2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
// Copyright 2018 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
|
2022-11-27 13:20:29 -05:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
package integration
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import (
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
"bytes"
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
|
|
|
"net/http"
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
"net/url"
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
"strings"
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-03-27 19:40:14 +00:00
|
|
|
auth_model "forgejo.org/models/auth"
|
|
|
|
|
repo_model "forgejo.org/models/repo"
|
|
|
|
|
"forgejo.org/models/unittest"
|
|
|
|
|
user_model "forgejo.org/models/user"
|
|
|
|
|
"forgejo.org/modules/git"
|
|
|
|
|
"forgejo.org/modules/gitrepo"
|
|
|
|
|
api "forgejo.org/modules/structs"
|
|
|
|
|
"forgejo.org/tests"
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseList(t *testing.T) {
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-16 10:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
user2 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
|
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767)
## Changes
- Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and
`write` levels:
- `activitypub`
- `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin)
- `misc`
- `notification`
- `organization`
- `package`
- `issue`
- `repository`
- `user`
- Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to
`reqToken()`
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section
- _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is
included based on the section and HTTP method
- `reqToken()` is used for individual routes
- checks that required authentication is present (but does not check
scope levels as this will already have been handled by
`tokenRequiresScopes()`
- Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of
scopes
- Updates the user interface for scope selection
### User interface example
<img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3">
<img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c">
## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes.
For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category
(say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say
`DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include
`delete:organization`.
- `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that
require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request,
`tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error
## TODO
- [x] Alphabetize scope categories
- [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public).
Also expand this to organizations
- [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show
warning
- [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api.
`tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct
scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other
auth) is present.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to
minimize access changes to existing user tokens.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what
read/write/delete levels correspond to
- [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly
deviates from the api definition.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- For example:
```go
m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() {
m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs)
m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions)
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization),
context_service.UserAssignmentAPI())
```
## Future improvements
- [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation
- [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in
- [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository`
- [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display
text instead of an empty bullet point
- [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read
categories be selected by default
Closes #24501
Closes #24799
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
|
|
|
token := getUserToken(t, user2.LowerName, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
link, _ := url.Parse(fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", user2.Name, repo.Name))
|
2023-12-22 22:29:51 -05:00
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", link.String()).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
var apiReleases []*api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &apiReleases)
|
|
|
|
|
if assert.Len(t, apiReleases, 3) {
|
|
|
|
|
for _, release := range apiReleases {
|
|
|
|
|
switch release.ID {
|
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, release.IsDraft)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, release.IsPrerelease)
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(release.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/1/assets"), release.UploadURL)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, release.IsDraft)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, release.IsPrerelease)
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(release.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/4/assets"), release.UploadURL)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
case 5:
|
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, release.IsDraft)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, release.IsPrerelease)
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(release.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/5/assets"), release.UploadURL)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, fmt.Errorf("unexpected release: %v", release))
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// test filter
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen := func(auth bool, query url.Values, expectedLength int, msgAndArgs ...string) {
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
link.RawQuery = query.Encode()
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", link.String())
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
if auth {
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
req.AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &apiReleases)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Len(t, apiReleases, expectedLength, msgAndArgs)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(false, url.Values{"draft": {"true"}}, 0, "anon should not see drafts")
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"true"}}, 1, "repo owner should see drafts")
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"false"}}, 2, "exclude drafts")
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"false"}, "pre-release": {"false"}}, 1, "exclude drafts and pre-releases")
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"pre-release": {"true"}}, 1, "only get pre-release")
|
|
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"true"}, "pre-release": {"true"}}, 0, "there is no pre-release draft")
|
2024-11-02 10:24:35 +01:00
|
|
|
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"q": {"release"}}, 3, "keyword")
|
2021-06-17 10:58:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
func createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t *testing.T, token string, owner *user_model.User, repo *repo_model.Repository, name, target, title, desc string) *api.Release {
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", owner.Name, repo.Name)
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", urlStr, &api.CreateReleaseOption{
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
TagName: name,
|
|
|
|
|
Title: title,
|
|
|
|
|
Note: desc,
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
IsDraft: false,
|
|
|
|
|
IsPrerelease: false,
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
Target: target,
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var newRelease api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &newRelease)
|
2022-08-25 10:31:57 +08:00
|
|
|
rel := &repo_model.Release{
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
ID: newRelease.ID,
|
|
|
|
|
TagName: newRelease.TagName,
|
|
|
|
|
Title: newRelease.Title,
|
2022-06-05 03:18:50 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, rel)
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.Note, rel.Note)
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
return &newRelease
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseCreateAndUpdate(t *testing.T) {
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-16 10:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767)
## Changes
- Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and
`write` levels:
- `activitypub`
- `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin)
- `misc`
- `notification`
- `organization`
- `package`
- `issue`
- `repository`
- `user`
- Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to
`reqToken()`
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section
- _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is
included based on the section and HTTP method
- `reqToken()` is used for individual routes
- checks that required authentication is present (but does not check
scope levels as this will already have been handled by
`tokenRequiresScopes()`
- Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of
scopes
- Updates the user interface for scope selection
### User interface example
<img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3">
<img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c">
## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes.
