-06 22:16:23 -08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef UNRAR_LINKED
|
|
|
|
cli_unrar_open = unrar_open;
|
|
|
|
cli_unrar_peek_file_header = unrar_peek_file_header;
|
|
|
|
cli_unrar_extract_file = unrar_extract_file;
|
|
|
|
cli_unrar_skip_file = unrar_skip_file;
|
|
|
|
cli_unrar_close = unrar_close;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2021-05-27 19:45:12 -07:00
|
|
|
rhandle = load_module("libclamunrar_iface", "unrar");
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == rhandle)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-03-31 12:29:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((NULL == (cli_unrar_open = (cl_unrar_error_t (*)(const char *, void **, char **, uint32_t *, uint8_t))get_module_function(rhandle, "libclamunrar_iface_LTX_unrar_open"))) ||
|
|
|
|
(NULL == (cli_unrar_peek_file_header = (cl_unrar_error_t (*)(void *, unrar_metadata_t *))get_module_function(rhandle, "libclamunrar_iface_LTX_unrar_peek_file_header"))) ||
|
|
|
|
(NULL == (cli_unrar_extract_file = (cl_unrar_error_t (*)(void *, const char *, char *))get_module_function(rhandle, "libclamunrar_iface_LTX_unrar_extract_file"))) ||
|
|
|
|
(NULL == (cli_unrar_skip_file = (cl_unrar_error_t (*)(void *))get_module_function(rhandle, "libclamunrar_iface_LTX_unrar_skip_file"))) ||
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
(NULL == (cli_unrar_close = (void (*)(void *))get_module_function(rhandle, "libclamunrar_iface_LTX_unrar_close")))) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Failed to load function from UnRAR module\n");
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Version mismatch?\n");
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("UnRAR support unavailable\n");
|
2008-11-13 02:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-11-06 22:16:23 -08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-13 02:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
have_rar = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-31 19:55:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-08-02 22:37:52 +00:00
|
|
|
void cl_debug(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cli_debug_flag = 1;
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-09 15:57:56 -04:00
|
|
|
void cl_always_gen_section_hash(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cli_always_gen_section_hash = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-01 16:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int cl_retflevel(void)
|
2004-01-14 03:47:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return CL_FLEVEL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 09:28:38 -07:00
|
|
|
const char *cl_strerror(cl_error_t clerror)
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
switch (clerror) {
|
|
|
|
/* libclamav specific codes */
|
|
|
|
case CL_CLEAN:
|
|
|
|
return "No viruses detected";
|
|
|
|
case CL_VIRUS:
|
|
|
|
return "Virus(es) detected";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENULLARG:
|
|
|
|
return "Null argument passed to function";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EARG:
|
|
|
|
return "Invalid argument passed to function";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EMALFDB:
|
|
|
|
return "Malformed database";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ECVD:
|
|
|
|
return "Broken or not a CVD file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EVERIFY:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't verify database integrity";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EUNPACK:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't unpack some data";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EPARSE: /* like CL_EFORMAT but reported outside magicscan() */
|
|
|
|
return "Can't parse data";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* I/O and memory errors */
|
|
|
|
case CL_EOPEN:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't open file or directory";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ECREAT:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't create new file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EUNLINK:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't unlink file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ESTAT:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't get file status";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EREAD:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't read file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ESEEK:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't set file offset";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EWRITE:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't write to file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EDUP:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't duplicate file descriptor";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EACCES:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't access file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ETMPFILE:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't create temporary file";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ETMPDIR:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't create temporary directory";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EMAP:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't map file into memory";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EMEM:
|
|
|
|
return "Can't allocate memory";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ETIMEOUT:
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
return "Exceeded time limit";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
/* internal (needed for debug messages) */
|
2025-07-25 17:02:07 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_BREAK:
|
|
|
|
return "Process aborted";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EMAXREC:
|
2021-10-25 19:41:36 -07:00
|
|
|
return "Exceeded max recursion depth";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EMAXSIZE:
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
return "Exceeded max scan size";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EMAXFILES:
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
return "Exceeded max scan files";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EFORMAT:
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
return "Bad format or broken data";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_EBYTECODE:
|
|
|
|
return "Error during bytecode execution";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EBYTECODE_TESTFAIL:
|
|
|
|
return "Failure in bytecode testmode";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ELOCK:
|
|
|
|
return "Mutex lock failed";
|
|
|
|
case CL_EBUSY:
|
|
|
|
return "Scanner still active";
|
|
|
|
case CL_ESTATE:
|
|
|
|
return "Bad state (engine not initialized, or already initialized)";
|
2019-02-12 15:10:04 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_VERIFIED:
|
|
|
|
return "The scanned object was verified and deemed trusted";
|
2025-07-25 17:02:07 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
return "Unspecified error";
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "Unknown error code";
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cl_init(unsigned int initoptions)
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t rc;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
struct timeval tv;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pid = (unsigned int)getpid();
|
2009-10-26 16:10:04 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-10 18:11:49 -04:00
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(initoptions);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-23 13:38:26 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Rust logging initialization */
|
|
|
|
if (!clrs_log_init()) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Unexpected problem occurred while setting up rust logging... continuing without rust logging. \
|
|
|
|
Please submit an issue to https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-03 22:14:40 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_initialize_crypto();
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
rarload();
|
Add CMake build tooling
This patch adds experimental-quality CMake build tooling.
The libmspack build required a modification to use "" instead of <> for
header #includes. This will hopefully be included in the libmspack
upstream project when adding CMake build tooling to libmspack.
Removed use of libltdl when using CMake.
Flex & Bison are now required to build.
If -DMAINTAINER_MODE, then GPERF is also required, though it currently
doesn't actually do anything. TODO!
I found that the autotools build system was generating the lexer output
but not actually compiling it, instead using previously generated (and
manually renamed) lexer c source. As a consequence, changes to the .l
and .y files weren't making it into the build. To resolve this, I
removed generated flex/bison files and fixed the tooling to use the
freshly generated files. Flex and bison are now required build tools.
On Windows, this adds a dependency on the winflexbison package,
which can be obtained using Chocolatey or may be manually installed.
CMake tooling only has partial support for building with external LLVM
library, and no support for the internal LLVM (to be removed in the
future). I.e. The CMake build currently only supports the bytecode
interpreter.
Many files used include paths relative to the top source directory or
relative to the current project, rather than relative to each build
target. Modern CMake support requires including internal dependency
headers the same way you would external dependency headers (albeit
with "" instead of <>). This meant correcting all header includes to
be relative to the build targets and not relative to the workspace.
For example, ...
```c
include "../libclamav/clamav.h"
include "clamd/clamd_others.h"
```
... becomes:
```c
// libclamav
include "clamav.h"
// clamd
include "clamd_others.h"
```
Fixes header name conflicts by renaming a few of the files.
Converted the "shared" code into a static library, which depends on
libclamav. The ironically named "shared" static library provides
features common to the ClamAV apps which are not required in
libclamav itself and are not intended for use by downstream projects.
This change was required for correct modern CMake practices but was
also required to use the automake "subdir-objects" option.
This eliminates warnings when running autoreconf which, in the next
version of autoconf & automake are likely to break the build.
libclamav used to build in multiple stages where an earlier stage is
a static library containing utils required by the "shared" code.
Linking clamdscan and clamdtop with this libclamav utils static lib
allowed these two apps to function without libclamav. While this is
nice in theory, the practical gains are minimal and it complicates
the build system. As such, the autotools and CMake tooling was
simplified for improved maintainability and this feature was thrown
out. clamdtop and clamdscan now require libclamav to function.
Removed the nopthreads version of the autotools
libclamav_internal_utils static library and added pthread linking to
a couple apps that may have issues building on some platforms without
it, with the intention of removing needless complexity from the
source. Kept the regular version of libclamav_internal_utils.la
though it is no longer used anywhere but in libclamav.
Added an experimental doxygen build option which attempts to build
clamav.h and libfreshclam doxygen html docs.
The CMake build tooling also may build the example program(s), which
isn't a feature in the Autotools build system.
Changed C standard to C90+ due to inline linking issues with socket.h
when linking libfreshclam.so on Linux.
Generate common.rc for win32.
Fix tabs/spaces in shared Makefile.am, and remove vestigial ifndef
from misc.c.
Add CMake files to the automake dist, so users can try the new
CMake tooling w/out having to build from a git clone.
clamonacc changes:
- Renamed FANOTIFY macro to HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H to better match other
similar macros.
- Added a new clamav-clamonacc.service systemd unit file, based on
the work of ChadDevOps & Aaron Brighton.
- Added missing clamonacc man page.
Updates to clamdscan man page, add missing options.
Remove vestigial CL_NOLIBCLAMAV definitions (all apps now use
libclamav).
Rename Windows mspack.dll to libmspack.dll so all ClamAV-built
libraries have the lib-prefix with Visual Studio as with CMake.
2020-08-13 00:25:34 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *)0);
|
|
|
|
srand(pid + tv.tv_usec * (pid + 1) + clock());
|
2009-08-25 18:54:14 +03:00
|
|
|
rc = bytecode_init();
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2024-03-25 10:54:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-03 15:48:09 -05:00
|
|
|
xmlInitParser();
|
2024-03-25 10:54:44 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-13 15:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *cl_engine_new(void)
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cl_engine *new = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cli_intel_t *intel = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *cvdcertsdir = NULL;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-08 14:59:09 -07:00
|
|
|
new = (struct cl_engine *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct cl_engine));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!new) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't allocate memory for cl_engine\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup default limits */
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
new->maxscantime = CLI_DEFAULT_TIMELIMIT;
|
|
|
|
new->maxscansize = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXSCANSIZE;
|
|
|
|
new->maxfilesize = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXFILESIZE;
|
|
|
|
new->max_recursion_level = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXRECLEVEL;
|
|
|
|
new->maxfiles = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXFILES;
|
|
|
|
new->min_cc_count = CLI_DEFAULT_MIN_CC_COUNT;
|
|
|
|
new->min_ssn_count = CLI_DEFAULT_MIN_SSN_COUNT;
|
2012-11-27 17:15:02 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Engine Max sizes */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->maxembeddedpe = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXEMBEDDEDPE;
|
|
|
|
new->maxhtmlnormalize = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXHTMLNORMALIZE;
|
|
|
|
new->maxhtmlnotags = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXHTMLNOTAGS;
|
2012-11-27 17:15:02 -05:00
|
|
|
new->maxscriptnormalize = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXSCRIPTNORMALIZE;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->maxziptypercg = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXZIPTYPERCG;
|
2023-03-31 17:20:54 -04:00
|
|
|
new->cache_size = CLI_DEFAULT_CACHE_SIZE;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-22 14:36:56 +02:00
|
|
|
new->bytecode_security = CL_BYTECODE_TRUST_SIGNED;
|
2010-03-22 17:16:07 +02:00
|
|
|
/* 5 seconds timeout */
|
2010-03-24 18:34:58 +02:00
|
|
|
new->bytecode_timeout = 60000;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->bytecode_mode = CL_BYTECODE_MODE_AUTO;
|
|
|
|
new->refcount = 1;
|
|
|
|
new->ac_only = 0;
|
|
|
|
new->ac_mindepth = CLI_DEFAULT_AC_MINDEPTH;
|
|
|
|
new->ac_maxdepth = CLI_DEFAULT_AC_MAXDEPTH;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
FIPS & FIPS-like limits on hash algs for cryptographic uses
ClamAV will not function when using a FIPS-enabled OpenSSL 3.x.
This is because ClamAV uses MD5 and SHA1 algorithms for a variety of
purposes including matching for malware detection, matching to prevent
false positives on known-clean files, and for verification of MD5-based
RSA digital signatures for determining CVD (signature database archive)
authenticity.
