forgejo/tests/integration/api_releases_test.go

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// Copyright 2018 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
auth_model "forgejo.org/models/auth"
repo_model "forgejo.org/models/repo"
"forgejo.org/models/unittest"
user_model "forgejo.org/models/user"
"forgejo.org/modules/git"
"forgejo.org/modules/gitrepo"
api "forgejo.org/modules/structs"
"forgejo.org/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseList(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
user2 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767) ## Changes - Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and `write` levels: - `activitypub` - `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin) - `misc` - `notification` - `organization` - `package` - `issue` - `repository` - `user` - Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to `reqToken()` - `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section - _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is included based on the section and HTTP method - `reqToken()` is used for individual routes - checks that required authentication is present (but does not check scope levels as this will already have been handled by `tokenRequiresScopes()` - Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of scopes - Updates the user interface for scope selection ### User interface example <img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3"> <img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c"> ## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision - `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes. For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category (say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say `DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include `delete:organization`. - `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request, `tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error ## TODO - [x] Alphabetize scope categories - [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public). Also expand this to organizations - [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show warning - [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api. `tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other auth) is present. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to minimize access changes to existing user tokens. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what read/write/delete levels correspond to - [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly deviates from the api definition. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - For example: ```go m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() { m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs) m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions) }, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), context_service.UserAssignmentAPI()) ``` ## Future improvements - [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation - [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in - [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository` - [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display text instead of an empty bullet point - [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read categories be selected by default Closes #24501 Closes #24799 Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io> Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
token := getUserToken(t, user2.LowerName, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository)
link, _ := url.Parse(fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", user2.Name, repo.Name))
resp := MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", link.String()).AddTokenAuth(token), http.StatusOK)
var apiReleases []*api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &apiReleases)
if assert.Len(t, apiReleases, 3) {
for _, release := range apiReleases {
switch release.ID {
case 1:
assert.False(t, release.IsDraft)
assert.False(t, release.IsPrerelease)
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(release.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/1/assets"), release.UploadURL)
case 4:
assert.True(t, release.IsDraft)
assert.False(t, release.IsPrerelease)
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(release.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/4/assets"), release.UploadURL)
case 5:
assert.False(t, release.IsDraft)
assert.True(t, release.IsPrerelease)
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(release.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/5/assets"), release.UploadURL)
default:
require.NoError(t, fmt.Errorf("unexpected release: %v", release))
}
}
}
// test filter
testFilterByLen := func(auth bool, query url.Values, expectedLength int, msgAndArgs ...string) {
link.RawQuery = query.Encode()
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", link.String())
if auth {
req.AddTokenAuth(token)
}
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &apiReleases)
assert.Len(t, apiReleases, expectedLength, msgAndArgs)
}
testFilterByLen(false, url.Values{"draft": {"true"}}, 0, "anon should not see drafts")
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"true"}}, 1, "repo owner should see drafts")
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"false"}}, 2, "exclude drafts")
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"false"}, "pre-release": {"false"}}, 1, "exclude drafts and pre-releases")
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"pre-release": {"true"}}, 1, "only get pre-release")
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"draft": {"true"}, "pre-release": {"true"}}, 0, "there is no pre-release draft")
2024-11-02 10:24:35 +01:00
testFilterByLen(true, url.Values{"q": {"release"}}, 3, "keyword")
}
func createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t *testing.T, token string, owner *user_model.User, repo *repo_model.Repository, name, target, title, desc string) *api.Release {
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", owner.Name, repo.Name)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", urlStr, &api.CreateReleaseOption{
TagName: name,
Title: title,
Note: desc,
IsDraft: false,
IsPrerelease: false,
Target: target,
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var newRelease api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &newRelease)
rel := &repo_model.Release{
ID: newRelease.ID,
TagName: newRelease.TagName,
Title: newRelease.Title,
}
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, rel)
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.Note, rel.Note)
return &newRelease
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseCreateAndUpdate(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767) ## Changes - Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and `write` levels: - `activitypub` - `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin) - `misc` - `notification` - `organization` - `package` - `issue` - `repository` - `user` - Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to `reqToken()` - `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section - _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is included based on the section and HTTP method - `reqToken()` is used for individual routes - checks that required authentication is present (but does not check scope levels as this will already have been handled by `tokenRequiresScopes()` - Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of scopes - Updates the user interface for scope selection ### User interface example <img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3"> <img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c"> ## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision - `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes. For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category (say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say `DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include `delete:organization`. - `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request, `tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error ## TODO - [x] Alphabetize scope categories - [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public). Also expand this to organizations - [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show warning - [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api. `tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other auth) is present. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to minimize access changes to existing user tokens. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what read/write/delete levels correspond to - [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly deviates from the api definition. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - For example: ```go m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() { m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs) m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions) }, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), context_service.UserAssignmentAPI()) ``` ## Future improvements - [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation - [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in - [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository` - [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display text instead of an empty bullet point - [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read categories be selected by default Closes #24501 Closes #24799 Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io> Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(git.DefaultContext, repo)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer gitRepo.Close()
err = gitRepo.CreateTag("v0.0.1", "master")
require.NoError(t, err)
target, err := gitRepo.GetTagCommitID("v0.0.1")
require.NoError(t, err)
newRelease := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "v0.0.1", target, "v0.0.1", "test")
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d", owner.Name, repo.Name, newRelease.ID)
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", urlStr).
AddTokenAuth(token)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
var release api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.TagName, release.TagName)
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.Title, release.Title)
assert.Equal(t, newRelease.Note, release.Note)
assert.False(t, newRelease.HideArchiveLinks)
hideArchiveLinks := true
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "PATCH", urlStr, &api.EditReleaseOption{
TagName: release.TagName,
Title: release.Title,
Note: "updated",
IsDraft: &release.IsDraft,
IsPrerelease: &release.IsPrerelease,
Target: release.Target,
HideArchiveLinks: &hideArchiveLinks,
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &newRelease)
rel := &repo_model.Release{
ID: newRelease.ID,
TagName: newRelease.TagName,
Title: newRelease.Title,
}
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, rel)
assert.Equal(t, rel.Note, newRelease.Note)
assert.True(t, newRelease.HideArchiveLinks)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseCreateProtectedTag(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 4})
writer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 4})
session := loginUser(t, writer.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(git.DefaultContext, repo)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer gitRepo.Close()
commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit("master")
require.NoError(t, err)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", repo.OwnerName, repo.Name), &api.CreateReleaseOption{
TagName: "v0.0.1",
Title: "v0.0.1",
IsDraft: false,
IsPrerelease: false,
Target: commit.ID.String(),
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseCreateToDefaultBranch(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767) ## Changes - Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and `write` levels: - `activitypub` - `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin) - `misc` - `notification` - `organization` - `package` - `issue` - `repository` - `user` - Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to `reqToken()` - `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section - _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is included based on the section and HTTP method - `reqToken()` is used for individual routes - checks that required authentication is present (but does not check scope levels as this will already have been handled by `tokenRequiresScopes()` - Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of scopes - Updates the user interface for scope selection ### User interface example <img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3"> <img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c"> ## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision - `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes. For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category (say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say `DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include `delete:organization`. - `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request, `tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error ## TODO - [x] Alphabetize scope categories - [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public). Also expand this to organizations - [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show warning - [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api. `tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other auth) is present. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to minimize access changes to existing user tokens. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what read/write/delete levels correspond to - [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly deviates from the api definition. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - For example: ```go m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() { m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs) m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions) }, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), context_service.UserAssignmentAPI()) ``` ## Future improvements - [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation - [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in - [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository` - [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display text instead of an empty bullet point - [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read categories be selected by default Closes #24501 Closes #24799 Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io> Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "v0.0.1", "", "v0.0.1", "test")
