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Done with this for 1.4.
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Guido van Rossum
parent
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commit
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4 changed files with 192 additions and 132 deletions
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@ -1,34 +1,35 @@
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\chapter{Restricted Execution}
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In general, executing Python programs have complete access to the
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underlying operating system through the various functions and classes
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contained in Python's modules. For example, a Python program can open
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any file\footnote{Provided the underlying OS gives you permission!}
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for reading and writing by using the
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\code{open()} built-in function. This is exactly what you want for
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most applications.
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In general, Python programs have complete access to the underlying
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operating system throug the various functions and classes, For
|
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example, a Python program can open any file for reading and writing by
|
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using the \code{open()} built-in function (provided the underlying OS
|
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gives you permission!). This is exactly what you want for most
|
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applications.
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There is a class of applications for which this ``openness'' is
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inappropriate. Imagine a web browser that accepts ``applets'', snippets of
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Python code, from anywhere on the Internet for execution on the local
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system. Since the originator of the code is unknown, it is obvious that it
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cannot be trusted with the full resources of the local machine.
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There exists a class of applications for which this ``openness'' is
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inappropriate. Take Grail: a web browser that accepts ``applets'',
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snippets of Python code, from anywhere on the Internet for execution
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on the local system. This can be used to improve the user interface
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of forms, for instance. Since the originator of the code is unknown,
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it is obvious that it cannot be trusted with the full resources of the
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local machine.
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\emph{Restricted execution} is the basic Python framework that allows
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\emph{Restricted execution} is the basic framework in Python that allows
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for the segregation of trusted and untrusted code. It is based on the
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notion that trusted Python code (a \emph{supervisor}) can create a
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``padded cell' (or environment) of limited permissions, and run the
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``padded cell' (or environment) with limited permissions, and run the
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untrusted code within this cell. The untrusted code cannot break out
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of its cell, and can only interact with sensitive system resources
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through interfaces defined, and managed by the trusted code. The term
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``restricted execution'' is favored over the term ``safe-Python''
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through interfaces defined and managed by the trusted code. The term
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``restricted execution'' is favored over ``safe-Python''
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since true safety is hard to define, and is determined by the way the
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restricted environment is created. Note that the restricted
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environments can be nested, with inner cells creating subcells of
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lesser, but never greater, privledge.
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lesser, but never greater, privilege.
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An interesting aspect of Python's restricted execution model is that
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the attributes presented to untrusted code usually have the same names
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the interfaces presented to untrusted code usually have the same names
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as those presented to trusted code. Therefore no special interfaces
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need to be learned to write code designed to run in a restricted
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environment. And because the exact nature of the padded cell is
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@ -42,11 +43,22 @@ may redefine the built-in
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\code{chroot()}-like operation on the \var{filename} parameter, such
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that root is always relative to some safe ``sandbox'' area of the
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filesystem. In this case, the untrusted code would still see an
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\code{open()} function in its \code{__builtin__} module, with the same
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built-in \code{open()} function in its environment, with the same
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calling interface. The semantics would be identical too, with
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\code{IOError}s being raised when the supervisor determined that an
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unallowable parameter is being used.
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The Python run-time determines whether a particular code block is
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executing in restricted execution mode based on the identity of the
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\code{__builtins__} object in its global variables: if this is (the
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dictionary of) the standard \code{__builtin__} module, the code is
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deemed to be unrestricted, else it is deemed to be restricted.
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Python code executing in restricted mode faces a number of limitations
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that are designed to prevent it from escaping from the padded cell.
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For instance, the function object attribute \code{func_globals} and the
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class and instance object attribute \code{__dict__} are unavailable.
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Two modules provide the framework for setting up restricted execution
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environments:
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@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ This module contains the \code{RExec} class, which supports
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\code{r_exec()}, \code{r_eval()}, \code{r_execfile()}, and
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\code{r_import()} methods, which are restricted versions of the standard
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Python functions \code{exec()}, \code{eval()}, \code{execfile()}, and
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\code{import()}. Code executed in this restricted environment will
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the \code{import} statement.
