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		e47da0ae04
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			* \bcode, \ecode added everywhere
	* \label{module-foo} added everywhere
	* A few \seealso sections added.
	* Indentation fixed inside verbatim in lib*tex files
		
	
			
		
			
				
	
	
		
			219 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			9.4 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			TeX
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			219 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			9.4 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			TeX
		
	
	
	
	
	
| \section{Standard Module \sectcode{rexec}}
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| \label{module-rexec}
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| \stmodindex{rexec}
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| \renewcommand{\indexsubitem}{(in module rexec)}
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| 
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| This module contains the \code{RExec} class, which supports
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| \code{r_exec()}, \code{r_eval()}, \code{r_execfile()}, and
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| \code{r_import()} methods, which are restricted versions of the standard
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| Python functions \code{exec()}, \code{eval()}, \code{execfile()}, and
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| the \code{import} statement.
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| Code executed in this restricted environment will
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| only have access to modules and functions that are deemed safe; you
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| can subclass \code{RExec} to add or remove capabilities as desired.
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| 
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| \emph{Note:} The \code{RExec} class can prevent code from performing
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| unsafe operations like reading or writing disk files, or using TCP/IP
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| sockets.  However, it does not protect against code using extremely
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| large amounts of memory or CPU time.  
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{RExec}{\optional{hooks\optional{\, verbose}}}
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| Returns an instance of the \code{RExec} class.  
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| 
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| \var{hooks} is an instance of the \code{RHooks} class or a subclass of it.
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| If it is omitted or \code{None}, the default \code{RHooks} class is
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| instantiated.
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| Whenever the RExec module searches for a module (even a built-in one)
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| or reads a module's code, it doesn't actually go out to the file
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| system itself.  Rather, it calls methods of an RHooks instance that
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| was passed to or created by its constructor.  (Actually, the RExec
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| object doesn't make these calls---they are made by a module loader
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| object that's part of the RExec object.  This allows another level of
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| flexibility, e.g. using packages.)
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| 
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| By providing an alternate RHooks object, we can control the
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| file system accesses made to import a module, without changing the
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| actual algorithm that controls the order in which those accesses are
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| made.  For instance, we could substitute an RHooks object that passes
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| all filesystem requests to a file server elsewhere, via some RPC
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| mechanism such as ILU.  Grail's applet loader uses this to support
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| importing applets from a URL for a directory.
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| 
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| If \var{verbose} is true, additional debugging output may be sent to
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| standard output.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| The RExec class has the following class attributes, which are used by the
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| \code{__init__} method.  Changing them on an existing instance won't
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| have any effect; instead, create a subclass of \code{RExec} and assign
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| them new values in the class definition.  Instances of the new class
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| will then use those new values.  All these attributes are tuples of
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| strings.
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| 
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| \renewcommand{\indexsubitem}{(RExec object attribute)}
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| \begin{datadesc}{nok_builtin_names}
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| Contains the names of built-in functions which will \emph{not} be
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| available to programs running in the restricted environment.  The
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| value for \code{RExec} is \code{('open',} \code{'reload',}
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| \code{'__import__')}.  (This gives the exceptions, because by far the
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| majority of built-in functions are harmless.  A subclass that wants to
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| override this variable should probably start with the value from the
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| base class and concatenate additional forbidden functions --- when new
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| dangerous built-in functions are added to Python, they will also be
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| added to this module.)
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| \end{datadesc}
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| 
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| \begin{datadesc}{ok_builtin_modules}
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| Contains the names of built-in modules which can be safely imported.
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| The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('audioop',} \code{'array',}
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| \code{'binascii',} \code{'cmath',} \code{'errno',} \code{'imageop',}
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| \code{'marshal',} \code{'math',} \code{'md5',} \code{'operator',}
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| \code{'parser',} \code{'regex',} \code{'rotor',} \code{'select',}
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| \code{'strop',} \code{'struct',} \code{'time')}.  A similar remark
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| about overriding this variable applies --- use the value from the base
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| class as a starting point.
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| \end{datadesc}
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| 
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| \begin{datadesc}{ok_path}
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| Contains the directories which will be searched when an \code{import}
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| is performed in the restricted environment.  
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| The value for \code{RExec} is the same as \code{sys.path} (at the time
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| the module is loaded) for unrestricted code.
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| \end{datadesc}
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| 
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| \begin{datadesc}{ok_posix_names}
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| % Should this be called ok_os_names?
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| Contains the names of the functions in the \code{os} module which will be
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| available to programs running in the restricted environment.  The
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| value for \code{RExec} is \code{('error',} \code{'fstat',}
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| \code{'listdir',} \code{'lstat',} \code{'readlink',} \code{'stat',}
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| \code{'times',} \code{'uname',} \code{'getpid',} \code{'getppid',}
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| \code{'getcwd',} \code{'getuid',} \code{'getgid',} \code{'geteuid',}
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| \code{'getegid')}.
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| \end{datadesc}
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| 