For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category
(say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say
`DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include
`delete:organization`.
- `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that
require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request,
`tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error
## TODO
- [x] Alphabetize scope categories
- [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public).
Also expand this to organizations
- [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show
warning
- [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api.
`tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct
scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other
auth) is present.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to
minimize access changes to existing user tokens.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what
read/write/delete levels correspond to
- [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly
deviates from the api definition.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- For example:
```go
m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() {
m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs)
m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions)
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization),
context_service.UserAssignmentAPI())
```
## Future improvements
- [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation
- [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in
- [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository`
- [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display
text instead of an empty bullet point
- [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read
categories be selected by default
Closes #24501
Closes #24799
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Simplify how git repositories are opened (#28937)
## Purpose
This is a refactor toward building an abstraction over managing git
repositories.
Afterwards, it does not matter anymore if they are stored on the local
disk or somewhere remote.
## What this PR changes
We used `git.OpenRepository` everywhere previously.
Now, we should split them into two distinct functions:
Firstly, there are temporary repositories which do not change:
```go
git.OpenRepository(ctx, diskPath)
```
Gitea managed repositories having a record in the database in the
`repository` table are moved into the new package `gitrepo`:
```go
gitrepo.OpenRepository(ctx, repo_model.Repo)
```
Why is `repo_model.Repository` the second parameter instead of file
path?
Because then we can easily adapt our repository storage strategy.
The repositories can be stored locally, however, they could just as well
be stored on a remote server.
## Further changes in other PRs
- A Git Command wrapper on package `gitrepo` could be created. i.e.
`NewCommand(ctx, repo_model.Repository, commands...)`. `git.RunOpts{Dir:
repo.RepoPath()}`, the directory should be empty before invoking this
method and it can be filled in the function only. #28940
- Remove the `RepoPath()`/`WikiPath()` functions to reduce the
possibility of mistakes.
---------
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
2024-01-28 04:09:51 +08:00
|
|
|
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(git.DefaultContext, repo)
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2019-11-13 07:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
defer gitRepo.Close()
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = gitRepo.CreateTag("v0.0.1", "master")
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
target, err := gitRepo.GetTagCommitID("v0.0.1")
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
newRelease := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "v0.0.1", target, "v0.0.1", "test")
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d", owner.Name, repo.Name, newRelease.ID)
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", urlStr).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var release api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.TagName, release.TagName)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.Title, release.Title)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.Note, release.Note)
|
2024-04-24 15:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.False(t, newRelease.HideArchiveLinks)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hideArchiveLinks := true
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "PATCH", urlStr, &api.EditReleaseOption{
|
2024-04-24 15:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
TagName: release.TagName,
|
|
|
|
|
Title: release.Title,
|
|
|
|
|
Note: "updated",
|
|
|
|
|
IsDraft: &release.IsDraft,
|
|
|
|
|
IsPrerelease: &release.IsPrerelease,
|
|
|
|
|
Target: release.Target,
|
|
|
|
|
HideArchiveLinks: &hideArchiveLinks,
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &newRelease)
|
2022-08-25 10:31:57 +08:00
|
|
|
rel := &repo_model.Release{
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
ID: newRelease.ID,
|
|
|
|
|
TagName: newRelease.TagName,
|
|
|
|
|
Title: newRelease.Title,
|
2022-06-05 03:18:50 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, rel)
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, rel.Note, newRelease.Note)
|
2024-04-24 15:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.True(t, newRelease.HideArchiveLinks)
|
2018-01-16 09:54:13 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseCreateProtectedTag(t *testing.T) {
|
2024-05-14 08:48:21 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 4})
|
|
|
|
|
writer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 4})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, writer.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(git.DefaultContext, repo)
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2024-05-14 08:48:21 +02:00
|
|
|
defer gitRepo.Close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit("master")
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2024-05-14 08:48:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", repo.OwnerName, repo.Name), &api.CreateReleaseOption{
|
|
|
|
|
TagName: "v0.0.1",
|
|
|
|
|
Title: "v0.0.1",
|
|
|
|
|
IsDraft: false,
|
|
|
|
|
IsPrerelease: false,
|
|
|
|
|
Target: commit.ID.String(),
|
|
|
|
|
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseCreateToDefaultBranch(t *testing.T) {
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-16 10:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767)
## Changes
- Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and
`write` levels:
- `activitypub`
- `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin)