Interestingly, FIPS had been intentionally bypassed when creating hashes
based whole buffers and whole files (by descriptor or `FILE`-pointer):
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/commit/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b
Note: this bypassed FIPS the 1.x way with:
`EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);`
It was NOT disabled when using `cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` /
`cl_finish_hash()`. That likely worked by coincidence in that the hash
was already calculated most of the time. It certainly would have made
use of those functions if the hash had not been calculated prior:
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/blob/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b/libclamav/matcher.c#L743
Regardless, bypassing FIPS entirely is not the correct solution.
The FIPS restrictions against using MD5 and SHA1 are valid, particularly
when verifying CVD digital siganatures, but also I think when using a
hash to determine if the file is known-clean (i.e. the "clean cache" and
also MD5-based and SHA1-based FP signatures).
This commit extends the work to bypass FIPS using the newer 3.x method:
`md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, alg, "-fips");`
It does this for the legacy `cl_hash*()` functions including
`cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` / `cl_finish_hash()`.
It also introduces extended versions that allow the caller to choose if
they want to bypass FIPS:
- `cl_hash_data_ex()`
- `cl_hash_init_ex()`
- `cl_update_hash_ex()`
- `cl_finish_hash_ex()`
- `cl_hash_destroy_ex()`
- `cl_hash_file_fd_ex()`
See the `flags` parameter for each.
Ironically, this commit does NOT use the new functions at this time.
The rational is that ClamAV may need MD5, SHA1, and SHA-256 hashes of
the same files both for determining if the file is malware, and for
determining if the file is clean.
So instead, this commit will do a checks when:
1. Creating a new ClamAV scanning engine. If FIPS-mode enabled, it will
automatically toggle the "FIPS limits" engine option.
When loading signatures, if the engine "FIPS limits" option is enabled,
then MD5 and SHA1 FP signatures will be skipped.
2. Before verifying a CVD (e.g. also for loading, unpacking when
verification enabled).
If "FIPS limits" or FIPS-mode are enabled, then the legacy MD5-based RSA
method is disabled.
Note: This commit also refactors the interface for `cl_cvdverify_ex()`
and `cl_cvdunpack_ex()` so they take a `flags` parameters, rather than a
single `bool`. As these functions are new in this version, it does not
break the ABI.
The cache was already switched to use SHA2-256, so that's not a concern
for checking FIPS-mode / FIPS limits options.
This adds an option for `freshclam.conf` and `clamd.conf`:
FIPSCryptoHashLimits yes
And an equivalent command-line option for `clamscan` and `sigtool`:
--fips-limits
You may programmatically enable FIPS-limits for a ClamAV engine like this:
```C
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_FIPS_LIMITS, 1);
```
CLAM-2792
2025-07-01 20:41:47 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Enable FIPS limits if the linked OpenSSL library is in FIPS mode. */
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)) new->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_FIPS_LIMITS;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
if (FIPS_mode()) new->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_FIPS_LIMITS;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_MPOOL
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!(new->mempool = mpool_create())) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't allocate memory for memory pool\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
new->root = MPOOL_CALLOC(new->mempool, CLI_MTARGETS, sizeof(struct cli_matcher *));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!new->root) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't allocate memory for roots\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-26 19:47:02 +00:00
|
|
|
new->dconf = cli_mpool_dconf_init(new->mempool);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!new->dconf) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't initialize dynamic configuration\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
new->pwdbs = MPOOL_CALLOC(new->mempool, CLI_PWDB_COUNT, sizeof(struct cli_pwdb *));
|
2015-07-20 15:00:18 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!new->pwdbs) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't initialize password databases\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2015-07-20 15:00:18 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-27 14:58:03 -04:00
|
|
|
crtmgr_init(&(new->cmgr));
|
2019-02-13 14:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
if (crtmgr_add_roots(new, &(new->cmgr), 0)) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't initialize root certificates\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2012-01-06 22:17:59 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-12-21 22:52:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-25 10:17:22 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Set up default stats/intel gathering callbacks */
|
2024-01-09 17:17:48 -05:00
|
|
|
intel = calloc(1, sizeof(cli_intel_t));
|
2014-05-09 16:27:16 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((intel)) {
|
2013-10-25 10:17:22 -04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CL_THREAD_SAFE
|
2014-05-09 16:27:16 -04:00
|
|
|
if (pthread_mutex_init(&(intel->mutex), NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_engine_new: Cannot initialize stats gathering mutex\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-05-09 16:27:16 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-25 10:17:22 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
intel->engine = new;
|
2014-05-09 16:27:16 -04:00
|
|
|
intel->maxsamples = STATS_MAX_SAMPLES;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
intel->maxmem = STATS_MAX_MEM;
|
|
|
|
intel->timeout = 10;
|
|
|
|
new->stats_data = intel;
|
2014-05-09 16:27:16 -04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
new->stats_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_add_sample = NULL;
|
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_submit = NULL;
|
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_flush = clamav_stats_flush;
|
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_remove_sample = clamav_stats_remove_sample;
|
2013-10-28 20:15:03 +00:00
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_decrement_count = clamav_stats_decrement_count;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_get_num = clamav_stats_get_num;
|
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_get_size = clamav_stats_get_size;
|
|
|
|
new->cb_stats_get_hostid = clamav_stats_get_hostid;
|
2013-10-25 10:17:22 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-06 18:19:11 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Setup raw disk image max settings */
|
|
|
|
new->maxpartitions = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXPARTITIONS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Engine max settings */
|
|
|
|
new->maxiconspe = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXICONSPE;
|
2016-01-19 14:25:55 -05:00
|
|
|
new->maxrechwp3 = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXRECHWP3;
|
2014-02-06 18:55:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
/* PCRE matching limitations */
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->pcre_match_limit = CLI_DEFAULT_PCRE_MATCH_LIMIT;
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
new->pcre_recmatch_limit = CLI_DEFAULT_PCRE_RECMATCH_LIMIT;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
new->pcre_max_filesize = CLI_DEFAULT_PCRE_MAX_FILESIZE;
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 16:35:48 -04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_YARA
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-09 17:30:47 -04:00
|
|
|
/* YARA */
|
2015-05-28 13:36:09 -04:00
|
|
|
if (cli_yara_init(new) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
2015-05-27 18:27:48 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_engine_new: failed to initialize YARA\n");
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2015-05-07 15:50:37 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 16:35:48 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
// Check if the CVD_CERTS_DIR environment variable is set
|
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir = getenv("CVD_CERTS_DIR");
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == cvdcertsdir) {
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
// On Windows, CERTSDIR is NOT defined in clamav-config.h.
|
|
|
|
// So instead we'll use the certs directory next to the module file.
|
|
|
|
char module_path[MAX_PATH] = "";
|
|
|
|
char certs_directory[MAX_PATH] = "";
|
|
|
|
char *dir;
|
|
|
|
DWORD get_module_name_ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_module_name_ret = GetModuleFileNameA(NULL, module_path, sizeof(module_path));
|
|
|
|
if (0 == get_module_name_ret) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_new: Can't get module file name\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Ensure null-termination before using dirname()
|
|
|
|
module_path[sizeof(module_path) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
dir = dirname(module_path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// set the certs directory to be the module directory + certs
|
|
|
|
snprintf(certs_directory, sizeof(certs_directory), "%s\\certs", dir);
|
|
|
|
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir = certs_directory;
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
cvdcertsdir = CERTSDIR;
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-07-10 21:48:27 -04:00
|
|
|
new->certs_directory = CLI_MPOOL_STRDUP(new->mempool, cvdcertsdir);
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Initialized %s engine\n", cl_retver());
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != status) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new->mempool) {
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new->certs_directory) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(new->mempool, new->certs_directory);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new->pwdbs) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(new->mempool, new->pwdbs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new->dconf) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(new->mempool, new->dconf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != new->root) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(new->mempool, new->root);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_MPOOL
|
|
|
|
mpool_destroy(new->mempool);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(new);
|
|
|
|
new = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != intel) {
|
|
|
|
free(intel);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return new;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cl_engine_set_num(struct cl_engine *engine, enum cl_engine_field field, long long num)
|
2008-11-11 14:42:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!engine)
|
|
|
|
return CL_ENULLARG;
|
2008-11-11 14:42:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TODO: consider adding checks and warn/errs when num overflows the
|
|
|
|
* destination type
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
switch (field) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCANSIZE:
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscansize = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_FILESIZE:
|
2023-09-22 16:33:35 -07:00
|
|
|
/* We have a limit of around 2GB (INT_MAX - 2). Enforce it here.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* TODO: Large file support is large-ly untested. Remove this restriction and test with a large set of large files of various types.
|
|
|
|
* libclamav's integer type safety has come a long way since 2014, so it's possible we could lift this restriction, but at least one
|
|
|
|
* of the parsers is bound to behave badly with large files. */
|
|
|
|
if ((uint64_t)num > INT_MAX - 2) {
|
|
|
|
if ((uint64_t)num > (uint64_t)2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 && num != LLONG_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
// If greater than 2GB, warn. If exactly at 2GB, don't hassle the user.
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("Max file-size was set to %lld bytes. Unfortunately, scanning files greater than 2147483647 bytes (2 GiB - 1) is not supported.\n", num);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
engine->maxfilesize = INT_MAX - 2;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
engine->maxfilesize = num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_RECURSION:
|
|
|
|
if (!num) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("MaxRecursion: the value of 0 is not allowed, using default: %u\n", CLI_DEFAULT_MAXRECLEVEL);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
engine->max_recursion_level = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXRECLEVEL;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
} else
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
engine->max_recursion_level = num;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_FILES:
|
|
|
|
engine->maxfiles = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_EMBEDDEDPE:
|
|
|
|
if (num < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("MaxEmbeddedPE: negative values are not allowed, using default: %u\n", CLI_DEFAULT_MAXEMBEDDEDPE);
|
|
|
|
engine->maxembeddedpe = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXEMBEDDEDPE;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
engine->maxembeddedpe = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_HTMLNORMALIZE:
|
|
|
|
if (num < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("MaxHTMLNormalize: negative values are not allowed, using default: %u\n", CLI_DEFAULT_MAXHTMLNORMALIZE);
|
|
|
|
engine->maxhtmlnormalize = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXHTMLNORMALIZE;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
engine->maxhtmlnormalize = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_HTMLNOTAGS:
|
|
|
|
if (num < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("MaxHTMLNoTags: negative values are not allowed, using default: %u\n", CLI_DEFAULT_MAXHTMLNOTAGS);
|
|
|
|
engine->maxhtmlnotags = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXHTMLNOTAGS;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
engine->maxhtmlnotags = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCRIPTNORMALIZE:
|
|
|
|
if (num < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("MaxScriptNormalize: negative values are not allowed, using default: %u\n", CLI_DEFAULT_MAXSCRIPTNORMALIZE);
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscriptnormalize = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXSCRIPTNORMALIZE;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscriptnormalize = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_ZIPTYPERCG:
|
|
|
|
if (num < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("MaxZipTypeRcg: negative values are not allowed, using default: %u\n", CLI_DEFAULT_MAXZIPTYPERCG);
|
|
|
|
engine->maxziptypercg = CLI_DEFAULT_MAXZIPTYPERCG;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
engine->maxziptypercg = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MIN_CC_COUNT:
|
|
|
|
engine->min_cc_count = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MIN_SSN_COUNT:
|
|
|
|
engine->min_ssn_count = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DB_OPTIONS:
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DB_VERSION:
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DB_TIME:
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("cl_engine_set_num: The field is read only\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_AC_ONLY:
|
|
|
|
engine->ac_only = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_AC_MINDEPTH:
|
|
|
|
engine->ac_mindepth = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_AC_MAXDEPTH:
|
|
|
|
engine->ac_maxdepth = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_KEEPTMP:
|
|
|
|
engine->keeptmp = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION:
|
|
|
|
if (num)
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_TMPDIR_RECURSION;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_TMPDIR_RECURSION);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_FORCETODISK:
|
|
|
|
if (num)
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_FORCE_TO_DISK;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_FORCE_TO_DISK);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_SECURITY:
|
|
|
|
if (engine->dboptions & CL_DB_COMPILED) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_num: CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_SECURITY cannot be set after engine was compiled\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
engine->bytecode_security = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_TIMEOUT:
|
|
|
|
engine->bytecode_timeout = num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_MODE:
|
|
|
|
if (engine->dboptions & CL_DB_COMPILED) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_num: CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_MODE cannot be set after engine was compiled\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (num == CL_BYTECODE_MODE_OFF) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_num: CL_BYTECODE_MODE_OFF is not settable, use dboptions to turn off!\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
engine->bytecode_mode = num;
|
|
|
|
if (num == CL_BYTECODE_MODE_TEST)
|
|
|
|
cli_infomsg(NULL, "bytecode engine in test mode\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DISABLE_CACHE:
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CACHE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CACHE);
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(engine->cache)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = clean_cache_init(engine);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_num: clean_cache_init failed with error %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2023-03-31 17:20:54 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_CACHE_SIZE:
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
engine->cache_size = (uint32_t)num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DISABLE_PE_STATS:
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_PE_STATS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_PE_STATS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_STATS_TIMEOUT:
|
|
|
|
if ((engine->stats_data)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_intel_t *intel = (cli_intel_t *)(engine->stats_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
intel->timeout = (uint32_t)num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_PARTITIONS:
|
|
|
|
engine->maxpartitions = (uint32_t)num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_ICONSPE:
|
|
|
|
engine->maxiconspe = (uint32_t)num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_RECHWP3:
|
|
|
|
engine->maxrechwp3 = (uint32_t)num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCANTIME:
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscantime = (uint32_t)num;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PCRE_MATCH_LIMIT:
|
|
|
|
engine->pcre_match_limit = (uint64_t)num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PCRE_RECMATCH_LIMIT:
|
|
|
|
engine->pcre_recmatch_limit = (uint64_t)num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PCRE_MAX_FILESIZE:
|
|
|
|
engine->pcre_max_filesize = (uint64_t)num;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DISABLE_PE_CERTS:
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_PE_CERTS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_PE_CERTS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PE_DUMPCERTS:
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_PE_DUMPCERTS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_PE_DUMPCERTS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
FIPS & FIPS-like limits on hash algs for cryptographic uses
ClamAV will not function when using a FIPS-enabled OpenSSL 3.x.
