crypto/x509: sub-quadratic name constraint checking

Previously, we implemented ~quadratic name constraint checking, wherein
we would check every SAN against every respective constraint in the
chain. This is the technique _basically everyone_ implements, because
it's easy, but it requires also capping the total number of constraint
checking operations to prevent denial of service.

Instead, this change implements a log-linear checking technique, as
originally described by davidben@google.com with some minor
modifications. The comment at the top of crypto/x509/constraints.go
describes this technique in detail.

This technique is faster than the existing quadratic approach in all but
one specific case, where there are a large number of constraints but
only a single name, since our previous algorithm resolves to linear in
that case.

Change-Id: Icb761f5f9898c04e266c0d0c2b07ab2637f03418
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/711421
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <nsh@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Roland Shoemaker 2025-09-25 19:13:23 -07:00 committed by Gopher Robot
parent ed4deb157e
commit 12d437c09a
3 changed files with 630 additions and 320 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,624 @@
// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package x509
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
)
// This file contains the data structures and functions necessary for
// efficiently checking X.509 name constraints. The method for constraint
// checking implemented in this file is based on a technique originally
// described by davidben@google.com.
//
// The basic concept is based on the fact that constraints describe possibly
// overlapping subtrees that we need to match against. If sorted in lexicographic
// order, and then pruned, removing any subtrees that overlap with preceding
// subtrees, a simple binary search can be used to find the nearest matching
// prefix. This reduces the complexity of name constraint checking from
// quadratic to log linear complexity.
//
// A close reading of RFC 5280 may suggest that constraints could also be
// implemented as a trie (or radix tree), which would present the possibility of
// doing construction and matching in linear time, but the memory cost of
// implementing them is actually quite high, and in the worst case (where each
// node has a high number of children) can be abused to require a program to use
// significant amounts of memory. The log linear approach taken here is
// extremely cheap in terms of memory because we directly alias the already
// parsed constraints, thus avoiding the need to do significant additional
// allocations.
//
// The basic data structure is nameConstraintsSet, which implements the sorting,
// pruning, and querying of the prefix sets.
//
// In order to check IP, DNS, URI, and email constraints, we need to use two
// different techniques, one for IP addresses, which is quite simple, and one
// for DNS names, which additionally compose the portions of URIs and emails we
// care about (technically we also need some special logic for email addresses
// as well for when constraints comprise of full email addresses) which is
// slightly more complex.
//
// IP addresses use two nameConstraintsSets, one for IPv4 addresses and one for
// IPv6 addresses, with no additional logic.
//
// DNS names require some extra logic in order to handle the distinctions
// between permitted and excluded subtrees, as well as for wildcards, and the
// semantics of leading period constraints (i.e. '.example.com'). This logic is
// implemented in the dnsConstraints type.
//
// Email addresses also require some additional logic, which does not make use
// of nameConstraintsSet, to handle constraints which define full email
// addresses (i.e. 'test@example.com'). For bare domain constraints, we use the
// dnsConstraints type described above, querying the domain portion of the email
// address. For full email addresses, we also hold a map of email addresses that
// map the local portion of the email to the domain. When querying full email
// addresses we then check if the local portion of the email is present in the
// map, and if so case insensitively compare the domain portion of the
// email.
type nameConstraintsSet[T *net.IPNet | string, V net.IP | string] struct {
set []T
}
// sortAndPrune sorts the constraints using the provided comparison function, and then
// prunes any constraints that are subsets of preceding constraints using the
// provided subset function.
func (nc *nameConstraintsSet[T, V]) sortAndPrune(cmp func(T, T) int, subset func(T, T) bool) {
if len(nc.set) < 2 {
return
}
slices.SortFunc(nc.set, cmp)
if len(nc.set) < 2 {
return
}
writeIndex := 1
for readIndex := 1; readIndex < len(nc.set); readIndex++ {
if !subset(nc.set[writeIndex-1], nc.set[readIndex]) {
nc.set[writeIndex] = nc.set[readIndex]
writeIndex++
}
}
nc.set = nc.set[:writeIndex]
}
// search does a binary search over the constraints set for the provided value
// s, using the provided comparison function cmp to find the lower bound, and
// the match function to determine if the found constraint is a prefix of s. If
// a matching constraint is found, it is returned along with true. If no
// matching constraint is found, the zero value of T and false are returned.