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Code executed in this restricted environment will
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only have access to modules and functions that are deemed safe; you
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can subclass \code{RExec} to add or remove capabilities as desired.
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@ -14,14 +15,13 @@ can subclass \code{RExec} to add or remove capabilities as desired.
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unsafe operations like reading or writing disk files, or using TCP/IP
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sockets. However, it does not protect against code using extremely
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large amounts of memory or CPU time.
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% XXX is there any protection against this?
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\begin{funcdesc}{RExec}{\optional{hooks\, verbose} }
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\begin{funcdesc}{RExec}{\optional{hooks\optional{\, verbose}}}
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Returns an instance of the \code{RExec} class.
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% XXX is ihooks.py documented? If yes, there should be a ref here
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\var{hooks} is an instance of the \code{RHooks} class or a subclass of it.
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If it is omitted or \code{None}, the default \code{RHooks} class is
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instantiated.
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Whenever the RExec module searches for a module (even a built-in one)
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or reads a module's code, it doesn't actually go out to the file
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system itself. Rather, it calls methods of an RHooks instance that
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ object doesn't make these calls---they are made by a module loader
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object that's part of the RExec object. This allows another level of
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flexibility, e.g. using packages.)
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By providing an alternate RHooks object, we can control the actual
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By providing an alternate RHooks object, we can control the
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file system accesses made to import a module, without changing the
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actual algorithm that controls the order in which those accesses are
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made. For instance, we could substitute an RHooks object that passes
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@ -38,12 +38,11 @@ all filesystem requests to a file server elsewhere, via some RPC
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mechanism such as ILU. Grail's applet loader uses this to support
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importing applets from a URL for a directory.
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% XXX does verbose actually do anything at the moment?
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If \var{verbose} is true, additional debugging output will be sent to
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If \var{verbose} is true, additional debugging output may be sent to
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standard output.
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\end{funcdesc}
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RExec instances have the following attributes, which are used by the
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The RExec class has the following class attributes, which are used by the
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\code{__init__} method. Changing them on an existing instance won't
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have any effect; instead, create a subclass of \code{RExec} and assign
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them new values in the class definition. Instances of the new class
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@ -54,22 +53,31 @@ strings.
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\begin{datadesc}{nok_builtin_names}
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Contains the names of built-in functions which will \emph{not} be
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available to programs running in the restricted environment. The
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value for \code{RExec} is \code{('open',} \code{reload',}
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\code{__import__')}.
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value for \code{RExec} is \code{('open',} \code{'reload',}
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\code{'__import__')}. (This gives the exceptions, because by far the
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majority of built-in functions are harmless. A subclass that wants to
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override this variable should probably start with the value from the
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base class and concatenate additional forbidden functions --- when new
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dangerous built-in functions are added to Python, they will also be
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added to this module.)
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\end{datadesc}
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\begin{datadesc}{ok_builtin_modules}
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Contains the names of built-in modules which can be safely imported.
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The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('array',} \code{'binascii',} \code{'audioop',}
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\code{'imageop',} \code{'marshal',} \code{'math',} \code{'md5',} \code{'parser',} \code{'regex',} \code{'rotor',}
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\code{'select',} \code{'strop',} \code{'struct',} \code{'time')}.
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The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('audioop',} \code{'array',}
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\code{'binascii',} \code{'cmath',} \code{'errno',} \code{'imageop',}
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\code{'marshal',} \code{'math',} \code{'md5',} \code{'operator',}
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\code{'parser',} \code{'regex',} \code{'rotor',} \code{'select',}
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\code{'strop',} \code{'struct',} \code{'time')}. A similar remark
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about overriding this variable applies --- use the value from the base
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class as a starting point.
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\end{datadesc}
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\begin{datadesc}{ok_path}
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Contains the directories which will be searched when an \code{import}
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is performed in the restricted environment.
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The value for \code{RExec} is the same as \code{sys.path} for
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unrestricted code.
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The value for \code{RExec} is the same as \code{sys.path} (at the time
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the module is loaded) for unrestricted code.