- `misc`
- `notification`
- `organization`
- `package`
- `issue`
- `repository`
- `user`
- Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to
`reqToken()`
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section
- _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is
included based on the section and HTTP method
- `reqToken()` is used for individual routes
- checks that required authentication is present (but does not check
scope levels as this will already have been handled by
`tokenRequiresScopes()`
- Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of
scopes
- Updates the user interface for scope selection
### User interface example
<img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3">
<img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c">
## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes.
For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category
(say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say
`DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include
`delete:organization`.
- `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that
require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request,
`tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error
## TODO
- [x] Alphabetize scope categories
- [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public).
Also expand this to organizations
- [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show
warning
- [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api.
`tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct
scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other
auth) is present.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to
minimize access changes to existing user tokens.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what
read/write/delete levels correspond to
- [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly
deviates from the api definition.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- For example:
```go
m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() {
m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs)
m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions)
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization),
context_service.UserAssignmentAPI())
```
## Future improvements
- [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation
- [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in
- [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository`
- [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display
text instead of an empty bullet point
- [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read
categories be selected by default
Closes #24501
Closes #24799
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "v0.0.1", "", "v0.0.1", "test")
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseCreateToDefaultBranchOnExistingTag(t *testing.T) {
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-16 10:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767)
## Changes
- Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and
`write` levels:
- `activitypub`
- `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin)
- `misc`
- `notification`
- `organization`
- `package`
- `issue`
- `repository`
- `user`
- Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to
`reqToken()`
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section
- _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is
included based on the section and HTTP method
- `reqToken()` is used for individual routes
- checks that required authentication is present (but does not check
scope levels as this will already have been handled by
`tokenRequiresScopes()`
- Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of
scopes
- Updates the user interface for scope selection
### User interface example
<img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3">
<img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c">
## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes.
For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category
(say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say
`DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include
`delete:organization`.
- `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that
require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request,
`tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error
## TODO
- [x] Alphabetize scope categories
- [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public).
Also expand this to organizations
- [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show
warning
- [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api.
`tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct
scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other
auth) is present.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to
minimize access changes to existing user tokens.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what
read/write/delete levels correspond to
- [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly
deviates from the api definition.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- For example:
```go
m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() {
m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs)
m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions)
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization),
context_service.UserAssignmentAPI())
```
## Future improvements
- [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation
- [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in
- [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository`
- [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display
text instead of an empty bullet point
- [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read
categories be selected by default
Closes #24501
Closes #24799
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Simplify how git repositories are opened (#28937)
## Purpose
This is a refactor toward building an abstraction over managing git
repositories.
Afterwards, it does not matter anymore if they are stored on the local
disk or somewhere remote.
## What this PR changes
We used `git.OpenRepository` everywhere previously.
Now, we should split them into two distinct functions:
Firstly, there are temporary repositories which do not change:
```go
git.OpenRepository(ctx, diskPath)
```
Gitea managed repositories having a record in the database in the
`repository` table are moved into the new package `gitrepo`:
```go
gitrepo.OpenRepository(ctx, repo_model.Repo)
```
Why is `repo_model.Repository` the second parameter instead of file
path?
Because then we can easily adapt our repository storage strategy.