func (nc *nameConstraintsSet[T, V]) search(s V, cmp func(T, V) int, match func(T, V) bool) (lowerBound T, exactMatch bool) {
if len(nc.set) == 0 {
return lowerBound, false
}
// Look for the lower bound of s in the set.
i, found := slices.BinarySearchFunc(nc.set, s, cmp)
// If we found an exact match, return it
if found {
return nc.set[i], true
}
if i < 0 {
return lowerBound, false
}
var constraint T
if i == 0 {
constraint = nc.set[0]
} else {
constraint = nc.set[i-1]
}
if match(constraint, s) {
return constraint, true
}
return lowerBound, false
}
func ipNetworkSubset(a, b *net.IPNet) bool {
if !a.Contains(b.IP) {
return false
}
broadcast := make(net.IP, len(b.IP))
for i := range b.IP {
broadcast[i] = b.IP[i] | (^b.Mask[i])
}
return a.Contains(broadcast)
}
func ipNetworkCompare(a, b *net.IPNet) int {
i := bytes.Compare(a.IP, b.IP)
if i != 0 {
return i
}
return bytes.Compare(a.Mask, b.Mask)
}
func ipBinarySearch(constraint *net.IPNet, target net.IP) int {
return bytes.Compare(constraint.IP, target)
}
func ipMatch(constraint *net.IPNet, target net.IP) bool {
return constraint.Contains(target)
}
type ipConstraints struct {
// NOTE: we could store IP network prefixes as a pre-processed byte slice
// (i.e. by masking the IP) and doing the byte prefix checking using faster
// techniques, but this would require allocating new byte slices, which is
// likely significantly more expensive than just operating on the
// pre-allocated *net.IPNet and net.IP objects directly.
ipv4 *nameConstraintsSet[*net.IPNet, net.IP]
ipv6 *nameConstraintsSet[*net.IPNet, net.IP]
}
func newIPNetConstraints(l []*net.IPNet) interface {
query(net.IP) (*net.IPNet, bool)
} {
if len(l) == 0 {
return nil
}
var ipv4, ipv6 []*net.IPNet
for _, n := range l {
if len(n.IP) == net.IPv4len {
ipv4 = append(ipv4, n)
} else {
ipv6 = append(ipv6, n)
}
}
var v4c, v6c *nameConstraintsSet[*net.IPNet, net.IP]
if len(ipv4) > 0 {
v4c = &nameConstraintsSet[*net.IPNet, net.IP]{
set: ipv4,
}
v4c.sortAndPrune(ipNetworkCompare, ipNetworkSubset)
}
if len(ipv6) > 0 {
v6c = &nameConstraintsSet[*net.IPNet, net.IP]{
set: ipv6,
}
v6c.sortAndPrune(ipNetworkCompare, ipNetworkSubset)
}
return &ipConstraints{ipv4: v4c, ipv6: v6c}
}
func (ipc *ipConstraints) query(ip net.IP) (*net.IPNet, bool) {
var c *nameConstraintsSet[*net.IPNet, net.IP]
if len(ip) == net.IPv4len {
c = ipc.ipv4
} else {
c = ipc.ipv6
}
if c == nil {
return nil, false
}
return c.search(ip, ipBinarySearch, ipMatch)
}
// dnsHasSuffix case-insensitively checks if DNS name b is a label suffix of DNS
// name a, meaning that example.com is not considered a suffix of
// testexample.com, but is a suffix of test.example.com.
//
// dnsHasSuffix supports the URI "leading period" constraint semantics, which
// while not explicitly defined for dNSNames in RFC 5280, are widely supported
// (see errata 5997). In particular, a constraint of ".example.com" is
// considered to only match subdomains of example.com, but not example.com
// itself.