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\end{datadesc}
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\begin{datadesc}{ok_posix_names}
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@ -84,35 +92,38 @@ value for \code{RExec} is \code{('error',} \code{'fstat',}
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\end{datadesc}
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\begin{datadesc}{ok_sys_names}
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Contains the names of the functions and variables in the \code{sys} module which will be
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available to programs running in the restricted environment. The
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value for \code{RExec} is \code{('ps1',} \code{'ps2',}
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\code{'copyright',} \code{'version',} \code{'platform',} \code{'exit',}
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\code{'maxint')}.
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Contains the names of the functions and variables in the \code{sys}
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module which will be available to programs running in the restricted
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environment. The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('ps1',}
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\code{'ps2',} \code{'copyright',} \code{'version',} \code{'platform',}
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\code{'exit',} \code{'maxint')}.
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\end{datadesc}
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RExec instances support the following methods:
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\renewcommand{\indexsubitem}{(RExec object method)}
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_eval}{code}
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\var{code} must either be a string containing a Python expression, or a compiled code object, which will
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be evaluated in the restricted environment. The value of the expression or code object will be returned.
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\var{code} must either be a string containing a Python expression, or
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a compiled code object, which will be evaluated in the restricted
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environment's \code{__main__} module. The value of the expression or
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code object will be returned.
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\end{funcdesc}
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_exec}{code}
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\var{code} must either be a string containing one or more lines of Python code, or a compiled code object,
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which will be executed in the restricted environment.
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\var{code} must either be a string containing one or more lines of
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Python code, or a compiled code object, which will be executed in the
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restricted environment's \code{__main__} module.
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\end{funcdesc}
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_execfile}{filename}
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Execute the Python code contained in the file \var{filename} in the
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restricted environment.
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restricted environment's \code{__main__} module.
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\end{funcdesc}
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Methods whose names begin with \code{s_} are similar to the functions
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beginning with \code{r_}, but the code will be granted access to
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restricted versions of \code{sys.stdin}, \code{sys.stderr}, and
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\code{sys.stdout}.
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restricted versions of the standard I/O streans \code{sys.stdin},
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\code{sys.stderr}, and \code{sys.stdout}.
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\begin{funcdesc}{s_eval}{code}
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\var{code} must be a string containing a Python expression, which will
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@ -129,13 +140,14 @@ Execute the Python code contained in the file \var{filename} in the
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restricted environment.
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\end{funcdesc}
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\code{RExec} objects must also support various methods which will be implicitly called
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by code executing in the restricted environment. Overriding these
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methods in a subclass is used to change the policies enforced by a restricted environment.
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\code{RExec} objects must also support various methods which will be
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implicitly called by code executing in the restricted environment.
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Overriding these methods in a subclass is used to change the policies
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enforced by a restricted environment.
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals, locals, fromlist}}
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Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError} exception
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if the module is considered unsafe.
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals\, locals\, fromlist}}
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Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError}
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exception if the module is considered unsafe.
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\end{funcdesc}
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_open}{filename\optional{\, mode\optional{\, bufsize}}}
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@ -144,7 +156,8 @@ environment. The arguments are identical to those of \code{open()},
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and a file object (or a class instance compatible with file objects)
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should be returned. \code{RExec}'s default behaviour is allow opening
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any file for reading, but forbidding any attempt to write a file. See
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the example below for an implementation of a less restrictive \code{r_open()}.
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the example below for an implementation of a less restrictive
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\code{r_open()}.
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\end{funcdesc}
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_reload}{module}
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|
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@ -152,13 +165,15 @@ Reload the module object \var{module}, re-parsing and re-initializing it.
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\end{funcdesc}
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\begin{funcdesc}{r_unload}{module}
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Unload the module object \var{module}.
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% XXX what are the semantics of this?
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Unload the module object \var{module} (i.e., remove it from the
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restricted environment's \code{sys.modules} dictionary).