This is because ClamAV uses MD5 and SHA1 algorithms for a variety of
purposes including matching for malware detection, matching to prevent
false positives on known-clean files, and for verification of MD5-based
RSA digital signatures for determining CVD (signature database archive)
authenticity.
Interestingly, FIPS had been intentionally bypassed when creating hashes
based whole buffers and whole files (by descriptor or `FILE`-pointer):
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/commit/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b
Note: this bypassed FIPS the 1.x way with:
`EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);`
It was NOT disabled when using `cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` /
`cl_finish_hash()`. That likely worked by coincidence in that the hash
was already calculated most of the time. It certainly would have made
use of those functions if the hash had not been calculated prior:
https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/blob/78d4a9985a06a418dd1338c94ee5db461035d75b/libclamav/matcher.c#L743
Regardless, bypassing FIPS entirely is not the correct solution.
The FIPS restrictions against using MD5 and SHA1 are valid, particularly
when verifying CVD digital siganatures, but also I think when using a
hash to determine if the file is known-clean (i.e. the "clean cache" and
also MD5-based and SHA1-based FP signatures).
This commit extends the work to bypass FIPS using the newer 3.x method:
`md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, alg, "-fips");`
It does this for the legacy `cl_hash*()` functions including
`cl_hash_init()` / `cl_update_hash()` / `cl_finish_hash()`.
It also introduces extended versions that allow the caller to choose if
they want to bypass FIPS:
- `cl_hash_data_ex()`
- `cl_hash_init_ex()`
- `cl_update_hash_ex()`
- `cl_finish_hash_ex()`
- `cl_hash_destroy_ex()`
- `cl_hash_file_fd_ex()`
See the `flags` parameter for each.
Ironically, this commit does NOT use the new functions at this time.
The rational is that ClamAV may need MD5, SHA1, and SHA-256 hashes of
the same files both for determining if the file is malware, and for
determining if the file is clean.
So instead, this commit will do a checks when:
1. Creating a new ClamAV scanning engine. If FIPS-mode enabled, it will
automatically toggle the "FIPS limits" engine option.
When loading signatures, if the engine "FIPS limits" option is enabled,
then MD5 and SHA1 FP signatures will be skipped.
2. Before verifying a CVD (e.g. also for loading, unpacking when
verification enabled).
If "FIPS limits" or FIPS-mode are enabled, then the legacy MD5-based RSA
method is disabled.
Note: This commit also refactors the interface for `cl_cvdverify_ex()`
and `cl_cvdunpack_ex()` so they take a `flags` parameters, rather than a
single `bool`. As these functions are new in this version, it does not
break the ABI.
The cache was already switched to use SHA2-256, so that's not a concern
for checking FIPS-mode / FIPS limits options.
This adds an option for `freshclam.conf` and `clamd.conf`:
FIPSCryptoHashLimits yes
And an equivalent command-line option for `clamscan` and `sigtool`:
--fips-limits
You may programmatically enable FIPS-limits for a ClamAV engine like this:
```C
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_FIPS_LIMITS, 1);
```
CLAM-2792
2025-07-01 20:41:47 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_FIPS_LIMITS:
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options |= ENGINE_OPTIONS_FIPS_LIMITS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options &= ~(ENGINE_OPTIONS_FIPS_LIMITS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_num: Incorrect field number\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
2008-11-11 14:42:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
long long cl_engine_get_num(const struct cl_engine *engine, enum cl_engine_field field, int *err)
|
2008-11-11 14:42:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!engine) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_get_num: engine == NULL\n");
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
*err = CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
*err = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (field) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DB_OPTIONS:
|
|
|
|
return engine->dboptions;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCANSIZE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxscansize;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_FILESIZE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxfilesize;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_RECURSION:
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
return engine->max_recursion_level;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_FILES:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxfiles;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_EMBEDDEDPE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxembeddedpe;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_HTMLNORMALIZE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxhtmlnormalize;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_HTMLNOTAGS:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxhtmlnotags;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCRIPTNORMALIZE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxscriptnormalize;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_ZIPTYPERCG:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxziptypercg;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MIN_CC_COUNT:
|
|
|
|
return engine->min_cc_count;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MIN_SSN_COUNT:
|
|
|
|
return engine->min_ssn_count;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DB_VERSION:
|
|
|
|
return engine->dbversion[0];
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DB_TIME:
|
|
|
|
return engine->dbversion[1];
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_AC_ONLY:
|
|
|
|
return engine->ac_only;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_AC_MINDEPTH:
|
|
|
|
return engine->ac_mindepth;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_AC_MAXDEPTH:
|
|
|
|
return engine->ac_maxdepth;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_KEEPTMP:
|
|
|
|
return engine->keeptmp;
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION:
|
|
|
|
return engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_TMPDIR_RECURSION;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_FORCETODISK:
|
|
|
|
return engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_FORCE_TO_DISK;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_SECURITY:
|
|
|
|
return engine->bytecode_security;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_TIMEOUT:
|
|
|
|
return engine->bytecode_timeout;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_BYTECODE_MODE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->bytecode_mode;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_DISABLE_CACHE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CACHE;
|
2023-03-31 17:20:54 -04:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_CACHE_SIZE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->cache_size;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_STATS_TIMEOUT:
|
|
|
|
return ((cli_intel_t *)(engine->stats_data))->timeout;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_PARTITIONS:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxpartitions;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_ICONSPE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxiconspe;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_RECHWP3:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxrechwp3;
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_MAX_SCANTIME:
|
|
|
|
return engine->maxscantime;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PCRE_MATCH_LIMIT:
|
|
|
|
return engine->pcre_match_limit;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PCRE_RECMATCH_LIMIT:
|
|
|
|
return engine->pcre_recmatch_limit;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PCRE_MAX_FILESIZE:
|
|
|
|
return engine->pcre_max_filesize;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_get: Incorrect field number\n");
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
*err = CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cl_engine_set_str(struct cl_engine *engine, enum cl_engine_field field, const char *str)
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!engine)
|
|
|
|
return CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (field) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PUA_CATEGORIES:
|
2019-05-23 22:50:04 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine->pua_cats) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, engine->pua_cats);
|
|
|
|
engine->pua_cats = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->pua_cats = CLI_MPOOL_STRDUP(engine->mempool, str);
|
2019-05-23 22:50:04 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == engine->pua_cats)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR:
|
2019-05-23 22:50:04 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine->tmpdir) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, engine->tmpdir);
|
|
|
|
engine->tmpdir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->tmpdir = CLI_MPOOL_STRDUP(engine->mempool, str);
|
2019-05-23 22:50:04 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == engine->tmpdir)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR:
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != engine->certs_directory) {
|
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, engine->certs_directory);
|
|
|
|
engine->certs_directory = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
engine->certs_directory = CLI_MPOOL_STRDUP(engine->mempool, str);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == engine->certs_directory)
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_num: Incorrect field number\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EARG;
|
2008-11-11 14:42:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *cl_engine_get_str(const struct cl_engine *engine, enum cl_engine_field field, int *err)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!engine) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_get_str: engine == NULL\n");
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
*err = CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
*err = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (field) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_PUA_CATEGORIES:
|
|
|
|
return engine->pua_cats;
|
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR:
|
|
|
|
return engine->tmpdir;
|
FIPS-compliant CVD signing and verification
Add X509 certificate chain based signing with PKCS7-PEM external
signatures distributed alongside CVD's in a custom .cvd.sign format.
This new signing and verification mechanism is primarily in support
of FIPS compliance.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/564
Add a Rust implementation for parsing, verifying, and unpacking CVD
files.
Now installs a 'certs' directory in the app config directory
(e.g. <prefix>/etc/certs). The install location is configurable.
The CMake option to configure the CVD certs directory is:
`-D CVD_CERTS_DIRECTORY=PATH`
New options to set an alternative CVD certs directory:
- Commandline for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`--cvdcertsdir PATH`
- Env variable for freshclam, clamd, clamscan, and sigtool is:
`CVD_CERTS_DIR`
- Config option for freshclam and clamd is:
`CVDCertsDirectory PATH`
Sigtool:
- Add sign/verify commands.
- Also verify CDIFF external digital signatures when applying CDIFFs.
- Place commonly used commands at the top of --help string.
- Fix up manpage.
Freshclam:
- Will try to download .sign files to verify CVDs and CDIFFs.
- Fix an issue where making a CLD would only include the CFG file for
daily and not if patching any other database.
libclamav.so:
- Bump version to 13:0:1 (aka 12.1.0).
- Also remove libclamav.map versioning.
Resolves: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1304
- Add two new API's to the public clamav.h header:
```c
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdverify_ex(const char *file,
const char *certs_directory);
extern cl_error_t cl_cvdunpack_ex(const char *file,
const char *dir,
bool dont_verify,
const char *certs_directory);
```
The original `cl_cvdverify` and `cl_cvdunpack` are deprecated.
- Add `cl_engine_field` enum option `CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR`.
You may set this option with `cl_engine_set_str` and get it
with `cl_engine_get_str`, to override the compiled in default
CVD certs directory.
libfreshclam.so: Bump version to 4:0:0 (aka 4.0.0).
Add sigtool sign/verify tests and test certs.
Make it so downloadFile doesn't throw a warning if the server
doesn't have the .sign file.