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseCreateToDefaultBranchOnExistingTag(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767) ## Changes - Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and `write` levels: - `activitypub` - `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin) - `misc` - `notification` - `organization` - `package` - `issue` - `repository` - `user` - Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to `reqToken()` - `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section - _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is included based on the section and HTTP method - `reqToken()` is used for individual routes - checks that required authentication is present (but does not check scope levels as this will already have been handled by `tokenRequiresScopes()` - Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of scopes - Updates the user interface for scope selection ### User interface example <img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3"> <img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c"> ## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision - `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes. For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category (say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say `DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include `delete:organization`. - `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request, `tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error ## TODO - [x] Alphabetize scope categories - [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public). Also expand this to organizations - [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show warning - [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api. `tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other auth) is present. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to minimize access changes to existing user tokens. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what read/write/delete levels correspond to - [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly deviates from the api definition. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - For example: ```go m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() { m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs) m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions) }, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), context_service.UserAssignmentAPI()) ``` ## Future improvements - [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation - [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in - [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository` - [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display text instead of an empty bullet point - [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read categories be selected by default Closes #24501 Closes #24799 Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io> Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(git.DefaultContext, repo)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer gitRepo.Close()
err = gitRepo.CreateTag("v0.0.1", "master")
require.NoError(t, err)
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "v0.0.1", "", "v0.0.1", "test")
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseCreateGivenInvalidTarget(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases", owner.Name, repo.Name)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", urlStr, &api.CreateReleaseOption{
TagName: "i-point-to-an-invalid-target",
Title: "Invalid Target",
Target: "invalid-target",
}).AddTokenAuth(token)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseGetLatest(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/latest", owner.Name, repo.Name))
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
var release *api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
assert.Equal(t, "testing-release", release.Title)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseGetByTag(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
tag := "v1.1"
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, tag))
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
var release *api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
assert.Equal(t, "testing-release", release.Title)
nonexistingtag := "nonexistingtag"
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, nonexistingtag))
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
var err *api.APIError
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, err.Message)
}
func TestAPIReleaseGetDraftByTag(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
rel := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Release{
RepoID: repo.ID,
TagName: "draft-release",
})
assert.True(t, rel.IsDraft)
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", repo.OwnerName, repo.Name, rel.TagName))
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
var err *api.APIError
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, err.Message)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseDeleteByTagName(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
Redesign Scoped Access Tokens (#24767) ## Changes - Adds the following high level access scopes, each with `read` and `write` levels: - `activitypub` - `admin` (hidden if user is not a site admin) - `misc` - `notification` - `organization` - `package` - `issue` - `repository` - `user` - Adds new middleware function `tokenRequiresScopes()` in addition to `reqToken()` - `tokenRequiresScopes()` is used for each high-level api section - _if_ a scoped token is present, checks that the required scope is included based on the section and HTTP method - `reqToken()` is used for individual routes - checks that required authentication is present (but does not check scope levels as this will already have been handled by `tokenRequiresScopes()` - Adds migration to convert old scoped access tokens to the new set of scopes - Updates the user interface for scope selection ### User interface example <img width="903" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 55 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/654766ec-2143-4f59-9037-3b51600e32f3"> <img width="917" alt="Screen Shot 2023-05-31 at 1 56 43 PM" src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/23248839/1ad64081-012c-4a73-b393-66b30352654c"> ## tokenRequiresScopes Design Decision - `tokenRequiresScopes()` was added to more reliably cover api routes. For an incoming request, this function uses the given scope category (say `AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization`) and the HTTP method (say `DELETE`) and verifies that any scoped tokens in use include `delete:organization`. - `reqToken()` is used to enforce auth for individual routes that require it. If a scoped token is not present for a request, `tokenRequiresScopes()` will not return an error ## TODO - [x] Alphabetize scope categories - [x] Change 'public repos only' to a radio button (private vs public). Also expand this to organizations - [X] Disable token creation if no scopes selected. Alternatively, show warning - [x] `reqToken()` is missing from many `POST/DELETE` routes in the api. `tokenRequiresScopes()` only checks that a given token has the correct scope, `reqToken()` must be used to check that a token (or some other auth) is present. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] The migration should be reviewed very carefully in order to minimize access changes to existing user tokens. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - [x] Link to api to swagger documentation, clarify what read/write/delete levels correspond to - [x] Review cases where more than one scope is needed as this directly deviates from the api definition. - _This should be addressed in this PR_ - For example: ```go m.Group("/users/{username}/orgs", func() { m.Get("", reqToken(), org.ListUserOrgs) m.Get("/{org}/permissions", reqToken(), org.GetUserOrgsPermissions) }, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), context_service.UserAssignmentAPI()) ``` ## Future improvements - [ ] Add required scopes to swagger documentation - [ ] Redesign `reqToken()` to be opt-out rather than opt-in - [ ] Subdivide scopes like `repository` - [ ] Once a token is created, if it has no scopes, we should display text instead of an empty bullet point - [ ] If the 'public repos only' option is selected, should read categories be selected by default Closes #24501 Closes #24799 Co-authored-by: Jonathan Tran <jon@allspice.io> Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2023-06-04 14:57:16 -04:00
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
// delete release
2024-08-14 11:43:42 +02:00
req := NewRequestf(t, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/release-tag", owner.Name, repo.Name).