The repositories can be stored locally, however, they could just as well
be stored on a remote server.
## Further changes in other PRs
- A Git Command wrapper on package `gitrepo` could be created. i.e.
`NewCommand(ctx, repo_model.Repository, commands...)`. `git.RunOpts{Dir:
repo.RepoPath()}`, the directory should be empty before invoking this
method and it can be filled in the function only. #28940
- Remove the `RepoPath()`/`WikiPath()` functions to reduce the
possibility of mistakes.
---------
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
2024-01-28 04:09:51 +08:00
|
|
|
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(git.DefaultContext, repo)
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2019-11-13 07:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
defer gitRepo.Close()
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = gitRepo.CreateTag("v0.0.1", "master")
|
2024-07-30 19:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "v0.0.1", "", "v0.0.1", "test")
|
2019-01-30 18:33:00 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseCreateGivenInvalidTarget(t *testing.T) {
|
2024-09-12 00:47:31 -07:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", owner.Name, repo.Name)
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", urlStr, &api.CreateReleaseOption{
|
|
|
|
|
TagName: "i-point-to-an-invalid-target",
|
|
|
|
|
Title: "Invalid Target",
|
|
|
|
|
Target: "invalid-target",
|
|
|
|
|
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseGetLatest(t *testing.T) {
|
2023-01-26 17:33:47 +01:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/latest", owner.Name, repo.Name))
|
2023-01-26 17:33:47 +01:00
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var release *api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "testing-release", release.Title)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseGetByTag(t *testing.T) {
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-16 10:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tag := "v1.1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, tag))
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var release *api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "testing-release", release.Title)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nonexistingtag := "nonexistingtag"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, nonexistingtag))
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
var err *api.APIError
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &err)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, err.Message)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseGetDraftByTag(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
rel := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Release{
|
|
|
|
|
RepoID: repo.ID,
|
|
|
|
|
TagName: "draft-release",
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, rel.IsDraft)
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", repo.OwnerName, repo.Name, rel.TagName))
|
|
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
var err *api.APIError
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &err)
|
2021-12-28 13:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, err.Message)
|
2020-09-25 21:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseDeleteByTagName(t *testing.T) {
|
2022-09-02 15:18:23 -04:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-16 10:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767)
## Changes
- Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and
`write` levels:
- `activitypub`
- `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin)
- `misc`
- `notification`
- `organization`
- `package`
- `issue`
- `repository`
- `user`
- Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to
`reqToken()`
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section
- _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is
included based on the section and HTTP method
- `reqToken()` is used for individual routes
- checks that required authentication is present (but does not check
scope levels as this will already have been handled by
`tokenRequiresScopes()`
- Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of
scopes
- Updates the user interface for scope selection
### User interface example
<img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3">
<img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c">
## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision
- `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes.
For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category
(say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say
`DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include
`delete:organization`.
- `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that
require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request,
`tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error
## TODO
- [x] Alphabetize scope categories
- [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public).
Also expand this to organizations
- [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show
warning
- [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api.
`tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct
scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other
auth) is present.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to
minimize access changes to existing user tokens.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what
read/write/delete levels correspond to
- [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly
deviates from the api definition.
- _This should be addressed in this PR_
- For example:
```go
m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() {
m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs)
m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions)
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization),
context_service.UserAssignmentAPI())
```
## Future improvements
- [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation
- [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in
- [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository`
- [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display
text instead of an empty bullet point
- [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read
categories be selected by default
Closes #24501
Closes #24799
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-07 19:32:18 +01:00
|
|
|
// delete release
|
2024-08-14 11:43:42 +02:00
|
|
|
req := NewRequestf(t, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/release-tag", owner.Name, repo.Name).
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
_ = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNoContent)
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-07 19:32:18 +01:00
|
|
|
// make sure release is deleted
|
2024-08-14 11:43:42 +02:00
|
|
|
req = NewRequestf(t, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/release-tag", owner.Name, repo.Name).