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\end{funcdesc}
|
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|
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And their equivalents with access to restricted standard I/O streams:
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\begin{funcdesc}{s_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals, locals, fromlist}}
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Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError} exception
|
||||
if the module is considered unsafe.
|
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Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError}
|
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exception if the module is considered unsafe.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
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\begin{funcdesc}{s_reload}{module}
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|
|
@ -179,13 +194,16 @@ standard RExec class. For example, if we're willing to allow files in
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\bcode\begin{verbatim}
|
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class TmpWriterRExec(rexec.RExec):
|
||||
def r_open(self, file, mode='r', buf=-1):
|
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if mode in ('r', 'rb'): pass
|
||||
elif mode in ('w', 'wb'):
|
||||
if mode in ('r', 'rb'):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
elif mode in ('w', 'wb', 'a', 'ab'):
|
||||
# check filename : must begin with /tmp/
|
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if file[0:5]!='/tmp/':
|
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raise IOError, "can't open files for writing outside of /tmp"
|
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elif string.find(file, '/../')!=-1:
|
||||
raise IOError, "'..' in filename; open for writing forbidden"
|
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if file[:5]!='/tmp/':
|
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raise IOError, "can't write outside /tmp"
|
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elif (string.find(file, '/../') >= 0 or
|
||||
file[:3] == '../' or file[-3:] == '/..'):
|
||||
raise IOError, "'..' in filename forbidden"
|
||||
else: raise IOError, "Illegal open() mode"
|
||||
return open(file, mode, buf)
|
||||
\end{verbatim}\ecode
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,34 +1,35 @@
|
|||
\chapter{Restricted Execution}
|
||||
|
||||
In general, executing Python programs have complete access to the
|
||||
underlying operating system through the various functions and classes
|
||||
contained in Python's modules. For example, a Python program can open
|
||||
any file\footnote{Provided the underlying OS gives you permission!}
|
||||
for reading and writing by using the
|
||||
\code{open()} built-in function. This is exactly what you want for
|
||||
most applications.
|
||||
In general, Python programs have complete access to the underlying
|
||||
operating system throug the various functions and classes, For
|
||||
example, a Python program can open any file for reading and writing by
|
||||
using the \code{open()} built-in function (provided the underlying OS
|
||||
gives you permission!). This is exactly what you want for most
|
||||
applications.
|
||||
|
||||
There is a class of applications for which this ``openness'' is
|
||||
inappropriate. Imagine a web browser that accepts ``applets'', snippets of
|
||||
Python code, from anywhere on the Internet for execution on the local
|
||||
system. Since the originator of the code is unknown, it is obvious that it
|
||||
cannot be trusted with the full resources of the local machine.
|
||||
There exists a class of applications for which this ``openness'' is
|
||||
inappropriate. Take Grail: a web browser that accepts ``applets'',
|
||||
snippets of Python code, from anywhere on the Internet for execution
|
||||
on the local system. This can be used to improve the user interface
|
||||
of forms, for instance. Since the originator of the code is unknown,
|
||||
it is obvious that it cannot be trusted with the full resources of the
|
||||
local machine.
|
||||
|
||||
\emph{Restricted execution} is the basic Python framework that allows
|
||||
\emph{Restricted execution} is the basic framework in Python that allows
|
||||
for the segregation of trusted and untrusted code. It is based on the
|
||||
notion that trusted Python code (a \emph{supervisor}) can create a
|
||||
``padded cell' (or environment) of limited permissions, and run the
|
||||
``padded cell' (or environment) with limited permissions, and run the
|
||||
untrusted code within this cell. The untrusted code cannot break out
|
||||
of its cell, and can only interact with sensitive system resources
|
||||
through interfaces defined, and managed by the trusted code. The term
|
||||
``restricted execution'' is favored over the term ``safe-Python''
|
||||
through interfaces defined and managed by the trusted code. The term
|
||||
``restricted execution'' is favored over ``safe-Python''
|
||||
since true safety is hard to define, and is determined by the way the
|
||||
restricted environment is created. Note that the restricted
|
||||
environments can be nested, with inner cells creating subcells of
|
||||
lesser, but never greater, privledge.
|
||||
lesser, but never greater, privilege.