//
// a and b must both be non-empty strings representing (mostly) valid DNS names.
func dnsHasSuffix(a, b string) bool {
lenA := len(a)
lenB := len(b)
if lenA > lenB {
return false
}
i := lenA - 1
offset := lenA - lenB
for ; i >= 0; i-- {
ar, br := a[i], b[i-(offset)]
if ar == br {
continue
}
if br < ar {
ar, br = br, ar
}
if 'A' <= ar && ar <= 'Z' && br == ar+'a'-'A' {
continue
}
return false
}
if a[0] != '.' && lenB > lenA && b[lenB-lenA-1] != '.' {
return false
}
return true
}
// dnsCompareTable contains the ASCII alphabet mapped from a characters index in
// the table to its lowercased form.
var dnsCompareTable [256]byte
func init() {
// NOTE: we don't actually need the
// full alphabet, but calculating offsets would be more expensive than just
// having redundant characters.
for i := 0; i < 256; i++ {
c := byte(i)
if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
// Lowercase uppercase characters A-Z.
c += 'a' - 'A'
}
dnsCompareTable[i] = c
}
// Set the period character to 0 so that we get the right sorting behavior.
//
// In particular, we need the period character to sort before the only
// other valid DNS name character which isn't a-z or 0-9, the hyphen,
// otherwise a name with a dash would be incorrectly sorted into the middle
// of another tree.
//
// For example, imagine a certificate with the constraints "a.com", "a.a.com", and
// "a-a.com". These would sort as "a.com", "a-a.com", "a.a.com", which would break
// the pruning step since we wouldn't see that "a.a.com" is a subset of "a.com".
// Sorting the period before the hyphen ensures that "a.a.com" sorts before "a-a.com".
dnsCompareTable['.'] = 0
}
// dnsCompare is a case-insensitive reversed implementation of strings.Compare
// that operates from the end to the start of the strings. This is more
// efficient that allocating reversed version of a and b and using
// strings.Compare directly (even though it is highly optimized).
//
// NOTE: this function treats the period character ('.') as sorting above every
// other character, which is necessary for us to properly sort names into their
// correct order. This is further discussed in the init function above.
func dnsCompare(a, b string) int {
idxA := len(a) - 1
idxB := len(b) - 1
for idxA >= 0 && idxB >= 0 {
byteA := dnsCompareTable[a[idxA]]
byteB := dnsCompareTable[b[idxB]]
if byteA == byteB {
idxA--
idxB--
continue
}
ret := 1
if byteA < byteB {
ret = -1
}
return ret
}
ret := 0
if idxA < idxB {
ret = -1
} else if idxB < idxA {
ret = 1
}
return ret
}
type dnsConstraints struct {
// all lets us short circuit the query logic if we see a zero length
// constraint which permits or excludes everything.
all bool
// permitted indicates if these constraints are for permitted or excluded
// names.
permitted bool
constraints *nameConstraintsSet[string, string]
// parentConstraints contains a subset of constraints which are used for
// wildcard SAN queries, which are constructed by removing the first label
// from the constraints in constraints. parentConstraints is only populated
// if permitted is false.
parentConstraints map[string]string
}
func newDNSConstraints(l []string, permitted bool) interface{ query(string) (string, bool) } {
if len(l) == 0 {
return nil
}
for _, n := range l {
if len(n) == 0 {
return &dnsConstraints{all: true}
}
}
constraints := slices.Clone(l)
nc := &dnsConstraints{
constraints: &nameConstraintsSet[string, string]{
set: constraints,
},
permitted: permitted,
}
nc.constraints.sortAndPrune(dnsCompare, dnsHasSuffix)
if !permitted {
parentConstraints := map[string]string{}
for _, name := range nc.constraints.set {
trimmedName := trimFirstLabel(name)
if trimmedName == "" {
continue
}
parentConstraints[trimmedName] = name
}
if len(parentConstraints) > 0 {
nc.parentConstraints = parentConstraints
}
}
return nc
}
func (dnc *dnsConstraints) query(s string) (string, bool) {
if dnc.all {
return "", true
}
constraint, match := dnc.constraints.search(s, dnsCompare, dnsHasSuffix)
if match {
return constraint, true
}
if !dnc.permitted && s[0] == '*' {
trimmed := trimFirstLabel(s)
if constraint, found := dnc.parentConstraints[trimmed]; found {
return constraint, true
}
}
return "", false
}
type emailConstraints struct {
dnsConstraints interface{ query(string) (string, bool) }
fullEmails map[string]string
}
func newEmailConstraints(l []string, permitted bool) interface {
query(parsedEmail) (string, bool)
} {
if len(l) == 0 {
return nil
}
exactMap := map[string]string{}
var domains []string
for _, c := range l {
if !strings.ContainsRune(c, '@') {
domains = append(domains, c)
continue
}
parsed, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(c)
if !ok {
// We've already parsed these addresses in parseCertificate, and
// treat failures as a hard failure for parsing. The only way we can
// get a parse failure here is if the caller has mutated the
// certificate since parsing.