AddTokenAuth(token)
_ = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNoContent)
// make sure release is deleted
2024-08-14 11:43:42 +02:00
req = NewRequestf(t, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/release-tag", owner.Name, repo.Name).
AddTokenAuth(token)
_ = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
// delete release tag too
2024-08-14 11:43:42 +02:00
req = NewRequestf(t, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/tags/release-tag", owner.Name, repo.Name).
AddTokenAuth(token)
_ = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNoContent)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseUploadAsset(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
filename := "image.png"
buff := generateImg()
assetURL := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID)
t.Run("multipart/form-data", func(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrintCurrentTest(t)()
body := &bytes.Buffer{}
contentType := tests.WriteImageBody(t, buff, filename, body)
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL, bytes.NewReader(body.Bytes())).
AddTokenAuth(token).
SetHeader("Content-Type", contentType)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var attachment *api.Attachment
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
assert.Equal(t, filename, attachment.Name)
assert.EqualValues(t, 104, attachment.Size)
req = NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL+"?name=test-asset", bytes.NewReader(body.Bytes())).
AddTokenAuth(token).
SetHeader("Content-Type", contentType)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var attachment2 *api.Attachment
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment2)
assert.Equal(t, "test-asset", attachment2.Name)
assert.EqualValues(t, 104, attachment2.Size)
})
t.Run("application/octet-stream", func(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrintCurrentTest(t)()
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL, bytes.NewReader(buff.Bytes())).
AddTokenAuth(token)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusBadRequest)
req = NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, assetURL+"?name=stream.bin", bytes.NewReader(buff.Bytes())).
AddTokenAuth(token)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var attachment *api.Attachment
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
assert.Equal(t, "stream.bin", attachment.Name)
assert.EqualValues(t, 104, attachment.Size)
assert.Equal(t, "attachment", attachment.Type)
})
}
2024-04-02 16:34:57 +02:00
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseGetArchiveDownloadCount(t *testing.T) {
2024-04-02 16:34:57 +02:00
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
name := "ReleaseDownloadCount"
createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, name, "", name, "test")
2024-04-02 16:34:57 +02:00
urlStr := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/tags/%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, name)
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", urlStr)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
var release *api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
// Check if everything defaults to 0
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.TarGz)
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.Zip)
// Download the tarball to increase the count
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", release.TarURL), http.StatusOK)
// Check if the count has increased
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &release)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.TarGz)
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), release.ArchiveDownloadCount.Zip)
}
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseExternalAsset(t *testing.T) {
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
req := NewRequest(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset&external_url=https%%3A%%2F%%2Fforgejo.org%%2F", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID)).