Replace use of md5-based FP signatures in the unit tests with
sha256-based FP signatures because the md5 implementation used
by Python may be disabled in FIPS mode.
Fixes: https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/clamav/issues/1411
CMake: Add logic to enable the Rust openssl-sys / openssl-rs crates
to build against the same OpenSSL library as is used for the C build.
The Rust unit test application must also link directly with libcrypto
and libssl.
Fix some log messages with missing new lines.
Fix missing environment variable notes in --help messages and manpages.
Deconflict CONFDIR/DATADIR/CERTSDIR variable names that are defined in
clamav-config.h.in for libclamav from variable that had the same name
for use in clamav applications that use the optparser.
The 'clamav-test' certs for the unit tests will live for 10 years.
The 'clamav-beta.crt' public cert will only live for 120 days and will
be replaced before the stable release with a production 'clamav.crt'.
2024-11-21 14:01:09 -05:00
|
|
|
case CL_ENGINE_CVDCERTSDIR:
|
|
|
|
return engine->certs_directory;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_get: Incorrect field number\n");
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
*err = CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2009-03-12 15:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cl_settings *cl_engine_settings_copy(const struct cl_engine *engine)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
struct cl_settings *settings;
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
settings = (struct cl_settings *)malloc(sizeof(struct cl_settings));
|
|
|
|
if (!settings) {
|
2016-02-22 13:26:15 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_settings_copy: Unable to allocate memory for settings %llu\n",
|
|
|
|
(long long unsigned)sizeof(struct cl_settings));
|
2013-03-01 13:51:15 -05:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
settings->ac_only = engine->ac_only;
|
|
|
|
settings->ac_mindepth = engine->ac_mindepth;
|
|
|
|
settings->ac_maxdepth = engine->ac_maxdepth;
|
|
|
|
settings->tmpdir = engine->tmpdir ? strdup(engine->tmpdir) : NULL;
|
|
|
|
settings->keeptmp = engine->keeptmp;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxscantime = engine->maxscantime;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxscansize = engine->maxscansize;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxfilesize = engine->maxfilesize;
|
|
|
|
settings->max_recursion_level = engine->max_recursion_level;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxfiles = engine->maxfiles;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxembeddedpe = engine->maxembeddedpe;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxhtmlnormalize = engine->maxhtmlnormalize;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxhtmlnotags = engine->maxhtmlnotags;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxscriptnormalize = engine->maxscriptnormalize;
|
|
|
|
settings->maxziptypercg = engine->maxziptypercg;
|
|
|
|
settings->min_cc_count = engine->min_cc_count;
|
|
|
|
settings->min_ssn_count = engine->min_ssn_count;
|
|
|
|
settings->bytecode_security = engine->bytecode_security;
|
|
|
|
settings->bytecode_timeout = engine->bytecode_timeout;
|
|
|
|
settings->bytecode_mode = engine->bytecode_mode;
|
|
|
|
settings->pua_cats = engine->pua_cats ? strdup(engine->pua_cats) : NULL;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2021-07-16 11:47:23 -07:00
|
|
|
settings->cb_pre_cache = engine->cb_pre_cache;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_pre_scan = engine->cb_pre_scan;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_post_scan = engine->cb_post_scan;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_virus_found = engine->cb_virus_found;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_sigload = engine->cb_sigload;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_sigload_ctx = engine->cb_sigload_ctx;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_sigload_progress = engine->cb_sigload_progress;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_sigload_progress_ctx = engine->cb_sigload_progress_ctx;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_engine_compile_progress = engine->cb_engine_compile_progress;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_engine_compile_progress_ctx = engine->cb_engine_compile_progress_ctx;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_engine_free_progress = engine->cb_engine_free_progress;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_engine_free_progress_ctx = engine->cb_engine_free_progress_ctx;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_hash = engine->cb_hash;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_meta = engine->cb_meta;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_file_props = engine->cb_file_props;
|
|
|
|
settings->engine_options = engine->engine_options;
|
2023-03-31 17:20:54 -04:00
|
|
|
settings->cache_size = engine->cache_size;
|
2010-12-09 13:31:17 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_add_sample = engine->cb_stats_add_sample;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_remove_sample = engine->cb_stats_remove_sample;
|
2014-01-15 19:22:53 +00:00
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_decrement_count = engine->cb_stats_decrement_count;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_submit = engine->cb_stats_submit;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_flush = engine->cb_stats_flush;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_get_num = engine->cb_stats_get_num;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_get_size = engine->cb_stats_get_size;
|
|
|
|
settings->cb_stats_get_hostid = engine->cb_stats_get_hostid;
|
2014-01-15 19:22:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-06 18:55:40 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->maxpartitions = engine->maxpartitions;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-06 18:19:11 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->maxiconspe = engine->maxiconspe;
|
2016-01-19 14:25:55 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->maxrechwp3 = engine->maxrechwp3;
|
2014-03-06 18:19:11 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->pcre_match_limit = engine->pcre_match_limit;
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
settings->pcre_recmatch_limit = engine->pcre_recmatch_limit;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
settings->pcre_max_filesize = engine->pcre_max_filesize;
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return settings;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cl_engine_settings_apply(struct cl_engine *engine, const struct cl_settings *settings)
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
engine->ac_only = settings->ac_only;
|
|
|
|
engine->ac_mindepth = settings->ac_mindepth;
|
|
|
|
engine->ac_maxdepth = settings->ac_maxdepth;
|
|
|
|
engine->keeptmp = settings->keeptmp;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscantime = settings->maxscantime;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscansize = settings->maxscansize;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxfilesize = settings->maxfilesize;
|
|
|
|
engine->max_recursion_level = settings->max_recursion_level;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxfiles = settings->maxfiles;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxembeddedpe = settings->maxembeddedpe;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxhtmlnormalize = settings->maxhtmlnormalize;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxhtmlnotags = settings->maxhtmlnotags;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxscriptnormalize = settings->maxscriptnormalize;
|
|
|
|
engine->maxziptypercg = settings->maxziptypercg;
|
|
|
|
engine->min_cc_count = settings->min_cc_count;
|
|
|
|
engine->min_ssn_count = settings->min_ssn_count;
|
|
|
|
engine->bytecode_security = settings->bytecode_security;
|
|
|
|
engine->bytecode_timeout = settings->bytecode_timeout;
|
|
|
|
engine->bytecode_mode = settings->bytecode_mode;
|
|
|
|
engine->engine_options = settings->engine_options;
|
2023-03-31 17:20:54 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->cache_size = settings->cache_size;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (engine->tmpdir)
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, engine->tmpdir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (settings->tmpdir) {
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->tmpdir = CLI_MPOOL_STRDUP(engine->mempool, settings->tmpdir);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!engine->tmpdir)
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMEM;
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->tmpdir = NULL;
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (engine->pua_cats)
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, engine->pua_cats);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (settings->pua_cats) {
|
2019-05-03 18:16:03 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->pua_cats = CLI_MPOOL_STRDUP(engine->mempool, settings->pua_cats);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!engine->pua_cats)
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMEM;
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->pua_cats = NULL;
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-07-16 11:47:23 -07:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_pre_cache = settings->cb_pre_cache;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_pre_scan = settings->cb_pre_scan;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_post_scan = settings->cb_post_scan;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_virus_found = settings->cb_virus_found;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload = settings->cb_sigload;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload_ctx = settings->cb_sigload_ctx;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload_progress = settings->cb_sigload_progress;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload_progress_ctx = settings->cb_sigload_progress_ctx;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_compile_progress = settings->cb_engine_compile_progress;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_compile_progress_ctx = settings->cb_engine_compile_progress_ctx;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_free_progress = settings->cb_engine_free_progress;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_free_progress_ctx = settings->cb_engine_free_progress_ctx;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_hash = settings->cb_hash;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_meta = settings->cb_meta;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_file_props = settings->cb_file_props;
|
2010-12-09 13:31:17 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_add_sample = settings->cb_stats_add_sample;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_remove_sample = settings->cb_stats_remove_sample;
|
2014-01-15 19:22:53 +00:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_decrement_count = settings->cb_stats_decrement_count;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_submit = settings->cb_stats_submit;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_flush = settings->cb_stats_flush;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_get_num = settings->cb_stats_get_num;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_get_size = settings->cb_stats_get_size;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_stats_get_hostid = settings->cb_stats_get_hostid;
|
2014-01-15 19:22:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-06 18:55:40 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->maxpartitions = settings->maxpartitions;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-06 18:19:11 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->maxiconspe = settings->maxiconspe;
|
2016-01-19 14:25:55 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->maxrechwp3 = settings->maxrechwp3;
|
2014-03-06 18:19:11 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->pcre_match_limit = settings->pcre_match_limit;
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->pcre_recmatch_limit = settings->pcre_recmatch_limit;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
engine->pcre_max_filesize = settings->pcre_max_filesize;
|
2014-08-25 19:11:12 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cl_engine_settings_free(struct cl_settings *settings)
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!settings)
|
|
|
|
return CL_ENULLARG;
|
2009-03-02 18:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(settings->tmpdir);
|
|
|
|
free(settings->pua_cats);
|
|
|
|
free(settings);
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
void cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(cli_ctx *ctx, char *vname)
|
2016-08-24 17:39:20 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx->limit_exceeded) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->limit_exceeded = true; // guard against adding an alert (or metadata) a million times for non-fatal exceeds-max conditions
|
|
|
|
// TODO: consider changing this from a bool to a threshold so we could at least see more than 1 limits exceeded
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_HEURISTIC_EXCEEDS_MAX) {
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted(ctx, vname);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s: scanning may be incomplete and additional analysis needed for this file.\n", vname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Also record the event in the scan metadata, under "ParseErrors" */
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && ctx->this_layer_metadata_json) {
|
|
|
|
cli_json_parse_error(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, vname);
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-24 17:39:20 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
2024-03-20 12:21:40 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_checklimits(const char *who, cli_ctx *ctx, uint64_t need1, uint64_t need2, uint64_t need3)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
2024-03-20 12:21:40 -04:00
|
|
|
uint64_t needed;
|
2008-01-29 03:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
|
|
/* if called without limits, go on, unpack, scan */
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-29 03:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
needed = (need1 > need2) ? need1 : need2;
|
|
|
|
needed = (needed > need3) ? needed : need3;
|
2008-01-29 03:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Enforce global time limit, if limit enabled */
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_checktimelimit(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != ret) {
|
|
|
|
// Exceeding the time limit will abort the scan.
|
|
|
|
// The logic for this and the possible heuristic is done inside the cli_checktimelimit function.
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Enforce global scan-size limit, if limit enabled */
|
|
|
|
if (needed && (ctx->engine->maxscansize != 0) && (ctx->engine->maxscansize - ctx->scansize < needed)) {
|
|
|
|
/* The size needed is greater than the remaining scansize ... Skip this file. */
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
2024-03-20 12:21:40 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s: scansize exceeded (initial: %lu, consumed: %lu, needed: %lu)\n", who, ctx->engine->maxscansize, ctx->scansize, needed);
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMAXSIZE;
|
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxScanSize");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-01-28 01:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Enforce per-file file-size limit, if limit enabled */
|
|
|
|
if (needed && (ctx->engine->maxfilesize != 0) && (ctx->engine->maxfilesize < needed)) {
|
|
|
|
/* The size needed is greater than that limit ... Skip this file. */
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
2024-03-20 12:21:40 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s: filesize exceeded (allowed: %lu, needed: %lu)\n", who, ctx->engine->maxfilesize, needed);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMAXSIZE;
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxFileSize");
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-01-29 03:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-06 21:19:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Enforce limit on number of embedded files, if limit enabled */
|
|
|
|
if ((ctx->engine->maxfiles != 0) && (ctx->scannedfiles >= ctx->engine->maxfiles)) {
|
|
|
|
/* This file would exceed the max # of files ... Skip this file. */
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s: files limit reached (max: %u)\n", who, ctx->engine->maxfiles);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMAXFILES;
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxFiles");
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// We don't need to set the `ctx->abort_scan` flag here.
|
|
|
|
// We want `cli_magic_scan()` to finish scanning the current file, but not any future files.
|
|
|
|
// We keep track of the # scanned files with `ctx->scannedfiles`, and that should be sufficient to prevent
|
|
|
|
// additional files from being scanned.