continue
}
exactMap[parsed.local] = parsed.domain
}
ec := &emailConstraints{
fullEmails: exactMap,
}
if len(domains) > 0 {
ec.dnsConstraints = newDNSConstraints(domains, permitted)
}
return ec
}
func (ec *emailConstraints) query(s parsedEmail) (string, bool) {
if len(ec.fullEmails) > 0 && strings.ContainsRune(s.email, '@') {
if domain, ok := ec.fullEmails[s.mailbox.local]; ok && strings.EqualFold(domain, s.mailbox.domain) {
return ec.fullEmails[s.email] + "@" + s.mailbox.domain, true
}
}
if ec.dnsConstraints == nil {
return "", false
}
constraint, found := ec.dnsConstraints.query(s.mailbox.domain)
return constraint, found
}
type constraints[T any, V any] struct {
constraintType string
permitted interface{ query(V) (T, bool) }
excluded interface{ query(V) (T, bool) }
}
func checkConstraints[T string | *net.IPNet, V any, P string | net.IP | parsedURI | parsedEmail](c constraints[T, V], s V, p P) error {
if c.permitted != nil {
if _, found := c.permitted.query(s); !found {
return fmt.Errorf("%s %q is not permitted by any constraint", c.constraintType, p)
}
}
if c.excluded != nil {
if constraint, found := c.excluded.query(s); found {
return fmt.Errorf("%s %q is excluded by constraint %q", c.constraintType, p, constraint)
}
}
return nil
}
type chainConstraints struct {
ip constraints[*net.IPNet, net.IP]
dns constraints[string, string]
uri constraints[string, string]
email constraints[string, parsedEmail]
index int
next *chainConstraints
}
func (cc *chainConstraints) check(dns []string, uris []parsedURI, emails []parsedEmail, ips []net.IP) error {
for _, ip := range ips {
if err := checkConstraints(cc.ip, ip, ip); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, d := range dns {
if !domainNameValid(d, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse dnsName %q", d)
}
if err := checkConstraints(cc.dns, d, d); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, u := range uris {
if !domainNameValid(u.domain, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: URI SAN %q failed to parse", u)
}
if err := checkConstraints(cc.uri, u.domain, u); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, e := range emails {
if !domainNameValid(e.mailbox.domain, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse rfc822Name %q", e.mailbox)
}
if err := checkConstraints(cc.email, e, e); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func checkChainConstraints(chain []*Certificate) error {
var currentConstraints *chainConstraints
var last *chainConstraints
for i, c := range chain {
if !c.hasNameConstraints() {
continue
}
cc := &chainConstraints{
ip: constraints[*net.IPNet, net.IP]{"IP address", newIPNetConstraints(c.PermittedIPRanges), newIPNetConstraints(c.ExcludedIPRanges)},
dns: constraints[string, string]{"DNS name", newDNSConstraints(c.PermittedDNSDomains, true), newDNSConstraints(c.ExcludedDNSDomains, false)},
uri: constraints[string, string]{"URI", newDNSConstraints(c.PermittedURIDomains, true), newDNSConstraints(c.ExcludedURIDomains, false)},
email: constraints[string, parsedEmail]{"email address", newEmailConstraints(c.PermittedEmailAddresses, true), newEmailConstraints(c.ExcludedEmailAddresses, false)},
index: i,
}
if currentConstraints == nil {
currentConstraints = cc
last = cc
} else if last != nil {
last.next = cc
last = cc
}
}
if currentConstraints == nil {
return nil
}
for i, c := range chain {
if !c.hasSANExtension() {
continue
}
if i >= currentConstraints.index {
for currentConstraints.index <= i {
if currentConstraints.next == nil {
return nil
}
currentConstraints = currentConstraints.next
}
}
uris, err := parseURIs(c.URIs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
emails, err := parseMailboxes(c.EmailAddresses)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for n := currentConstraints; n != nil; n = n.next {
if err := n.check(c.DNSNames, uris, emails, c.IPAddresses); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
type parsedURI struct {
uri *url.URL
domain string
}
func (u parsedURI) String() string {
return u.uri.String()
}
func parseURIs(uris []*url.URL) ([]parsedURI, error) {
parsed := make([]parsedURI, 0, len(uris))
for _, uri := range uris {
host := strings.ToLower(uri.Host)
if len(host) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("URI with empty host (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
if strings.Contains(host, ":") && !strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
var err error
host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(uri.Host)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse URI host %q: %v", uri.Host, err)
}
}
// netip.ParseAddr will reject the URI IPv6 literal form "[...]", so we
// check if _either_ the string parses as an IP, or if it is enclosed in
// square brackets.