|
||||
|
||||
An interesting aspect of Python's restricted execution model is that
|
||||
the attributes presented to untrusted code usually have the same names
|
||||
the interfaces presented to untrusted code usually have the same names
|
||||
as those presented to trusted code. Therefore no special interfaces
|
||||
need to be learned to write code designed to run in a restricted
|
||||
environment. And because the exact nature of the padded cell is
|
||||
|
|
@ -42,11 +43,22 @@ may redefine the built-in
|
|||
\code{chroot()}-like operation on the \var{filename} parameter, such
|
||||
that root is always relative to some safe ``sandbox'' area of the
|
||||
filesystem. In this case, the untrusted code would still see an
|
||||
\code{open()} function in its \code{__builtin__} module, with the same
|
||||
built-in \code{open()} function in its environment, with the same
|
||||
calling interface. The semantics would be identical too, with
|
||||
\code{IOError}s being raised when the supervisor determined that an
|
||||
unallowable parameter is being used.
|
||||
|
||||
The Python run-time determines whether a particular code block is
|
||||
executing in restricted execution mode based on the identity of the
|
||||
\code{__builtins__} object in its global variables: if this is (the
|
||||
dictionary of) the standard \code{__builtin__} module, the code is
|
||||
deemed to be unrestricted, else it is deemed to be restricted.
|
||||
|
||||
Python code executing in restricted mode faces a number of limitations
|
||||
that are designed to prevent it from escaping from the padded cell.
|
||||
For instance, the function object attribute \code{func_globals} and the
|
||||
class and instance object attribute \code{__dict__} are unavailable.
|
||||
|
||||
Two modules provide the framework for setting up restricted execution
|
||||
environments:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
108
Doc/librexec.tex
108
Doc/librexec.tex
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ This module contains the \code{RExec} class, which supports
|
|||
\code{r_exec()}, \code{r_eval()}, \code{r_execfile()}, and
|
||||
\code{r_import()} methods, which are restricted versions of the standard
|
||||
Python functions \code{exec()}, \code{eval()}, \code{execfile()}, and
|
||||
\code{import()}. Code executed in this restricted environment will
|
||||
the \code{import} statement.
|
||||
Code executed in this restricted environment will
|
||||
only have access to modules and functions that are deemed safe; you
|
||||
can subclass \code{RExec} to add or remove capabilities as desired.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,14 +15,13 @@ can subclass \code{RExec} to add or remove capabilities as desired.
|
|||
unsafe operations like reading or writing disk files, or using TCP/IP
|
||||
sockets. However, it does not protect against code using extremely
|
||||
large amounts of memory or CPU time.
|
||||
% XXX is there any protection against this?
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{RExec}{\optional{hooks\, verbose} }
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{RExec}{\optional{hooks\optional{\, verbose}}}
|
||||
Returns an instance of the \code{RExec} class.
|
||||
|
||||
% XXX is ihooks.py documented? If yes, there should be a ref here
|
||||
|
||||
\var{hooks} is an instance of the \code{RHooks} class or a subclass of it.
|
||||
If it is omitted or \code{None}, the default \code{RHooks} class is
|
||||
instantiated.
|
||||
Whenever the RExec module searches for a module (even a built-in one)
|
||||
or reads a module's code, it doesn't actually go out to the file
|
||||
system itself. Rather, it calls methods of an RHooks instance that
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ object doesn't make these calls---they are made by a module loader
|
|||
object that's part of the RExec object. This allows another level of
|
||||
flexibility, e.g. using packages.)
|
||||
|
||||
By providing an alternate RHooks object, we can control the actual
|
||||
By providing an alternate RHooks object, we can control the
|
||||
file system accesses made to import a module, without changing the
|
||||
actual algorithm that controls the order in which those accesses are
|
||||
made. For instance, we could substitute an RHooks object that passes
|
||||
|
|
@ -38,12 +38,11 @@ all filesystem requests to a file server elsewhere, via some RPC
|
|||
mechanism such as ILU. Grail's applet loader uses this to support
|
||||
importing applets from a URL for a directory.
|
||||
|
||||
% XXX does verbose actually do anything at the moment?