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2008-02-06 21:19:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-24 17:39:20 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-29 03:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2008-01-28 01:55:01 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_updatelimits(cli_ctx *ctx, size_t needed)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = cli_checklimits("cli_updatelimits", ctx, needed, 0, 0);
|
2008-01-29 03:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-06 21:19:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->scannedfiles++;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
ctx->scansize += needed;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->scansize > ctx->engine->maxscansize)
|
2008-11-10 17:39:58 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->scansize = ctx->engine->maxscansize;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
2008-01-28 01:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Check if we've exceeded the time limit.
|
|
|
|
* If ctx is NULL, there can be no timelimit so just return success.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx The scanning context.
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t CL_SUCCESS if has not exceeded, CL_ETIMEOUT if has exceeded.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_checktimelimit(cli_ctx *ctx)
|
2014-06-13 16:11:15 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == ctx) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-13 16:11:15 -04:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->time_limit.tv_sec != 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct timeval now;
|
|
|
|
if (gettimeofday(&now, NULL) == 0) {
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if ((now.tv_sec > ctx->time_limit.tv_sec) ||
|
|
|
|
(now.tv_sec == ctx->time_limit.tv_sec && now.tv_usec > ctx->time_limit.tv_usec)) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->abort_scan = true;
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ETIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-13 16:11:15 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (CL_ETIMEOUT == ret) {
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxScanTime");
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// abort_scan flag is set so that in cli_magic_scan() we *will* stop scanning, even if we lose the status code.
|
|
|
|
ctx->abort_scan = true;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-16 17:18:59 -07:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2014-06-13 16:11:15 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
char *cli_hashstream(FILE *fs, uint8_t *hash, cli_hash_type_t type)
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
uint8_t digest[CLI_HASHLEN_MAX];
|
2014-02-08 00:31:12 -05:00
|
|
|
char buff[FILEBUFF];
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
char *hashstr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *pt;
|
|
|
|
size_t i, bytes;
|
|
|
|
const char *hash_alg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t hash_len;
|
|
|
|
void *ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!fs) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_hashstream: NULL file stream\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-02-28 12:12:30 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-02-13 13:05:50 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (type < CLI_HASH_MD5 || type >= CLI_HASH_AVAIL_TYPES) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_hashstream: Unsupported hash type %d\n", type);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-09-01 14:14:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
hash_alg = cli_hash_name(type);
|
|
|
|
hash_len = cli_hash_len(type);
|
2014-02-08 00:31:12 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx = cl_hash_init(hash_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_hashstream: Unable to initialize hash context for %s\n", hash_alg);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (0 != (bytes = fread(buff, 1, FILEBUFF, fs))) {
|
|
|
|
if (cl_update_hash(ctx, buff, bytes) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_hashstream: Failed to update hash for %s\n", hash_alg);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-02-28 12:12:30 -05:00
|
|
|
cl_finish_hash(ctx, digest);
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
2004-09-01 14:14:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!(hashstr = (char *)calloc(hash_len * 2 + 1, sizeof(char)))) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_hashstream: Unable to allocate memory for hash string\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-18 15:00:37 +01:00
|
|
|
pt = hashstr;
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hash_len; i++) {
|
2014-02-08 00:31:12 -05:00
|
|
|
sprintf(pt, "%02x", digest[i]);
|
|
|
|
pt += 2;
|
2004-09-01 14:14:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
if (hash) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(hash, digest, hash_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
|
cl_hash_destroy(ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-18 15:00:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return hashstr;
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
char *cli_hashfile(const char *filename, uint8_t *hash, cli_hash_type_t type)
|
2003-10-08 12:51:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
FILE *fs;
|
|
|
|
char *hashstr;
|
2003-10-08 12:51:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((fs = fopen(filename, "rb")) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_hashfile(): Can't open file %s\n", filename);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2004-07-19 17:54:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-03 19:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
hashstr = cli_hashstream(fs, hash, type);
|
2003-10-08 12:51:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-18 15:00:37 +01:00
|
|
|
fclose(fs);
|
|
|
|
return hashstr;
|
2003-10-08 12:51:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-02 11:13:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Function: unlink
|
|
|
|
unlink() with error checking
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-08-18 14:55:16 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_unlink(const char *pathname)
|
2008-04-02 11:13:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
|
|
|
if (unlink(pathname) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
2019-07-09 09:21:34 -07:00
|
|
|
/* Windows may fail to unlink a file if it is marked read-only,
|
2022-02-16 00:13:55 +01:00
|
|
|
* even if the user has permissions to delete the file. */
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
|
|
|
if (-1 == _chmod(pathname, _S_IWRITE)) {
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
2022-08-09 16:56:54 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("cli_unlink: _chmod failure for %s - %s\n", pathname, cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
2022-08-18 14:55:16 -07:00
|
|
|
return CL_EUNLINK;
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
|
|
|
} else if (unlink(pathname) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
2022-08-09 16:56:54 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("cli_unlink: unlink failure for %s - %s\n", pathname, cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
2022-08-18 14:55:16 -07:00
|
|
|
return CL_EUNLINK;
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-18 14:55:16 -07:00
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
2022-08-09 16:56:54 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("cli_unlink: unlink failure for %s - %s\n", pathname, cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
2022-08-18 14:55:16 -07:00
|
|
|
return CL_EUNLINK;
|
2018-07-30 20:19:28 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-18 14:55:16 -07:00
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
2008-04-02 11:13:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_virus_found_cb(cli_ctx *ctx, const char *virname, bool is_potentially_unwanted)
|
2017-04-18 12:03:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_VIRUS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx || !virname) {
|
|
|
|
return CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Run deprecated legacy virus callback */
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->engine->cb_virus_found) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->engine->cb_virus_found(
|
|
|
|
fmap_fd(ctx->fmap),
|
|
|
|
virname,
|
|
|
|
ctx->cb_ctx);
|
2017-04-18 12:03:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Run the alert callback */
|
|
|
|
status = cli_dispatch_scan_callback(ctx, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (CL_CLEAN == status) {
|
|
|
|
// An alert callback returning CL_CLEAN means to ignore this alert and keep scanning.
|
|
|
|
// We need to remove the last alerting indicator from the evidence.
|
|
|
|
bool remove_successful;
|
|
|
|
FFIError *remove_indicator_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
remove_successful = evidence_remove_indicator(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
virname,
|
|
|
|
is_potentially_unwanted ? IndicatorType_PotentiallyUnwanted : IndicatorType_Strong,
|
|
|
|
&remove_indicator_error);
|
|
|
|
if (!remove_successful) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("Failed to remove indicator from scan evidence: %s\n", ffierror_fmt(remove_indicator_error));
|
|
|
|
status = CL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && ctx->this_layer_metadata_json) {
|
|
|
|
// Note alerts ignored by callback in metadata.
|
|
|
|
json_object *arrobj, *virobj;
|
|
|
|
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "IgnoredAlerts", &arrobj)) {
|
|
|
|
arrobj = json_object_new_array();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == arrobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for json ignored alerts array\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virobj = json_object_new_string(virname);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == virobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for json ignored alert name object\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(arrobj, virobj);
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "IgnoredAlerts", arrobj);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
2017-04-18 12:03:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Add an indicator to the scan evidence.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx
|
|
|
|
* @param virname Name of the indicator
|
|
|
|
* @param type Type of the indicator
|
|
|
|
* @return Returns CL_SUCCESS if added and IS in ALLMATCH mode, or if was PUA and not in HEURISTIC-PRECEDENCE-mode.
|
|
|
|
* @return Returns CL_VIRUS if added and NOT in ALLMATCH mode, or if was PUA and not in ALLMATCH but IS in HEURISTIC-PRECEDENCE-mode.
|
|
|
|
* @return Returns some other error code like CL_ERROR or CL_EMEM if something went wrong.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t append_virus(cli_ctx *ctx, const char *virname, IndicatorType type)
|
2012-10-18 14:12:58 -07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_ERROR;
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t callback_ret = CL_VIRUS;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
FFIError *add_indicator_error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
bool add_successful;
|
|
|
|
char *location = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
if (NULL == ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence) {
|
|
|
|
// evidence storage for this layer not initialized, initialize a new evidence store.
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence = evidence_new();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for evidence store\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((ctx->fmap != NULL) &&
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
(ctx->recursion_stack != NULL) &&
|
|
|
|
(CL_VIRUS != cli_check_fp(ctx, virname))) {
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
// FP signature found for one of the layers. Ignore indicator.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
add_successful = evidence_add_indicator(
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
virname,
|
|
|
|
type,
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].object_id,
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
&add_indicator_error);
|
|
|
|
if (!add_successful) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("Failed to add indicator to scan evidence: %s\n", ffierror_fmt(add_indicator_error));
|
|
|
|
status = CL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2020-04-18 10:46:57 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (type == IndicatorType_Strong) {
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
// Run the virus callbacks which in clamscan says "<signature name> FOUND"
|
|
|
|
callback_ret = cli_virus_found_cb(ctx, virname, type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (callback_ret) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_SUCCESS:
|
|
|
|
case CL_VERIFIED: {
|
|
|
|
/* Caller says this thing is clean! */
|
|
|
|
status = callback_ret;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default: {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Keep this alert!
|
|
|
|
* In case of CL_BREAK, we'll handle it after we add metadata.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && ctx->this_layer_metadata_json) {
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
if (type == IndicatorType_Weak) {
|
|
|
|
// If this is a weak indicator, we don't add it to the "Viruses" array.
|
|
|
|
// Instead, we add it to the "WeakIndicators" array.
|
|
|
|
json_object *arrobj, *virobj;
|
|
|
|
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "WeakIndicators", &arrobj)) {
|
|
|
|
arrobj = json_object_new_array();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == arrobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for json weak indicators array\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "WeakIndicators", arrobj);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virobj = json_object_new_string(virname);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == virobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for json weak indicator name object\n");
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-04-30 16:28:46 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(arrobj, virobj);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// If this is a strong or potentially unwanted indicator, we add it to the "Viruses" array.
|
|
|
|
json_object *arrobj, *virobj;
|
|
|
|
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "Viruses", &arrobj)) {
|
|
|
|
arrobj = json_object_new_array();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == arrobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for json virus array\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "Viruses", arrobj);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virobj = json_object_new_string(virname);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == virobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_append_virus: no memory for json virus name object\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(arrobj, virobj);
|
2014-04-30 16:28:46 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (callback_ret == CL_BREAK) {
|
|
|
|
// Callback requested to break the scan.
|
|
|
|
// Do that now that we've added the indicator to the evidence and metadata.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (SCAN_ALLMATCHES) {
|
|
|
|
// Never break.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Usually break.