if _, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil || (strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]")) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("URI with IP (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
parsed = append(parsed, parsedURI{uri, host})
}
return parsed, nil
}
type parsedEmail struct {
email string
mailbox *rfc2821Mailbox
}
func (e parsedEmail) String() string {
return e.mailbox.local + "@" + e.mailbox.domain
}
func parseMailboxes(emails []string) ([]parsedEmail, error) {
parsed := make([]parsedEmail, 0, len(emails))
for _, email := range emails {
mailbox, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(email)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse rfc822Name %q", email)
}
mailbox.domain = strings.ToLower(mailbox.domain)
parsed = append(parsed, parsedEmail{strings.ToLower(email), &mailbox})
}
return parsed, nil
}
func trimFirstLabel(dnsName string) string {
firstDotInd := strings.IndexByte(dnsName, '.')
if firstDotInd < 0 {
// Constraint is a single label, we cannot trim it.
return ""
}
return dnsName[firstDotInd:]
}

View file

@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ import (
"iter" "iter"
"maps" "maps"
"net" "net"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"reflect"
"runtime" "runtime"
"slices" "slices"
"strings" "strings"
@ -430,180 +427,6 @@ func domainToReverseLabels(domain string) (reverseLabels []string, ok bool) {
return reverseLabels, true return reverseLabels, true
} }
func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
// If the constraint contains an @, then it specifies an exact mailbox
// name.
if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
constraintMailbox, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse constraint %q", constraint)
}
return mailbox.local == constraintMailbox.local && strings.EqualFold(mailbox.domain, constraintMailbox.domain), nil
}
// Otherwise the constraint is like a DNS constraint of the domain part
// of the mailbox.
return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
}
func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
// “a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
// component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain
// name (e.g., if the URI either does not include an authority
// component or includes an authority component in which the host name
// is specified as an IP address), then the application MUST reject the
// certificate.”
host := uri.Host
if len(host) == 0 {
return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with empty host (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
if strings.Contains(host, ":") && !strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
var err error
host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(uri.Host)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
}
// netip.ParseAddr will reject the URI IPv6 literal form "[...]", so we
// check if _either_ the string parses as an IP, or if it is enclosed in
// square brackets.
if _, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil || (strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]")) {
return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with IP (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
}
func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
if len(ip) != len(constraint.IP) {
return false, nil
}
for i := range ip {
if mask := constraint.Mask[i]; ip[i]&mask != constraint.IP[i]&mask {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}
func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
// code follows NSS and accepts them as matching everything.
if len(constraint) == 0 {
return true, nil
}
domainLabels, found := reversedDomainsCache[domain]
if !found {
var ok bool
domainLabels, ok = domainToReverseLabels(domain)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", domain)
}
reversedDomainsCache[domain] = domainLabels
}
// RFC 5280 says that a leading period in a domain name means that at
// least one label must be prepended, but only for URI and email
// constraints, not DNS constraints. The code also supports that
// behaviour for DNS constraints.