AddTokenAuth(token)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var attachment *api.Attachment
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
assert.Equal(t, "test-asset", attachment.Name)
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
assert.EqualValues(t, 0, attachment.Size)
assert.Equal(t, "https://forgejo.org/", attachment.DownloadURL)
assert.Equal(t, "external", attachment.Type)
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseAllowedAPIURL(t *testing.T) {
fix: allow instance API URLs in release assets (#7644) Currently, if you try to add an "external" link to a release in Forgejo, the validation code checks for basic URL soundness and then specifically checks that the URL is not an API URL. In some cases, it may make sense to link to instance API URLs (like when you want to create a release that links to several different repos' packages). Relax this check so it only validates basic URL soundness. Refs: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/7598 ## Checklist The [contributor guide](https://forgejo.org/docs/next/contributor/) contains information that will be helpful to first time contributors. There also are a few [conditions for merging Pull Requests in Forgejo repositories](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/governance/src/branch/main/PullRequestsAgreement.md). You are also welcome to join the [Forgejo development chatroom](https://matrix.to/#/#forgejo-development:matrix.org). ### Tests - I added test coverage for Go changes... - [ ] in their respective `*_test.go` for unit tests. - [x] in the `tests/integration` directory if it involves interactions with a live Forgejo server. - I added test coverage for JavaScript changes... - [ ] in `web_src/js/*.test.js` if it can be unit tested. - [ ] in `tests/e2e/*.test.e2e.js` if it requires interactions with a live Forgejo server (see also the [developer guide for JavaScript testing](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/src/branch/forgejo/tests/e2e/README.md#end-to-end-tests)). ### Documentation - [ ] I created a pull request [to the documentation](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/docs) to explain to Forgejo users how to use this change. - [x] I did not document these changes and I do not expect someone else to do it. See: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/docs/pulls/1161 ### Release notes - [ ] I do not want this change to show in the release notes. - [x] I want the title to show in the release notes with a link to this pull request. - [ ] I want the content of the `release-notes/<pull request number>.md` to be be used for the release notes instead of the title. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/7644): <!--number 7644 --><!--line 0 --><!--description YWxsb3cgaW5zdGFuY2UgQVBJIFVSTHMgaW4gcmVsZWFzZSBhc3NldHM=-->allow instance API URLs in release assets<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/7644 Reviewed-by: Gusted <gusted@noreply.codeberg.org> Reviewed-by: Malte Jürgens <maltejur@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: John Moon <john.moon@vts-i.com> Co-committed-by: John Moon <john.moon@vts-i.com>
2025-06-09 10:01:59 +02:00
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
internalURL := "https://localhost:3003/api/packages/owner/generic/test/1.0.0/test.txt"
req := NewRequest(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset&external_url=%s", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID, url.QueryEscape(internalURL))).
AddTokenAuth(token)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var attachment *api.Attachment
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &attachment)
assert.Equal(t, "test-asset", attachment.Name)
assert.EqualValues(t, 0, attachment.Size)
assert.Equal(t, internalURL, attachment.DownloadURL)
assert.Equal(t, "external", attachment.Type)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseDuplicateAsset(t *testing.T) {
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
filename := "image.png"
buff := generateImg()
body := &bytes.Buffer{}
contentType := tests.WriteImageBody(t, buff, filename, body)
2023-09-15 18:20:16 +02:00
req := NewRequestWithBody(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset&external_url=https%%3A%%2F%%2Fforgejo.org%%2F", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID), body).