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case IndicatorType_Strong: {
|
|
|
|
status = CL_VIRUS;
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
// abort_scan flag is set so that in cli_magic_scan() we *will* stop scanning, even if we lose the status code.
|
|
|
|
ctx->abort_scan = true;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case IndicatorType_PotentiallyUnwanted: {
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default: {
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != location) {
|
|
|
|
free(location);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_append_potentially_unwanted(cli_ctx *ctx, const char *virname)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_HEURISTIC_PRECEDENCE) {
|
|
|
|
return append_virus(ctx, virname, IndicatorType_Strong);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return append_virus(ctx, virname, IndicatorType_PotentiallyUnwanted);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_append_virus(cli_ctx *ctx, const char *virname)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
if ((strncmp(virname, "PUA.", 4) == 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(strncmp(virname, "Heuristics.", 11) == 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(strncmp(virname, "BC.Heuristics.", 14) == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return cli_append_potentially_unwanted(ctx, virname);
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(virname, "Weak.", 5) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return append_virus(ctx, virname, IndicatorType_Weak);
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return append_virus(ctx, virname, IndicatorType_Strong);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-18 14:12:58 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
const char *cli_get_last_virus(const cli_ctx *ctx)
|
2012-10-18 14:12:58 -07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx || !ctx->this_layer_evidence) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
return evidence_get_last_alert(ctx->this_layer_evidence);
|
2012-10-18 14:12:58 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
const char *cli_get_last_virus_str(const cli_ctx *ctx)
|
2012-10-25 12:36:05 -07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
const char *ret;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != (ret = cli_get_last_virus(ctx))) {
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2022-08-03 20:34:48 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-25 12:36:05 -07:00
|
|
|
return "";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-09 22:26:40 -08:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_recursion_stack_push(cli_ctx *ctx, cl_fmap_t *map, cli_file_t type, bool is_new_buffer, uint32_t attributes)
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_scan_layer_t *current_layer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cli_scan_layer_t *new_layer = NULL;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check the regular limits
|
2022-08-27 10:46:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != (status = cli_checklimits("cli_recursion_stack_push", ctx, map->len, 0, 0))) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: Some content was skipped. The scan result will not be cached.\n");
|
|
|
|
emax_reached(ctx); // Disable caching for all recursion layers.
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check the recursion limit
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->recursion_level == ctx->recursion_stack_size - 1) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: Archive recursion limit exceeded (%u, max: %u)\n", ctx->recursion_level, ctx->engine->max_recursion_level);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: Some content was skipped. The scan result will not be cached.\n");
|
|
|
|
emax_reached(ctx); // Disable caching for all recursion layers.
|
2022-08-19 16:21:42 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxRecursion");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
status = CL_EMAXREC;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
current_layer = &ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level];
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_level++;
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
new_layer = &ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level];
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
memset(new_layer, 0, sizeof(cli_scan_layer_t));
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
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|
new_layer->fmap = map;
|
|
|
|
new_layer->type = type;
|
|
|
|
new_layer->size = map->len;
|
|
|
|
new_layer->parent = current_layer;
|
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|
new_layer->recursion_level = current_layer->recursion_level + 1; // same as ctx->recursion_level
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
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// Keep track of if this is a new buffer or not.
|
|
|
|
// And if not, how many layers deep we are in the same buffer.
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
if (is_new_buffer) {
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
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// This the first layer in a new buffer, so we increment the number of buffer levels.
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// And reset the buffer fmap level (because it's now the zeroeth level in this new buffer).
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new_layer->recursion_level_buffer = current_layer->recursion_level_buffer + 1;
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new_layer->recursion_level_buffer_fmap = 0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
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|
} else {
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
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// This another layer in the same buffer, so we increment the buffer fmap level.
|
|
|
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new_layer->recursion_level_buffer_fmap = current_layer->recursion_level_buffer_fmap + 1;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 09:13:17 -08:00
|
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|
// Apply the requested next-layer attributes.
|
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|
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//
|
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|
// Note that this is how we also keep track of normalized layers.
|
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// Normalized layers should be ignored when using the get_type() and get_intermediate_type()
|
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// functions so that signatures that specify the container or intermediates need not account
|
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|
// for normalized layers "contained in" HTML / Javascript / etc.
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
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new_layer->attributes = attributes;
|
2020-12-18 09:13:17 -08:00
|
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|
|
|
|
|
// If the current layer is marked "decrypted", all child-layers are also marked "decrypted".
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (current_layer->attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_DECRYPTED) {
|
|
|
|
new_layer->attributes |= LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_DECRYPTED;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
// Assign a unique object_id to the new container.
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
new_layer->object_id = ctx->object_count;
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx->object_count++;
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
// Set the current layer's fmap to the new container's fmap.
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx->fmap = new_layer->fmap;
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Skip initializing a new evidence object because we only need it if there are indicators found.
|
|
|
|
// See append_virus()
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_TMPDIR_RECURSION) {
|
|
|
|
char *new_temp_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *fmap_basename = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *parent_tmpdir = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level - 1].tmpdir;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Keep-temp enabled, so create a sub-directory to provide extraction directory recursion.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((NULL != ctx->fmap->name) &&
|
|
|
|
(CL_SUCCESS == cli_basename(ctx->fmap->name, strlen(ctx->fmap->name), &fmap_basename, true /* posix_support_backslash_pathsep */))) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The fmap has a name, lets include it in the new sub-directory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
new_temp_path = cli_gentemp_with_prefix(parent_tmpdir, fmap_basename);
|
|
|
|
free(fmap_basename);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_temp_path) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_magic_scan: Failed to generate temp directory name.\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The fmap has no name or we failed to get the basename.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
new_temp_path = cli_gentemp(parent_tmpdir);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_temp_path) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_magic_scan: Failed to generate temp directory name.\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mkdir(new_temp_path, 0700)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_magic_scan: Can't create tmp sub-directory for scan: %s.\n", new_temp_path);
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EACCES;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].tmpdir = new_temp_path;
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_tmpdir = new_temp_path;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Keep-temp disabled, so use the parent layer's tmpdir.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *parent_tmpdir = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level - 1].tmpdir;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].tmpdir = parent_tmpdir;
|
|
|
|
// Don't need to set ctx->this_layer_tmpdir, it is already set to the parent layer's tmpdir.
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create JSON object to record metadata during the scan.
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
* Add this new layer's metadata JSON object to the parent layer's "ContainedObjects" array or "EmbeddedObjects" array.
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
json_object *arrobj;
|
|
|
|
struct json_object *parent_object;
|
|
|
|
struct json_object *new_object;
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
const char *array_name;
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_EMBEDDED) {
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
array_name = "EmbeddedObjects";
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
array_name = "ContainedObjects";
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
parent_object = ctx->this_layer_metadata_json;
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(parent_object, array_name, &arrobj)) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
arrobj = json_object_new_array();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == arrobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json properties object\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(parent_object, array_name, arrobj);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_object = json_object_new_object();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == new_object) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json properties object\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(arrobj, new_object);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].metadata_json = new_object;
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_metadata_json = new_object;
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Add basic file metadata to the JSON object.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->fmap->name) {
|
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonstr(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "FileName", new_layer->fmap->name);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json FileName object\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_EMBEDDED) {
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
/* For embedded files, we can just say it's at some offset in the parent file.
|
|
|
|
* Offset is calculated from fmap->real_len - fmap->len */
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonuint64(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "Offset", (uint64_t)(new_layer->fmap->real_len - new_layer->fmap->len));
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json Offset object\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add the file type as well, since embedded files are identifed by file type signatures. */
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonstr(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "FileType", cli_ftname(new_layer->type));
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json FileType object\n");
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* For non-embedded files, there may be a file path. */
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->fmap->path) {
|
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonstr(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "FilePath", new_layer->fmap->path);
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json FilePath object\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonuint64(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "FileSize", (uint64_t)new_layer->fmap->len);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonuint64(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "ObjectID", (uint64_t)new_layer->object_id);
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Record layer attributes in the JSON object.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_DECRYPTED) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonbool(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "Decrypted", true);
|
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json Decrypted object\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NORMALIZED) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonbool(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "Normalized", true);
|
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json Normalized object\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (new_layer->attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_RETYPED) {
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
status = cli_jsonbool(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "Retyped", true);
|
|
|
|
if (status != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_push: no memory for json Retyped object\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
done:
|
2020-12-18 09:13:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_fmap_t *cli_recursion_stack_pop(cli_ctx *ctx)
|
2017-01-19 12:24:46 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cl_fmap_t *popped_map = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 == ctx->recursion_level) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("cli_recursion_stack_pop: recursion_level == 0, cannot pop off more layers!\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
/* If evidence (i.e. a collection of indicators / matches) were found for the popped layer, add it to the parents evidence */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Record contained matches in the parent layer's evidence.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA) {
|
|
|
|
size_t num_indicators;
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
json_object *parent_object = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level - 1].metadata_json;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get "ContainedIndicators" array */
|
|
|
|
json_object *contained_indicators = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(parent_object, "ContainedIndicators", &contained_indicators)) {
|
|
|
|
contained_indicators = json_object_new_array();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == contained_indicators) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_pop: no memory for json ContainedIndicators array\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(parent_object, "ContainedIndicators", contained_indicators);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != contained_indicators) {
|
|
|
|
/* Get each Strong indicator and add it */
|
|
|
|
num_indicators = evidence_num_indicators_type(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
IndicatorType_Strong);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_indicators; i++) {
|
|
|
|
size_t depth, object_id;
|
|
|
|
const char *indicator = evidence_get_indicator(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
IndicatorType_Strong,
|
|
|
|
i,
|
|
|
|
&depth,
|
|
|
|
&object_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != indicator) {
|
|
|
|
// Create json object containing name, type, depth, and object_id
|
|
|
|
json_object *match_obj = json_object_new_object();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == match_obj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_pop: no memory for json match object\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Name", json_object_new_string(indicator));
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Type", json_object_new_string("Strong"));
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Depth", json_object_new_uint64((uint64_t)depth + 1)); // depth + 1 because this is a child of the parent layer
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "ObjectID", json_object_new_uint64((uint64_t)object_id));
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(contained_indicators, match_obj);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get each Potentially Unwanted indicator and add it */
|
|
|
|
num_indicators = evidence_num_indicators_type(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
IndicatorType_PotentiallyUnwanted);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_indicators; i++) {
|
|
|
|
size_t depth, object_id;
|
|
|
|
const char *indicator = evidence_get_indicator(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
IndicatorType_PotentiallyUnwanted,
|
|
|
|
i,
|
|
|
|
&depth,
|
|
|
|
&object_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != indicator) {
|
|
|
|
// Create json object containing name, type, depth, and object_id
|
|
|
|
json_object *match_obj = json_object_new_object();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == match_obj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_pop: no memory for json match object\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Name", json_object_new_string(indicator));
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Type", json_object_new_string("PotentiallyUnwanted"));
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Depth", json_object_new_uint64((uint64_t)depth + 1)); // depth + 1 because this is a child of the parent layer
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "ObjectID", json_object_new_uint64((uint64_t)object_id));
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(contained_indicators, match_obj);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get each Weak indicator and add it */
|
|
|
|
num_indicators = evidence_num_indicators_type(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
IndicatorType_Weak);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_indicators; i++) {
|
|
|
|
size_t depth, object_id;
|
|
|
|
const char *indicator = evidence_get_indicator(
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence,
|
|
|
|
IndicatorType_Weak,
|
|
|
|
i,
|
|
|
|
&depth,
|
|
|
|
&object_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != indicator) {
|
|
|
|
// Create json object containing name, type, depth, and object_id
|
|
|
|
json_object *match_obj = json_object_new_object();
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == match_obj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_pop: no memory for json match object\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Name", json_object_new_string(indicator));
|
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Type", json_object_new_string("Weak"));
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
json_object_object_add(match_obj, "Depth", json_object_new_uint64((uint64_t)depth + 1)); // depth + 1 because this is a child of the parent layer
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json_object_object_add(match_obj, "ObjectID", json_object_new_uint64((uint64_t)object_id));
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
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json_object_array_add(contained_indicators, match_obj);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level - 1].evidence == NULL) {
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evidence_t parent_evidence = NULL;
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FFIError *new_evidence_error = NULL;
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if (!evidence_new_from_child(
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// child
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence,
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// new parent evidence
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&parent_evidence,
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NORMALIZED,
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&new_evidence_error)) {
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cli_errmsg("Failed create evidence for parent layer given child's evidence: %s\n",
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ffierror_fmt(new_evidence_error));
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if (NULL != new_evidence_error) {
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ffierror_free(new_evidence_error);
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}
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}
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level - 1].evidence = parent_evidence;
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} else {
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FFIError *add_evidence_error = NULL;
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if (!evidence_add_child_evidence(
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// parent
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level - 1].evidence,
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// child
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence,
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NORMALIZED,
|
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&add_evidence_error)) {
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cli_errmsg("Failed add child's evidence to parent's evidence: %s\n",
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ffierror_fmt(add_evidence_error));
|
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if (NULL != add_evidence_error) {
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ffierror_free(add_evidence_error);
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}
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}
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}
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evidence_free(ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence);
|
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ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence = NULL;
|
|
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}
|
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|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((ctx->engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_TMPDIR_RECURSION)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Delete the layer's temporary directory.