mustHaveSubdomains := false
if constraint[0] == '.' {
mustHaveSubdomains = true
constraint = constraint[1:]
}
constraintLabels, found := reversedConstraintsCache[constraint]
if !found {
var ok bool
constraintLabels, ok = domainToReverseLabels(constraint)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", constraint)
}
reversedConstraintsCache[constraint] = constraintLabels
}
if len(domainLabels) < len(constraintLabels) ||
(mustHaveSubdomains && len(domainLabels) == len(constraintLabels)) {
return false, nil
}
for i, constraintLabel := range constraintLabels {
if !strings.EqualFold(constraintLabel, domainLabels[i]) {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}
// checkNameConstraints checks that c permits a child certificate to claim the
// given name, of type nameType. The argument parsedName contains the parsed
// form of name, suitable for passing to the match function. The total number
// of comparisons is tracked in the given count and should not exceed the given
// limit.
func (c *Certificate) checkNameConstraints(count *int,
maxConstraintComparisons int,
nameType string,
name string,
parsedName any,
match func(parsedName, constraint any) (match bool, err error),
permitted, excluded any) error {
excludedValue := reflect.ValueOf(excluded)
*count += excludedValue.Len()
if *count > maxConstraintComparisons {
return CertificateInvalidError{c, TooManyConstraints, ""}
}
for i := 0; i < excludedValue.Len(); i++ {
constraint := excludedValue.Index(i).Interface()
match, err := match(parsedName, constraint)
if err != nil {
return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, err.Error()}
}
if match {
return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, fmt.Sprintf("%s %q is excluded by constraint %q", nameType, name, constraint)}
}
}
permittedValue := reflect.ValueOf(permitted)
*count += permittedValue.Len()
if *count > maxConstraintComparisons {
return CertificateInvalidError{c, TooManyConstraints, ""}
}
ok := true
for i := 0; i < permittedValue.Len(); i++ {
constraint := permittedValue.Index(i).Interface()
var err error
if ok, err = match(parsedName, constraint); err != nil {
return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, err.Error()}
}
if ok {
break
}
}
if !ok {
return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, fmt.Sprintf("%s %q is not permitted by any constraint", nameType, name)}
}
return nil
}
// isValid performs validity checks on c given that it is a candidate to append // isValid performs validity checks on c given that it is a candidate to append
// to the chain in currentChain. // to the chain in currentChain.
func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error { func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
@ -636,9 +459,11 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
} }
} }
if (certType == intermediateCertificate || certType == rootCertificate) && len(currentChain) == 0 { if certType == intermediateCertificate || certType == rootCertificate {
if len(currentChain) == 0 {
return errors.New("x509: internal error: empty chain when appending CA cert") return errors.New("x509: internal error: empty chain when appending CA cert")
} }
}
// KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering Security, Peter // KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering Security, Peter
// Gutmann: A European government CA marked its signing certificates as // Gutmann: A European government CA marked its signing certificates as
@ -794,9 +619,9 @@ func (c *Certificate) Verify(opts VerifyOptions) ([][]*Certificate, error) {
incompatibleKeyUsageChains++ incompatibleKeyUsageChains++
return true return true
} }
if err := checkChainConstraints(chain, opts); err != nil { if err := checkChainConstraints(chain); err != nil {
if constraintsHintErr == nil { if constraintsHintErr == nil {
constraintsHintErr = err constraintsHintErr = CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, err.Error()}
} }
return true return true
} }
@ -1182,106 +1007,6 @@ NextCert:
return true return true
} }
func checkChainConstraints(chain []*Certificate, opts VerifyOptions) error {
maxConstraintComparisons := opts.MaxConstraintComparisions
if maxConstraintComparisons == 0 {
maxConstraintComparisons = 250000
}
comparisonCount := 0
// Each time we do constraint checking, we need to check the constraints in
// the current certificate against all of the names that preceded it. We
// reverse these names using domainToReverseLabels, which is a relatively
// expensive operation. Since we check each name against each constraint,
// this requires us to do N*C calls to domainToReverseLabels (where N is the
// total number of names that preceed the certificate, and C is the total
// number of constraints in the certificate). By caching the results of
// calling domainToReverseLabels, we can reduce that to N+C calls at the
// cost of keeping all of the parsed names and constraints in memory until
// we return from isValid.
