diff --git a/Lib/email/header.py b/Lib/email/header.py index f90883fe954..35cdb2b4056 100644 --- a/Lib/email/header.py +++ b/Lib/email/header.py @@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ # For use with .match() fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$') +# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for +# header injection attack. +_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:') + # Helpers @@ -320,7 +324,11 @@ def encode(self, splitchars=';, \t', maxlinelen=None, linesep='\n'): if len(lines) > 1: formatter.newline() formatter.add_transition() - return formatter._str(linesep) + value = formatter._str(linesep) + if _embeded_header.search(value): + raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain " + "an embedded header: {!r}".format(value)) + return value def _normalize(self): # Step 1: Normalize the chunks so that all runs of identical charsets diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py index a1798ceb241..e4083ad63a6 100644 --- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py +++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py @@ -561,6 +561,18 @@ def test_nonascii_add_header_with_tspecial(self): "attachment; filename*=utf-8''Fu%C3%9Fballer%20%5Bfilename%5D.ppt", msg['Content-Disposition']) + # Issue 5871: reject an attempt to embed a header inside a header value + # (header injection attack). + def test_embeded_header_via_Header_rejected(self): + msg = Message() + msg['Dummy'] = Header('dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test') + self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string) + + def test_embeded_header_via_string_rejected(self): + msg = Message() + msg['Dummy'] = 'dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test' + self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string) + # Test the email.encoders module class TestEncoders(unittest.TestCase): diff --git a/Misc/NEWS b/Misc/NEWS index c1d42604630..2f8b6dbf2df 100644 --- a/Misc/NEWS +++ b/Misc/NEWS @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ Core and Builtins Library ------- +- Issue #5871: email.header.Header.encode now raises an error if any + continuation line in the formatted value has no leading white space + and looks like a header. Since Generator uses Header to format all + headers, this check is made for all headers in any serialized message + at serialization time. This provides protection against header + injection attacks. + - Issue #10859: Make ``contextlib.GeneratorContextManager`` officially private by renaming it to ``_GeneratorContextManager``.