|
|
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|
* Use rmdir to remove empty tmp subdirectories. If rmdir fails, it wasn't empty. */
|
|
|
|
(void)rmdir(ctx->this_layer_tmpdir);
|
|
|
|
/* Free the temporary directory path */
|
|
|
|
free(ctx->this_layer_tmpdir);
|
|
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|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
/* save off the fmap to return it to the caller, in case they need it */
|
|
|
|
popped_map = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We're done with this layer, clear it */
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
memset(&ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level], 0, sizeof(cli_scan_layer_t));
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_level--;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the ctx->fmap convenience pointer to the current layer's fmap */
|
|
|
|
ctx->fmap = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].fmap;
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Set the ctx->this_layer_evidence convenience pointer to the current layer's evidence */
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence;
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if ((ctx->engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_TMPDIR_RECURSION)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Set the ctx->this_layer_tmpdir convenience pointer to the current layer's tmpdir */
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_tmpdir = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].tmpdir;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 01:33:26 -04:00
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA) {
|
|
|
|
/* Set the ctx->this_layer_metadata_json convenience pointer to the current layer's metadata_json */
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_metadata_json = ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].metadata_json;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-06-08 01:12:33 -04:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return popped_map;
|
2017-01-19 12:24:46 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Reassign the type of the current recursion stack layer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is used in two places:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Immediately after determining the file type at the top of cli_magic_scan().
|
|
|
|
* 2. When scanraw matches with a filetype signature designed to retype the file.
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
* TODO: Consider removing reassigning the type in this second case so that it would work the same way it does for
|
|
|
|
* HandlerType logical signatures. That is, by using `cli_recursion_stack_push()` with the new type.
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx The scanning context.
|
|
|
|
* @param type The new file type for the current recursion stack layer.
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @return CL_SUCCESS on success, or an error code on failure.
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_recursion_stack_change_type(cli_ctx *ctx, cli_file_t type, bool run_callback)
|
2017-01-19 12:24:46 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((NULL == ctx) ||
|
|
|
|
(NULL == ctx->recursion_stack) ||
|
|
|
|
(ctx->recursion_level >= ctx->recursion_stack_size)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_change_type: invalid context or recursion stack\n");
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].type = type;
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
if (run_callback) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Run the file_type callback.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
status = cli_dispatch_scan_callback(ctx, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != status) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
// If metadata is being collected, update the type in the metadata JSON object as well.
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && ctx->this_layer_metadata_json) {
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = cli_jsonstr(ctx->this_layer_metadata_json, "FileType", cli_ftname(type));
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_change_type: failed to reassign the FileType in metadata JSON: %s\n", cl_strerror(ret));
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
status = ret;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
libclamav: Add engine option to toggle temp directory recursion
Temp directory recursion in ClamAV is when each layer of a scan gets its
own temp directory in the parent layer's temp directory.
In addition to temp directory recursion, ClamAV has been creating a new
subdirectory for each file scan as a risk-adverse method to ensure
no temporary file leaks fill up the disk.
Creating a directory is relatively slow on Windows in particular if
scanning a lot of very small files.
This commit:
1. Separates the temp directory recursion feature from the leave-temps
feature so that libclamav can leave temp files without making
subdirectories for each file scanned.
2. Makes it so that when temp directory recursion is off, libclamav
will just use the configure temp directory for all files.
The new option to enable temp directory recursion is for libclamav-only
at this time. It is off by default, and you can enable it like this:
```c
cl_engine_set_num(engine, CL_ENGINE_TMPDIR_RECURSION, 1);
```
For the `clamscan` and `clamd` programs, temp directory recursion will
be enabled when `--leave-temps` / `LeaveTemporaryFiles` is enabled.
The difference is that when disabled, it will return to using the
configured temp directory without making a subdirectory for each file
scanned, so as to improve scan performance for small files, mostly on
Windows.
Under the hood, this commit also:
1. Cleans up how we keep track of tmpdirs for each layer.
The goal here is to align how we keep track of layer-specific stuff
using the scan_layer structure.
2. Cleans up how we record metadata JSON for embedded files.
Note: Embedded files being different from Contained files, as they
are extracted not with a parser, but by finding them with
file type magic signatures.
CLAM-1583
2025-06-09 20:42:31 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (status == CL_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_recursion_stack_change_type: failed to change type for current recursion stack layer\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Convert the desired index into the recursion stack to an actual index, excluding normalized layers.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Accepts negative indexes, which is in fact the primary use case.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For index:
|
|
|
|
* 0 == the outermost (bottom) layer of the stack.
|
|
|
|
* 1 == the first layer (probably never explicitly used).
|
|
|
|
* -1 == the present innermost (top) layer of the stack.
|
|
|
|
* -2 == the parent layer (or "container"). That is, the second from the top of the stack.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx The scanning context.
|
|
|
|
* @param index The index (probably negative) of the layer we think we want.
|
|
|
|
* @return int -1 if layer doesn't exist, else the index of the desired layer in the recursion_stack
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int recursion_stack_get(cli_ctx *ctx, int index)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int desired_layer;
|
|
|
|
int current_layer = (int)ctx->recursion_level;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (index < 0) {
|
|
|
|
desired_layer = ctx->recursion_level + index + 1; // The +1 is so that -1 == the current layer
|
|
|
|
// and -2 == the parent layer (the container)
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
desired_layer = index;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (desired_layer > current_layer) {
|
|
|
|
desired_layer = ctx->recursion_level + 1; // layer doesn't exist
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (current_layer >= desired_layer && current_layer > 0) {
|
2020-12-18 09:13:17 -08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->recursion_stack[current_layer].attributes & LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NORMALIZED) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
// The current layer is normalized, so we should step back an extra layer
|
|
|
|
// It's okay if desired_layer goes negative.
|
|
|
|
desired_layer--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_layer--;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return desired_layer;
|
2017-05-23 15:56:41 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
cli_file_t cli_recursion_stack_get_type(cli_ctx *ctx, int index)
|
2017-05-23 15:56:41 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
int index_ignoring_normalized_layers;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// translate requested index into index of non-normalized layer
|
|
|
|
index_ignoring_normalized_layers = recursion_stack_get(ctx, index);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 > index_ignoring_normalized_layers) {
|
|
|
|
// Layer too low, does not exist.
|
|
|
|
// Most likely we're at the top layer and there is no container. That's okay.
|
|
|
|
return CL_TYPE_ANY;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ctx->recursion_level < (uint32_t)index_ignoring_normalized_layers) {
|
|
|
|
// layer too high, does not exist. This should never happen!
|
|
|
|
return CL_TYPE_IGNORED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ctx->recursion_stack[index_ignoring_normalized_layers].type;
|
2017-01-19 12:24:46 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
size_t cli_recursion_stack_get_size(cli_ctx *ctx, int index)
|
2017-01-19 12:24:46 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
int index_ignoring_normalized_layers;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// translate requested index into index of non-normalized layer
|
|
|
|
index_ignoring_normalized_layers = recursion_stack_get(ctx, index);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 > index_ignoring_normalized_layers) {
|
|
|
|
// Layer too low, does not exist.
|
|
|
|
// Most likely we're at the top layer and there is no container. That's okay.
|
|
|
|
return ctx->recursion_stack[0].size;
|
2021-10-26 13:19:40 -07:00
|
|
|
} else if (ctx->recursion_level < (uint32_t)index_ignoring_normalized_layers) {
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
// layer too high, does not exist. This should never happen!
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
2021-09-11 14:15:21 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ctx->recursion_stack[index_ignoring_normalized_layers].size;
|
2017-01-19 12:24:46 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
#ifdef C_WINDOWS
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Windows doesn't allow you to delete a directory while it is still open
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
int cli_rmdirs(const char *dirname)
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF statb;
|
|
|
|
DIR *dd;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dent;
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
if (CLAMSTAT(dirname, &statb) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("cli_rmdirs: Can't locate %s: %s\n", dirname, cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(statb.st_mode)) {
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
if (cli_unlink(dirname)) return -1;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(dirname)) == NULL)
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd)) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(dent->d_name, "..") == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
path = malloc(strlen(dirname) + strlen(dent->d_name) + 2);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (path == NULL) {
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_rmdirs: Unable to allocate memory for path %u\n", strlen(dirname) + strlen(dent->d_name) + 2);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
sprintf(path, "%s\\%s", dirname, dent->d_name);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
rc = cli_rmdirs(path);
|
|
|
|
free(path);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
if (rmdir(dirname) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_rmdirs: Can't remove temporary directory %s: %s\n", dirname, cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
int cli_rmdirs(const char *dirname)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DIR *dd;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dent;
|
|
|
|
STATBUF maind, statbuf;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char err[128];
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
chmod(dirname, 0700);
|
|
|
|
if ((dd = opendir(dirname)) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
while (CLAMSTAT(dirname, &maind) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if (!rmdir(dirname)) break;
|
|
|
|
if (errno != ENOTEMPTY && errno != EEXIST && errno != EBADF) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_rmdirs: Can't remove temporary directory %s: %s\n", dirname, cli_strerror(errno, err, sizeof(err)));
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
while ((dent = readdir(dd))) {
|
|
|
|
if (dent->d_ino) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") && strcmp(dent->d_name, "..")) {
|
Remove max-allocation limits where not required
The cli_max_malloc, cli_max_calloc, and cli_max_realloc functions
provide a way to protect against allocating too much memory
when the size of the allocation is derived from the untrusted input.
Specifically, we worry about values in the file being scanned being
manipulated to exhaust the RAM and crash the application.
There is no need to check the limits if the size of the allocation
is fixed, or if the size of the allocation is necessary for signature
loading, or the general operation of the applications.
E.g. checking the max-allocation limit for the size of a hash, or
for the size of the scan recursion stack, is a complete waste of
time.
Although we significantly increased the max-allocation limit in
a recent release, it is best not to check an allocation if the
allocation will be safe. It would be a waste of time.
I am also hopeful that if we can reduce the number allocations
that require a limit-check to those that require it for the safe
scan of a file, then eventually we can store the limit in the scan-
context, and make it configurable.