reversedDomainsCache := map[string][]string{}
reversedConstraintsCache := map[string][]string{}
for i, c := range chain {
if !c.hasNameConstraints() {
continue
}
for _, sanCert := range chain[:i] {
if !sanCert.hasSANExtension() {
continue
}
err := forEachSAN(sanCert.getSANExtension(), func(tag int, data []byte) error {
switch tag {
case nameTypeEmail:
name := string(data)
mailbox, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(name)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse rfc822Name %q", mailbox)
}
if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "email address", name, mailbox,
func(parsedName, constraint any) (bool, error) {
return matchEmailConstraint(parsedName.(rfc2821Mailbox), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
}, c.PermittedEmailAddresses, c.ExcludedEmailAddresses); err != nil {
return err
}
case nameTypeDNS:
name := string(data)
if !domainNameValid(name, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse dnsName %q", name)
}
if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "DNS name", name, name,
func(parsedName, constraint any) (bool, error) {
return matchDomainConstraint(parsedName.(string), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
}, c.PermittedDNSDomains, c.ExcludedDNSDomains); err != nil {
return err
}
case nameTypeURI:
name := string(data)
uri, err := url.Parse(name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: URI SAN %q failed to parse", name)
}
if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "URI", name, uri,
func(parsedName, constraint any) (bool, error) {
return matchURIConstraint(parsedName.(*url.URL), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
}, c.PermittedURIDomains, c.ExcludedURIDomains); err != nil {
return err
}
case nameTypeIP:
ip := net.IP(data)
if l := len(ip); l != net.IPv4len && l != net.IPv6len {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: IP SAN %x failed to parse", data)
}
if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "IP address", ip.String(), ip,
func(parsedName, constraint any) (bool, error) {
return matchIPConstraint(parsedName.(net.IP), constraint.(*net.IPNet))
}, c.PermittedIPRanges, c.ExcludedIPRanges); err != nil {
return err
}
default:
// Unknown SAN types are ignored.
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
func mustNewOIDFromInts(ints []uint64) OID { func mustNewOIDFromInts(ints []uint64) OID {
oid, err := OIDFromInts(ints) oid, err := OIDFromInts(ints)
if err != nil { if err != nil {

View file

@ -1331,45 +1331,6 @@ func TestUnknownAuthorityError(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
var nameConstraintTests = []struct {
constraint, domain string
expectError bool
shouldMatch bool
}{
{"", "anything.com", false, true},
{"example.com", "example.com", false, true},
{"example.com.", "example.com", true, false},
{"example.com", "example.com.", true, false},
{"example.com", "ExAmPle.coM", false, true},
{"example.com", "exampl1.com", false, false},
{"example.com", "www.ExAmPle.coM", false, true},
{"example.com", "sub.www.ExAmPle.coM", false, true},
{"example.com", "notexample.com", false, false},
{".example.com", "example.com", false, false},
{".example.com", "www.example.com", false, true},
{".example.com", "www..example.com", true, false},
}
func TestNameConstraints(t *testing.T) {
for i, test := range nameConstraintTests {
result, err := matchDomainConstraint(test.domain, test.constraint, map[string][]string{}, map[string][]string{})
if err != nil && !test.expectError {
t.Errorf("unexpected error for test #%d: domain=%s, constraint=%s, err=%s", i, test.domain, test.constraint, err)
continue
}
if err == nil && test.expectError {
t.Errorf("unexpected success for test #%d: domain=%s, constraint=%s", i, test.domain, test.constraint)
continue
}
if result != test.shouldMatch {
t.Errorf("unexpected result for test #%d: domain=%s, constraint=%s, result=%t", i, test.domain, test.constraint, result)
}
}
}
const selfSignedWithCommonName = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- const selfSignedWithCommonName = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAaMQswCQYDVQQKEwJjYTEL MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAaMQswCQYDVQQKEwJjYTEL
MAkGA1UEAxMCY2EwHhcNMTYwODI4MTcwOTE4WhcNMjEwODI3MTcwOTE4WjAcMQsw MAkGA1UEAxMCY2EwHhcNMTYwODI4MTcwOTE4WhcNMjEwODI3MTcwOTE4WjAcMQsw