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
_ = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-07 19:32:18 +01:00
|
|
|
// delete release tag too
|
2024-08-14 11:43:42 +02:00
|
|
|
req = NewRequestf(t, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/tags/release-tag", owner.Name, repo.Name).
|
2023-12-22 00:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2022-12-02 11:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
_ = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNoContent)
|
2020-10-30 20:56:34 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseUploadAsset(t *testing.T) {
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
filename := "image.png"
|
|
|
|
|
buff := generateImg()
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assetURL := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID)
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
t.Run("multipart/form-data", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
|
defer tests.PrintCurrentTest(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
body := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
2025-09-03 16:13:40 +02:00
|
|
|
contentType := tests.WriteImageBody(t, buff, filename, body)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL, bytes.NewReader(body.Bytes())).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token).
|
2025-09-03 16:13:40 +02:00
|
|
|
SetHeader("Content-Type", contentType)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var attachment *api.Attachment
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, filename, attachment.Name)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assert.EqualValues(t, 104, attachment.Size)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req = NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL+"?name=test-asset", bytes.NewReader(body.Bytes())).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token).
|
2025-09-03 16:13:40 +02:00
|
|
|
SetHeader("Content-Type", contentType)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var attachment2 *api.Attachment
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment2)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "test-asset", attachment2.Name)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assert.EqualValues(t, 104, attachment2.Size)
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("application/octet-stream", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
|
defer tests.PrintCurrentTest(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL, bytes.NewReader(buff.Bytes())).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req = NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL+"?name=stream.bin", bytes.NewReader(buff.Bytes())).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
var attachment *api.Attachment
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "stream.bin", attachment.Name)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assert.EqualValues(t, 104, attachment.Size)
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "attachment", attachment.Type)
|
2024-03-02 18:02:01 +01:00
|
|
|
})
|
2023-08-24 12:36:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-04-02 16:34:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseGetArchiveDownloadCount(t *testing.T) {
|
2024-04-02 16:34:57 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
name := "ReleaseDownloadCount"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-04-29 04:47:56 -04:00
|
|
|
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, name, "", name, "test")
|
2024-04-02 16:34:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, name)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", urlStr)
|
|
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var release *api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check if everything defaults to 0
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.TarGz)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.Zip)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Download the tarball to increase the count
|
|
|
|
|
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", release.TarURL), http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check if the count has increased
|
|
|
|
|
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.TarGz)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.Zip)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseExternalAsset(t *testing.T) {
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset&external_url=https%%3A%%2F%%2Fforgejo.org%%2F", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID)).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var attachment *api.Attachment
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "test-asset", attachment.Name)
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
assert.EqualValues(t, 0, attachment.Size)
|
2025-03-28 22:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "https://forgejo.org/", attachment.DownloadURL)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "external", attachment.Type)
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseAllowedAPIURL(t *testing.T) {
|
2025-06-09 10:01:59 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
|
|
|
|
|
internalURL := "https://localhost:3003/api/packages/owner/generic/test/1.0.0/test.txt"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset&external_url=%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID, url.QueryEscape(internalURL))).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var attachment *api.Attachment
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "test-asset", attachment.Name)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.EqualValues(t, 0, attachment.Size)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, internalURL, attachment.DownloadURL)
|
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "external", attachment.Type)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseDuplicateAsset(t *testing.T) {
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
filename := "image.png"
|
|
|
|
|
buff := generateImg()
|
|
|
|
|
body := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
2025-09-03 16:13:40 +02:00
|
|
|
contentType := tests.WriteImageBody(t, buff, filename, body)
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset&external_url=https%%3A%%2F%%2Fforgejo.org%%2F", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID), body).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
2025-09-03 16:13:40 +02:00
|
|
|
req.Header.Add("Content-Type", contentType)
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037)
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository.
[CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published.
[CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control.
[CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected.
[CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security bug fixes
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description-->
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseMissingAsset(t *testing.T) {
|
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
|
|
|
|
|
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
|
|
|
|
|
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID)).
|
|
|
|
|
AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2025-09-15 15:53:35 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestAPIReleaseGithubFormat(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
|
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
|
|
|
|
|
user2 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
|
|
|
|
|
token := getUserToken(t, user2.LowerName, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/1", user2.Name, repo.Name)).AddTokenAuth(token)
|
|
|
|
|
req.Header.Add("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
|
|
|
|
|
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var apiRelease *api.Release
|
|
|
|
|
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &apiRelease)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(apiRelease.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/1/assets{?name,label}"), apiRelease.UploadURL)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|