AddTokenAuth(token)
req.Header.Add("Content-Type", contentType)
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MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
2025-11-21 combined security patches (#10037) [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- The `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/dependencies` APIs allow a user to link an issue in one repository as "depending upon" an issue in another repository. Forgejo's implementation had an incorrect permission check which would verify only that the user had write permissions on the issue being modified, and not on the issue it was linking to. Due to the incorrect permission check, it was possible to view limited information (the existence of, and title of) an issue in a private repository that the user does not have access to view. The permission check has been corrected to take into account visibility of the remote repository. [CVSS 5.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Fetching information about a release via the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/tag/{tag}` API endpoint did not check whether the release was a draft, allowing accessing to information about a draft release to users who could predict an upcoming release tag but didn't have access to view it. The missing check has been added, returning a 404 response when the release is not published. [CVSS 6.3 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- Forgejo's web interface allows deleting tags on a git repository through a form post. The endpoint for this form post had misconfigured middleware handlers which enforce security rights, allowing an anonymous user, or a logged-in user without the correct permissions, to delete tags on repositories that they did not own by injecting arbitrary internal tag identifiers into the form. The middleware handler configuration has been corrected. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When the head branch of a pull request matches a branch protection rule, the head branch should be able to be merged or rebased only according to the "Push" rules defined in the protection rule. An implementation error checked those branch protection rules in the context of the base repository rather than the head repository, allowing users with write access to the base repository to be considered able to push to the branch, bypassing the "Enable push" option's expected security control. [CVSS 2.1 Low](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- An issue owner can manipulate form inputs to delete the content history of comments they did not create, as long as those comments are on issues that they own. Although comment content is not affected, the history of edits on the comment can be trimmed. The validation in the form handler was corrected. [CVSS 5.1 Medium](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) -- When a repository is configured with tag protection rules, it should not be possible for a user that is outside the whitelisted users or teams from modifying the protected tags. An incorrect parameter being passed to a security verification method allowed a user with write access to the repo to delete tags even if they were protected, as long as the tag was originally created by a user who is still authorized by the protection rules. <!--start release-notes-assistant--> ## Release notes <!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo--> - Security bug fixes - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 0 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGZpeCBkZXBlbmRlbmN5IHJlcG8gcGVybXMgaW4gQ3JlYXRlL1JlbW92ZUlzc3VlRGVwZW5kZW5jeQ==-->fix(api): fix dependency repo perms in Create/RemoveIssueDependency<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 1 --><!--description Zml4KGFwaSk6IGRyYWZ0IHJlbGVhc2VzIGNvdWxkIGJlIHJlYWQgYmVmb3JlIGJlaW5nIHB1Ymxpc2hlZA==-->fix(api): draft releases could be read before being published<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 2 --><!--description bWlzY29uZmlndXJlZCBzZWN1cml0eSBjaGVja3Mgb24gdGFnIGRlbGV0ZSB3ZWIgZm9ybQ==-->misconfigured security checks on tag delete web form<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 3 --><!--description aW5jb3JyZWN0IGxvZ2ljIGluICJVcGRhdGUgUFIiIGRpZCBub3QgZW5mb3JjZSBoZWFkIGJyYW5jaCBwcm90ZWN0aW9uIHJ1bGVzIGNvcnJlY3RseQ==-->incorrect logic in "Update PR" did not enforce head branch protection rules correctly<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 4 --><!--description aXNzdWUgb3duZXIgY2FuIGRlbGV0ZSBhbm90aGVyIHVzZXIncyBjb21tZW50J3MgZWRpdCBoaXN0b3J5IG9uIHNhbWUgaXNzdWU=-->issue owner can delete another user's comment's edit history on same issue<!--description--> - [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037): <!--number 10037 --><!--line 5 --><!--description dGFnIHByb3RlY3Rpb24gcnVsZXMgY2FuIGJlIGJ5cGFzc2VkIGR1cmluZyB0YWcgZGVsZXRlIG9wZXJhdGlvbg==-->tag protection rules can be bypassed during tag delete operation<!--description--> <!--end release-notes-assistant--> Co-authored-by: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10037 Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net> Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2025-11-21 05:23:43 +01:00
func TestAPIReleaseMissingAsset(t *testing.T) {
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defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
owner := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: repo.OwnerID})
session := loginUser(t, owner.LowerName)
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)
r := createNewReleaseUsingAPI(t, token, owner, repo, "release-tag", "", "Release Tag", "test")
req := NewRequest(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/%d/assets?name=test-asset", owner.Name, repo.Name, r.ID)).
AddTokenAuth(token)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
2025-09-15 15:53:35 +02:00
func TestAPIReleaseGithubFormat(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
user2 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})
token := getUserToken(t, user2.LowerName, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository)
req := NewRequest(t, "GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/releases/1", user2.Name, repo.Name)).AddTokenAuth(token)
req.Header.Add("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
var apiRelease *api.Release
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &apiRelease)
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(apiRelease.UploadURL, "/api/v1/repos/user2/repo1/releases/1/assets{?name,label}"), apiRelease.UploadURL)
}