|
||||
If \var{verbose} is true, additional debugging output will be sent to
|
||||
If \var{verbose} is true, additional debugging output may be sent to
|
||||
standard output.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
RExec instances have the following attributes, which are used by the
|
||||
The RExec class has the following class attributes, which are used by the
|
||||
\code{__init__} method. Changing them on an existing instance won't
|
||||
have any effect; instead, create a subclass of \code{RExec} and assign
|
||||
them new values in the class definition. Instances of the new class
|
||||
|
|
@ -54,22 +53,31 @@ strings.
|
|||
\begin{datadesc}{nok_builtin_names}
|
||||
Contains the names of built-in functions which will \emph{not} be
|
||||
available to programs running in the restricted environment. The
|
||||
value for \code{RExec} is \code{('open',} \code{reload',}
|
||||
\code{__import__')}.
|
||||
value for \code{RExec} is \code{('open',} \code{'reload',}
|
||||
\code{'__import__')}. (This gives the exceptions, because by far the
|
||||
majority of built-in functions are harmless. A subclass that wants to
|
||||
override this variable should probably start with the value from the
|
||||
base class and concatenate additional forbidden functions --- when new
|
||||
dangerous built-in functions are added to Python, they will also be
|
||||
added to this module.)
|
||||
\end{datadesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{datadesc}{ok_builtin_modules}
|
||||
Contains the names of built-in modules which can be safely imported.
|
||||
The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('array',} \code{'binascii',} \code{'audioop',}
|
||||
\code{'imageop',} \code{'marshal',} \code{'math',} \code{'md5',} \code{'parser',} \code{'regex',} \code{'rotor',}
|
||||
\code{'select',} \code{'strop',} \code{'struct',} \code{'time')}.
|
||||
The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('audioop',} \code{'array',}
|
||||
\code{'binascii',} \code{'cmath',} \code{'errno',} \code{'imageop',}
|
||||
\code{'marshal',} \code{'math',} \code{'md5',} \code{'operator',}
|
||||
\code{'parser',} \code{'regex',} \code{'rotor',} \code{'select',}
|
||||
\code{'strop',} \code{'struct',} \code{'time')}. A similar remark
|
||||
about overriding this variable applies --- use the value from the base
|
||||
class as a starting point.
|
||||
\end{datadesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{datadesc}{ok_path}
|
||||
Contains the directories which will be searched when an \code{import}
|
||||
is performed in the restricted environment.
|
||||
The value for \code{RExec} is the same as \code{sys.path} for
|
||||
unrestricted code.
|
||||
The value for \code{RExec} is the same as \code{sys.path} (at the time
|
||||
the module is loaded) for unrestricted code.
|
||||
\end{datadesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{datadesc}{ok_posix_names}
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,35 +92,38 @@ value for \code{RExec} is \code{('error',} \code{'fstat',}
|
|||
\end{datadesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{datadesc}{ok_sys_names}
|
||||
Contains the names of the functions and variables in the \code{sys} module which will be
|
||||
available to programs running in the restricted environment. The
|
||||
value for \code{RExec} is \code{('ps1',} \code{'ps2',}
|
||||
\code{'copyright',} \code{'version',} \code{'platform',} \code{'exit',}
|
||||
\code{'maxint')}.
|
||||
Contains the names of the functions and variables in the \code{sys}
|
||||
module which will be available to programs running in the restricted
|
||||
environment. The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('ps1',}
|
||||
\code{'ps2',} \code{'copyright',} \code{'version',} \code{'platform',}
|
||||
\code{'exit',} \code{'maxint')}.
|
||||
\end{datadesc}
|
||||
|
||||
RExec instances support the following methods:
|
||||
\renewcommand{\indexsubitem}{(RExec object method)}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_eval}{code}
|
||||
\var{code} must either be a string containing a Python expression, or a compiled code object, which will
|
||||
be evaluated in the restricted environment. The value of the expression or code object will be returned.
|
||||
\var{code} must either be a string containing a Python expression, or
|
||||
a compiled code object, which will be evaluated in the restricted
|
||||
environment's \code{__main__} module. The value of the expression or
|
||||
code object will be returned.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_exec}{code}
|
||||
\var{code} must either be a string containing one or more lines of Python code, or a compiled code object,
|
||||
which will be executed in the restricted environment.