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| \begin{datadesc}{ok_sys_names}
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| Contains the names of the functions and variables in the \code{sys}
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| module which will be available to programs running in the restricted
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| environment.  The value for \code{RExec} is \code{('ps1',}
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| \code{'ps2',} \code{'copyright',} \code{'version',} \code{'platform',}
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| \code{'exit',} \code{'maxint')}.
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| \end{datadesc}
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| 
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| RExec instances support the following methods:
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| \renewcommand{\indexsubitem}{(RExec object method)}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_eval}{code}
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| \var{code} must either be a string containing a Python expression, or
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| a compiled code object, which will be evaluated in the restricted
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| environment's \code{__main__} module.  The value of the expression or
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| code object will be returned.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_exec}{code}
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| \var{code} must either be a string containing one or more lines of
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| Python code, or a compiled code object, which will be executed in the
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| restricted environment's \code{__main__} module.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_execfile}{filename}
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| Execute the Python code contained in the file \var{filename} in the
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| restricted environment's \code{__main__} module.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| Methods whose names begin with \code{s_} are similar to the functions
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| beginning with \code{r_}, but the code will be granted access to
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| restricted versions of the standard I/O streans \code{sys.stdin},
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| \code{sys.stderr}, and \code{sys.stdout}.  
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{s_eval}{code}
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| \var{code} must be a string containing a Python expression, which will
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| be evaluated in the restricted environment.  
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{s_exec}{code}
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| \var{code} must be a string containing one or more lines of Python code,
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| which will be executed in the restricted environment.  
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{s_execfile}{code}
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| Execute the Python code contained in the file \var{filename} in the
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| restricted environment.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \code{RExec} objects must also support various methods which will be
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| implicitly called by code executing in the restricted environment.
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| Overriding these methods in a subclass is used to change the policies
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| enforced by a restricted environment.
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals\, locals\, fromlist}}
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| Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError}
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| exception if the module is considered unsafe.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_open}{filename\optional{\, mode\optional{\, bufsize}}}
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| Method called when \code{open()} is called in the restricted
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| environment.  The arguments are identical to those of \code{open()},
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| and a file object (or a class instance compatible with file objects)
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| should be returned.  \code{RExec}'s default behaviour is allow opening
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| any file for reading, but forbidding any attempt to write a file.  See
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| the example below for an implementation of a less restrictive
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| \code{r_open()}.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_reload}{module}
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| Reload the module object \var{module}, re-parsing and re-initializing it.  
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{r_unload}{module}
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| Unload the module object \var{module} (i.e., remove it from the
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| restricted environment's \code{sys.modules} dictionary).
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| And their equivalents with access to restricted standard I/O streams:
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{s_import}{modulename\optional{\, globals, locals, fromlist}}
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| Import the module \var{modulename}, raising an \code{ImportError}
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| exception if the module is considered unsafe.
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{s_reload}{module}
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| Reload the module object \var{module}, re-parsing and re-initializing it.  
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \begin{funcdesc}{s_unload}{module}
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| Unload the module object \var{module}.   
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| % XXX what are the semantics of this?  
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| \end{funcdesc}
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| 
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| \subsection{An example}
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| 
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| Let us say that we want a slightly more relaxed policy than the
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| standard RExec class.  For example, if we're willing to allow files in
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| \file{/tmp} to be written, we can subclass the \code{RExec} class:
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| 
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| \bcode\begin{verbatim}
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| class TmpWriterRExec(rexec.RExec):
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|     def r_open(self, file, mode='r', buf=-1):
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|         if mode in ('r', 'rb'):
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|             pass
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|         elif mode in ('w', 'wb', 'a', 'ab'):
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|             # check filename : must begin with /tmp/
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|             if file[:5]!='/tmp/': 
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|                 raise IOError, "can't write outside /tmp"
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|             elif (string.find(file, '/../') >= 0 or
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|                  file[:3] == '../' or file[-3:] == '/..'):
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|                 raise IOError, "'..' in filename forbidden"
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|         else: raise IOError, "Illegal open() mode"
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|         return open(file, mode, buf)
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| \end{verbatim}\ecode
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| %
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| Notice that the above code will occasionally forbid a perfectly valid
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| filename; for example, code in the restricted environment won't be
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| able to open a file called \file{/tmp/foo/../bar}.  To fix this, the
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| \code{r_open} method would have to simplify the filename to
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| \file{/tmp/bar}, which would require splitting apart the filename and
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| performing various operations on it.  In cases where security is at
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| stake, it may be preferable to write simple code which is sometimes
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| overly restrictive, instead of more general code that is also more
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| complex and may harbor a subtle security hole.
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