2024-01-08 22:48:28 -05:00
|
|
|
path = malloc(strlen(dirname) + strlen(dent->d_name) + 2);
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!path) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_rmdirs: Unable to allocate memory for path %llu\n", (long long unsigned)(strlen(dirname) + strlen(dent->d_name) + 2));
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
sprintf(path, "%s" PATHSEP "%s", dirname, dent->d_name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* stat the file */
|
|
|
|
if (LSTAT(path, &statbuf) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISLNK(statbuf.st_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
if (rmdir(path) == -1) { /* can't be deleted */
|
|
|
|
if (errno == EACCES) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_rmdirs: Can't remove some temporary directories due to access problem.\n");
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
free(path);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
if (cli_rmdirs(path)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("cli_rmdirs: Can't remove nested directory %s\n", path);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(path);
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_unlink(path)) {
|
|
|
|
free(path);
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
free(path);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
rewinddir(dd);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2003-07-29 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-01-03 18:40:48 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
closedir(dd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-08-11 16:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2004-03-26 09:37:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-10-25 22:38:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Implement a generic bitset, trog@clamav.net */
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define BITS_PER_CHAR (8)
|
|
|
|
#define BITSET_DEFAULT_SIZE (1024)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long nearest_power(unsigned long num)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned long n = BITSET_DEFAULT_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (n < num) {
|
|
|
|
n <<= 1;
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return n;
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-10 18:50:26 +00:00
|
|
|
bitset_t *cli_bitset_init(void)
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
bitset_t *bs;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-08 14:59:09 -07:00
|
|
|
bs = malloc(sizeof(bitset_t));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!bs) {
|
2016-02-22 13:26:15 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_bitset_init: Unable to allocate memory for bs %llu\n", (long long unsigned)sizeof(bitset_t));
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bs->length = BITSET_DEFAULT_SIZE;
|
2024-01-09 17:17:48 -05:00
|
|
|
bs->bitset = calloc(BITSET_DEFAULT_SIZE, 1);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!bs->bitset) {
|
2013-03-01 13:51:15 -05:00
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cli_bitset_init: Unable to allocate memory for bs->bitset %u\n", BITSET_DEFAULT_SIZE);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
free(bs);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return bs;
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void cli_bitset_free(bitset_t *bs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!bs) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bs->bitset) {
|
|
|
|
free(bs->bitset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(bs);
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bitset_t *bitset_realloc(bitset_t *bs, unsigned long min_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned long new_length;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *new_bitset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new_length = nearest_power(min_size);
|
2022-05-09 14:28:34 -07:00
|
|
|
new_bitset = (unsigned char *)cli_max_realloc(bs->bitset, new_length);
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!new_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bs->bitset = new_bitset;
|
|
|
|
memset(bs->bitset + bs->length, 0, new_length - bs->length);
|
|
|
|
bs->length = new_length;
|
|
|
|
return bs;
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int cli_bitset_set(bitset_t *bs, unsigned long bit_offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned long char_offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char_offset = bit_offset / BITS_PER_CHAR;
|
|
|
|
bit_offset = bit_offset % BITS_PER_CHAR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (char_offset >= bs->length) {
|
|
|
|
bs = bitset_realloc(bs, char_offset + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!bs) {
|
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bs->bitset[char_offset] |= ((unsigned char)1 << bit_offset);
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int cli_bitset_test(bitset_t *bs, unsigned long bit_offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
unsigned long char_offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char_offset = bit_offset / BITS_PER_CHAR;
|
|
|
|
bit_offset = bit_offset % BITS_PER_CHAR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (char_offset >= bs->length) {
|
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (bs->bitset[char_offset] & ((unsigned char)1 << bit_offset));
|
2005-10-18 10:32:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-06-22 15:41:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
libclamav: scan-layer callback API functions
Add the following scan callbacks:
```c
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_hash_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &pre_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &post_scan_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &alert_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT);
cl_engine_set_scan_callback(engine, &file_type_callback, CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE);
```
Each callback may alter scan behavior using the following return codes:
* CL_BREAK
Scan aborted by callback (the rest of the scan is skipped).
This does not mark the file as clean or infected, it just skips the rest of the scan.
* CL_SUCCESS / CL_CLEAN
File scan will continue.
This is different than CL_VERIFIED because it does not affect prior or future alerts.
Return CL_VERIFIED instead if you want to remove prior alerts for this layer and skip
the rest of the scan for this layer.
* CL_VIRUS
This means you don't trust the file. A new alert will be added.
For CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT: Means you agree with the alert (no extra alert needed).
* CL_VERIFIED
Layer explicitly trusted by the callback and previous alerts removed FOR THIS layer.
You might want to do this if you trust the hash or verified a digital signature.
The rest of the scan will be skipped FOR THIS layer.
For contained files, this does NOT mean that the parent or adjacent layers are trusted.
Each callback is given a pointer to the current scan layer from which
they can get previous layers, can get the the layer's fmap, and then
various attributes of the layer and of the fmap such as:
- layer recursion level
- layer object id
- layer file type
- layer attributes (was decerypted, normalized, embedded, or re-typed)
- layer last alert
- fmap name
- fmap hash (md5, sha1, or sha2-256)
- fmap data (pointer and size)
- fmap file descriptor, if any (fd, offset, size)
- fmap filepath, if any (filepath, offset, size)
To make this possible, this commits introduced a handful of new APIs to
query scan-layer details and fmap details:
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *name);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_name(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char *path);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_path(cl_fmap_t *map, const char **path_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_fd(const cl_fmap_t *map, int *fd_out, size_t *offset_out, size_t *len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_size(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t *size_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_set_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, char hash);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_have_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, bool *have_hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_will_need_hash_later(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_hash(const cl_fmap_t *map, const char *hash_alg, const char **hash_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_fmap_get_data(const cl_fmap_t *map, size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t **data_out, size_t *data_len_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_fmap(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_fmap_t **fmap_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_parent_layer(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, cl_scan_layer_t **parent_layer_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_type(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **type_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_recursion_level(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *recursion_level_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_object_id(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint64_t *object_id_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_last_alert(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, const char **alert_name_out);`
- `cl_error_t cl_scan_layer_get_attributes(cl_scan_layer_t *layer, uint32_t *attributes_out);`
This commit deprecates but does not remove the existing scan callbacks:
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback);`
- `void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback);`
This commit also adds an interactive test program to demonstrate the callbacks.
See: `examples/ex_scan_callbacks.c`
CLAM-255
CLAM-2485
CLAM-2626
2025-06-22 14:37:03 -04:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_scan_callback(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_scan callback, cl_scan_callback_t location)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (location) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH:
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_scan_pre_hash = callback;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN:
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_scan_pre_scan = callback;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN:
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_scan_post_scan = callback;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT:
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_scan_alert = callback;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE:
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_scan_file_type = callback;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("cl_engine_set_scan_callback: Invalid scan callback location %d\n", location);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define PRE_HASH_NAME "PreHash"
|
|
|
|
#define PRE_SCAN_NAME "PreScan"
|
|
|
|
#define POST_SCAN_NAME "PostScan"
|
|
|
|
#define ALERT_NAME "Alert"
|
|
|
|
#define FILE_TYPE_NAME "FileType"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_dispatch_scan_callback(cli_ctx *ctx, cl_scan_callback_t location)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
cl_scan_layer_t *current_layer;
|
|
|
|
clcb_scan callback = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
|
|
status = CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine which callback to use.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (location) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH:
|
|
|
|
callback = ctx->engine->cb_scan_pre_hash;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN:
|
|
|
|
callback = ctx->engine->cb_scan_pre_scan;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN:
|
|
|
|
callback = ctx->engine->cb_scan_post_scan;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT:
|
|
|
|
callback = ctx->engine->cb_scan_alert;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE:
|
|
|
|
callback = ctx->engine->cb_scan_file_type;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EARG;
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("dispatch_scan_callback: Invalid callback location\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == callback) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Callback is not set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (location == CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT) {
|
|
|
|
// Accept the alert.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_VIRUS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Keep scanning.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_layer = (cl_scan_layer_t *)&ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Call the callback function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Add performance measurements around the new callback specific to each callback location.
|
|
|
|
// perf_start(ctx, PERFT_PRECB);
|
|
|
|
status = callback(
|
|
|
|
current_layer, // current scan layer
|
|
|
|
ctx->cb_ctx // application context
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// perf_stop(ctx, PERFT_PRECB);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Interpret the return code from the callback.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (status) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_BREAK: {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("dispatch_scan_callback: scan aborted by callback\n");
|
|
|
|
ctx->abort_scan = true;
|
|
|
|
} break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case CL_SUCCESS /* aka CL_CLEAN */: {
|
|
|
|
// An alert callback returning CL_SUCCESS/CL_CLEAN means to ignore this alert and keep scanning.
|
|
|
|
// Other scan callbacks returning CL_SUCCESS means to keep scanning.
|
|
|
|
// Regardless, we return CL_SUCCESS here. The calling function will decide what to do next.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
} break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case CL_VIRUS: {
|
|
|
|
if (location == CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT) {
|
|
|
|
// An alert callback returning CL_VIRUS means to accept the alert.
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Other scan callbacks returning CL_VIRUS the application wants to alert on the file.
|
|
|
|
const char *virus_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
switch (location) {
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_HASH:
|
|
|
|
virus_name = "Detected.By.Callback." PRE_HASH_NAME;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_PRE_SCAN:
|
|
|
|
virus_name = "Detected.By.Callback." PRE_SCAN_NAME;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_POST_SCAN:
|
|
|
|
virus_name = "Detected.By.Callback." POST_SCAN_NAME;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT:
|
|
|
|
virus_name = "Detected.By.Callback." ALERT_NAME;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_FILE_TYPE:
|
|
|
|
virus_name = "Detected.By.Callback." FILE_TYPE_NAME;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = cli_append_virus(ctx, virus_name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("dispatch_scan_callback: Alert added by callback\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case CL_VERIFIED: {
|
|
|
|
// An alert callback returning CL_VERIFIED means the application verified the current layer as clean.
|
|
|
|
// So we need to remove any alerts for this layer and return CL_VERIFIED (will stop scanning this layer).
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("dispatch_scan_callback: Layer verified clean by callback\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
evidence_free(ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence);
|
|
|
|
ctx->recursion_stack[ctx->recursion_level].evidence = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->this_layer_evidence = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_VERIFIED;
|
|
|
|
} break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default: {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("dispatch_scan_callback: Ignoring bad return code from callback\n");
|
|
|
|
if (location == CL_SCAN_CALLBACK_ALERT) {
|
|
|
|
// Accept the alert.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_VIRUS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Keep scanning.
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_cache(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_cache callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-06-14 17:00:06 +02:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_pre_cache = callback;
|
2010-06-22 15:41:19 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 09:13:17 -08:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_inspection(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_inspection callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_file_inspection = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_pre_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_pre_scan callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-06-14 17:00:06 +02:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_pre_scan = callback;
|
2011-06-14 03:26:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_post_scan(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_post_scan callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-06-22 15:41:19 +02:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_post_scan = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_virus_found(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_virus_found callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-10-01 17:47:37 -04:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_virus_found = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-03 12:40:13 -05:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_sigload(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_sigload callback, void *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload = callback;
|
2010-06-22 15:41:19 +02:00
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload_ctx = callback ? context : NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-11-02 12:26:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-07-16 11:47:23 -07:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_sigload_progress(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_progress callback, void *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload_progress = callback;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_sigload_progress_ctx = callback ? context : NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_engine_compile_progress(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_progress callback, void *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_compile_progress = callback;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_compile_progress_ctx = callback ? context : NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_engine_free_progress(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_progress callback, void *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_free_progress = callback;
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_engine_free_progress_ctx = callback ? context : NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-02 12:26:33 +02:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_hash(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_hash callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_hash = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-22 15:22:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_meta(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_meta callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_meta = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-03 13:31:50 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-27 13:21:49 -04:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_file_props(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_file_props callback)
|
2014-06-03 13:31:50 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_file_props = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-08-11 18:51:42 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-02 17:23:46 -08:00
|
|
|
void cl_engine_set_clcb_vba(struct cl_engine *engine, clcb_generic_data callback)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
engine->cb_vba = callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-11 18:51:42 -07:00
|
|
|
uint8_t cli_get_debug_flag()
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return cli_debug_flag;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t cli_set_debug_flag(uint8_t debug_flag)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t was = cli_debug_flag;
|
|
|
|
cli_debug_flag = debug_flag;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return was;
|
|
|
|
}
|