|
||||
\var{code} must either be a string containing one or more lines of
|
||||
Python code, or a compiled code object, which will be executed in the
|
||||
restricted environment's \code{__main__} module.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_execfile}{filename}
|
||||
Execute the Python code contained in the file \var{filename} in the
|
||||
restricted environment.
|
||||
restricted environment's \code{__main__} module.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
Methods whose names begin with \code{s_} are similar to the functions
|
||||
beginning with \code{r_}, but the code will be granted access to
|
||||
restricted versions of \code{sys.stdin}, \code{sys.stderr}, and
|
||||
\code{sys.stdout}.
|
||||
restricted versions of the standard I/O streans \code{sys.stdin},
|
||||
\code{sys.stderr}, and \code{sys.stdout}.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{s_eval}{code}
|
||||
\var{code} must be a string containing a Python expression, which will
|
||||
|
|
@ -129,13 +140,14 @@ Execute the Python code contained in the file \var{filename} in the
|
|||
restricted environment.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\code{RExec} objects must also support various methods which will be implicitly called
|
||||
by code executing in the restricted environment. Overriding these
|
||||
methods in a subclass is used to change the policies enforced by a restricted environment.
|
||||
\code{RExec} objects must also support various methods which will be
|
||||
implicitly called by code executing in the restricted environment.
|
||||
Overriding these methods in a subclass is used to change the policies
|
||||
enforced by a restricted environment.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals, locals, fromlist}}
|
||||
Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError} exception
|
||||
if the module is considered unsafe.
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals\, locals\, fromlist}}
|
||||
Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError}
|
||||
exception if the module is considered unsafe.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_open}{filename\optional{\, mode\optional{\, bufsize}}}
|
||||
|
|
@ -144,7 +156,8 @@ environment. The arguments are identical to those of \code{open()},
|
|||
and a file object (or a class instance compatible with file objects)
|
||||
should be returned. \code{RExec}'s default behaviour is allow opening
|
||||
any file for reading, but forbidding any attempt to write a file. See
|
||||
the example below for an implementation of a less restrictive \code{r_open()}.
|
||||
the example below for an implementation of a less restrictive
|
||||
\code{r_open()}.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_reload}{module}
|
||||
|
|
@ -152,13 +165,15 @@ Reload the module object \var{module}, re-parsing and re-initializing it.
|
|||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{r_unload}{module}
|
||||
Unload the module object \var{module}.
|
||||
% XXX what are the semantics of this?
|
||||
Unload the module object \var{module} (i.e., remove it from the
|
||||
restricted environment's \code{sys.modules} dictionary).
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
And their equivalents with access to restricted standard I/O streams:
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{s_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals, locals, fromlist}}
|
||||
Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError} exception
|
||||
if the module is considered unsafe.
|
||||
Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError}
|
||||
exception if the module is considered unsafe.
|
||||
\end{funcdesc}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{funcdesc}{s_reload}{module}
|
||||
|
|
@ -179,13 +194,16 @@ standard RExec class. For example, if we're willing to allow files in
|
|||
\bcode\begin{verbatim}
|
||||
class TmpWriterRExec(rexec.RExec):
|
||||
def r_open(self, file, mode='r', buf=-1):
|
||||
if mode in ('r', 'rb'): pass
|
||||
elif mode in ('w', 'wb'):
|
||||
if mode in ('r', 'rb'):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
elif mode in ('w', 'wb', 'a', 'ab'):
|
||||
# check filename : must begin with /tmp/
|
||||
if file[0:5]!='/tmp/':
|
||||
raise IOError, "can't open files for writing outside of /tmp"
|
||||
elif string.find(file, '/../')!=-1:
|
||||
raise IOError, "'..' in filename; open for writing forbidden"
|
||||
if file[:5]!='/tmp/':
|
||||
raise IOError, "can't write outside /tmp"
|
||||
elif (string.find(file, '/../') >= 0 or
|
||||
file[:3] == '../' or file[-3:] == '/..'):
|
||||
raise IOError, "'..' in filename forbidden"
|
||||
else: raise IOError, "Illegal open() mode"
|
||||
return open(file, mode, buf)
|
||||
\end{verbatim}\ecode
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue