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Merge pull request #103247 from Faless/mbedtls/backport_defragment_tls_handshake

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[mbedTLS] Integrate TLS handshake defragmentation PR
This commit is contained in:
Rémi Verschelde 2025-02-24 17:33:35 +01:00 • committed by GitHub
commit 39c201ca58
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GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
12 changed files with 542 additions and 56 deletions
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4
doc/classes/EditorSettings.xml
View file

@ -1117,6 +1117,10 @@
<member name="network/tls/editor_tls_certificates" type="String" setter="" getter="">
The TLS certificate bundle to use for HTTP requests made within the editor (e.g. from the AssetLib tab). If left empty, the [url=https://github.com/godotengine/godot/blob/master/thirdparty/certs/ca-certificates.crt]included Mozilla certificate bundle[/url] will be used.
</member>
<member name="network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3" type="bool" setter="" getter="">
If [code]true[/code], enable TLSv1.3 negotiation.
[b]Note:[/b] Only supported when using Mbed TLS 3.0 or later (Linux distribution packages may be compiled against older system Mbed TLS packages), otherwise the maximum supported TLS version is always TLSv1.2.
</member>
<member name="project_manager/default_renderer" type="String" setter="" getter="">
The renderer type that will be checked off by default when creating a new project. Accepted strings are "forward_plus", "mobile" or "gl_compatibility".
</member>

3
doc/classes/ProjectSettings.xml
View file

@ -2204,9 +2204,8 @@
The CA certificates bundle to use for TLS connections. If this is set to a non-empty value, this will [i]override[/i] Godot's default [url=https://github.com/godotengine/godot/blob/master/thirdparty/certs/ca-certificates.crt]Mozilla certificate bundle[/url]. If left empty, the default certificate bundle will be used.
If in doubt, leave this setting empty.
</member>
<member name="network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3" type="bool" setter="" getter="" default="false">
<member name="network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3" type="bool" setter="" getter="" default="true">
If [code]true[/code], enable TLSv1.3 negotiation.
[b]Note:[/b] This is experimental, and may cause connections to fail in some cases (notably, if the remote server uses TLS handshake fragmentation).
[b]Note:[/b] Only supported when using Mbed TLS 3.0 or later (Linux distribution packages may be compiled against older system Mbed TLS packages), otherwise the maximum supported TLS version is always TLSv1.2.
</member>
<member name="physics/2d/default_angular_damp" type="float" setter="" getter="" default="1.0">

1
editor/editor_settings.cpp
View file

@ -974,6 +974,7 @@ void EditorSettings::_load_defaults(Ref<ConfigFile> p_extra_config) {
// SSL
EDITOR_SETTING_USAGE(Variant::STRING, PROPERTY_HINT_GLOBAL_FILE, "network/tls/editor_tls_certificates", _SYSTEM_CERTS_PATH, "*.crt,*.pem", PROPERTY_USAGE_DEFAULT | PROPERTY_USAGE_RESTART_IF_CHANGED);
EDITOR_SETTING_BASIC(Variant::BOOL, PROPERTY_HINT_NONE, "network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3", true, "")
// Debug
_initial_set("network/debug/remote_host", "127.0.0.1"); // Hints provided in setup_network

2
modules/mbedtls/register_types.cpp
View file

@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void initialize_mbedtls_module(ModuleInitializationLevel p_level) {
return;
}
GLOBAL_DEF("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3", false);
GLOBAL_DEF("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3", true);
#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
int status = psa_crypto_init();

26
modules/mbedtls/tls_context_mbedtls.cpp
View file

@ -32,6 +32,10 @@
#include "core/config/project_settings.h"
#ifdef TOOLS_ENABLED
#include "editor/editor_settings.h"
#endif // TOOLS_ENABLED
static void my_debug(void *ctx, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *str) {
@ -148,9 +152,18 @@ Error TLSContextMbedTLS::init_server(int p_transport, Ref<TLSOptions> p_options,
}
#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint() || !(bool)GLOBAL_GET("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3")) {
#ifdef TOOLS_ENABLED
if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint()) {
if (!EditorSettings::get_singleton()->get_setting("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3").operator bool()) {
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
}
} else
#endif
{
if (!GLOBAL_GET("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3").operator bool()) {
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
}
}
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_setup(&tls, &conf);
@ -197,9 +210,18 @@ Error TLSContextMbedTLS::init_client(int p_transport, const String &p_hostname,
}
#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint() || !(bool)GLOBAL_GET("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3")) {
#ifdef TOOLS_ENABLED
if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint()) {
if (!EditorSettings::get_singleton()->get_setting("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3").operator bool()) {
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
}
} else
#endif
{
if (!GLOBAL_GET("network/tls/enable_tls_v1.3").operator bool()) {
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
}
}
#endif
// Set valid CAs

1
thirdparty/README.md vendored
View file

@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ File extracted from upstream release tarball:
Patches:
- `0001-msvc-2019-psa-redeclaration.patch` (GH-90535)
- `0002-pr-9981-defragment-incoming-tls-handshake-messages.patch` (GH-103247)
## meshoptimizer

11
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h vendored
View file

@ -1724,7 +1724,16 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state);
#endif
unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */
/** Multipurpose field.
*
* - DTLS: records with a bad MAC received.
* - TLS: accumulated length of handshake fragments (up to \c in_hslen).
*
* This field is multipurpose in order to preserve the ABI in the
* Mbed TLS 3.6 LTS branch. Until 3.6.2, it was only used in DTLS
* and called `badmac_seen`.
*/
unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */

5
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h vendored
View file

@ -1829,10 +1829,11 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial);

114
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c vendored
View file

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
@ -3220,13 +3221,17 @@ static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
if (ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
/* First handshake fragment must at least include the header. */
if (ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && ssl->in_hslen == 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
if (ssl->in_hslen == 0) {
ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl);
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = 0;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("handshake message: msglen ="
" %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %"
@ -3292,10 +3297,67 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
}
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */
if (ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS handshake fragmentation not supported"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen <= ssl->in_hslen) {
int ret;
const size_t hs_remain = ssl->in_hslen - ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
("handshake fragment: %u .. %"
MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " of %"
MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " msglen %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen,
(size_t) ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen +
(hs_remain <= ssl->in_msglen ? hs_remain : ssl->in_msglen),
ssl->in_hslen, ssl->in_msglen));
if (ssl->in_msglen < hs_remain) {
/* ssl->in_msglen is a 25-bit value since it is the sum of the
* header length plus the payload length, the header length is 4
* and the payload length was received on the wire encoded as
* 3 octets. We don't support 16-bit platforms; more specifically,
* we assume that both unsigned and size_t are at least 32 bits.
* Therefore there is no possible integer overflow here.
*/
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen += (unsigned) ssl->in_msglen;
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen;
ssl->in_msglen = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen > 0) {
/*
* At in_first_hdr we have a sequence of records that cover the next handshake
* record, each with its own record header that we need to remove.
* Note that the reassembled record size may not equal the size of the message,
* there may be more messages after it, complete or partial.
*/
unsigned char *in_first_hdr = ssl->in_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
unsigned char *p = in_first_hdr, *q = NULL;
size_t merged_rec_len = 0;
do {
mbedtls_record rec;
ret = ssl_parse_record_header(ssl, p, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl), &rec);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
merged_rec_len += rec.data_len;
p = rec.buf + rec.buf_len;
if (q != NULL) {
memmove(q, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len);
q += rec.data_len;
} else {
q = p;
}
} while (merged_rec_len < ssl->in_hslen);
ssl->in_hdr = in_first_hdr;
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
ssl->in_msglen = merged_rec_len;
/* Adjust message length. */
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(merged_rec_len, ssl->in_len, 0);
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "reassembled record",
ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + merged_rec_len);
}
} else {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
return 0;
@ -4640,6 +4702,16 @@ static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen != 0) {
/* Not all handshake fragments have arrived, do not consume. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
("waiting for more fragments (%u of %"
MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " left)",
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen, ssl->in_hslen,
ssl->in_hslen - ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen));
return 0;
}
/*
* Get next Handshake message in the current record
*/
@ -4665,6 +4737,7 @@ static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen;
memmove(ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen,
ssl->in_msglen);
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_len, 0);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "remaining content in record",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen);
@ -4967,11 +5040,13 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
return ret;
}
if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 &&
++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) {
if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0) {
++ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen;
if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
}
/* As above, invalid records cause
* dismissal of the whole datagram. */
@ -5345,7 +5420,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
} else
#endif
{
ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_buf;
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len;
@ -5361,24 +5436,35 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
* Setup an SSL context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
}
/* Derive other internal pointers. */
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
}
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf;
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8;
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
}
/* Derive other internal pointers. */
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */);
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
}
/*

26
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c vendored
View file

@ -344,12 +344,13 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing,
size_t out_buf_new_len)
{
int modified = 0;
size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0;
size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0, hdr_in = 0;
size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0;
if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) {
written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf;
len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf;
hdr_in = ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf;
if (downsizing ?
ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len :
ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len) {
@ -381,7 +382,10 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing,
}
if (modified) {
/* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */
mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl);
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + hdr_in;
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(ssl);
/* Fields below might not be properly updated with record
* splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */
ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out;
@ -1409,7 +1413,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
goto error;
}
mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info));
@ -1474,7 +1479,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* Cancel any possibly running timer */
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0);
mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(ssl);
/* Reset incoming message parsing */
ssl->in_offt = NULL;
@ -1485,6 +1491,12 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
ssl->transform_in = NULL;
/* TLS: reset in_hsfraglen, which is part of message parsing.
* DTLS: on a client reconnect, don't reset badmac_seen. */
if (!partial) {
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = 0;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_epoch = 0;
@ -5014,7 +5026,7 @@ static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = {
* uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value
* uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use
* // fields from ssl_context
* uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC
* uint32 badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC
* uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num
* uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection
* uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram
@ -5156,7 +5168,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
*/
used += 4;
if (used <= buf_len) {
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0);
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen, p, 0);
p += 4;
}
@ -5386,7 +5398,7 @@ static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
ssl->badmac_seen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0);
ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0);
p += 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)

22
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c vendored
View file

@ -1057,28 +1057,6 @@ read_record_header:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
{
size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u",
(unsigned) handshake_len));
/* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and
* fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */
if (buf[1] != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0",
(unsigned) buf[1]));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
}
/* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u",
(unsigned) msg_len,
(unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl),
(unsigned) handshake_len));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {

373
thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/0002-pr-9981-defragment-incoming-tls-handshake-messages.patch vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
diff --git a/thirdparty/README.md b/thirdparty/README.md
index 16a7661f5b..7ad8524e1a 100644
--- a/thirdparty/README.md
+++ b/thirdparty/README.md
@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ File extracted from upstream release tarball:
Patches:
- `0001-msvc-2019-psa-redeclaration.patch` (GH-90535)
+- `0002-pr-9981-defragment-incoming-tls-handshake-messages.patch` (GH-102770)
## meshoptimizer
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 42fffbf860..597da2571f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1724,7 +1724,16 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state);
#endif
- unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */
+ /** Multipurpose field.
+ *
+ * - DTLS: records with a bad MAC received.
+ * - TLS: accumulated length of handshake fragments (up to \c in_hslen).
+ *
+ * This field is multipurpose in order to preserve the ABI in the
+ * Mbed TLS 3.6 LTS branch. Until 3.6.2, it was only used in DTLS
+ * and called `badmac_seen`.
+ */
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h
index 98668798a8..bfadac7be3 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -1829,10 +1829,11 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
-void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+void mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial);
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
index ef722d7bdc..08d197e08c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
@@ -3220,13 +3221,17 @@ static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- if (ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
+ /* First handshake fragment must at least include the header. */
+ if (ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && ssl->in_hslen == 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl);
+ if (ssl->in_hslen == 0) {
+ ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl);
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = 0;
+ }
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("handshake message: msglen ="
" %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %"
@@ -3292,10 +3297,67 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
}
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */
- if (ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS handshake fragmentation not supported"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen <= ssl->in_hslen) {
+ int ret;
+ const size_t hs_remain = ssl->in_hslen - ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("handshake fragment: %u .. %"
+ MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " of %"
+ MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " msglen %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen,
+ (size_t) ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen +
+ (hs_remain <= ssl->in_msglen ? hs_remain : ssl->in_msglen),
+ ssl->in_hslen, ssl->in_msglen));
+ if (ssl->in_msglen < hs_remain) {
+ /* ssl->in_msglen is a 25-bit value since it is the sum of the
+ * header length plus the payload length, the header length is 4
+ * and the payload length was received on the wire encoded as
+ * 3 octets. We don't support 16-bit platforms; more specifically,
+ * we assume that both unsigned and size_t are at least 32 bits.
+ * Therefore there is no possible integer overflow here.
+ */
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen += (unsigned) ssl->in_msglen;
+ ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen;
+ ssl->in_msglen = 0;
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ }
+ if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen > 0) {
+ /*
+ * At in_first_hdr we have a sequence of records that cover the next handshake
+ * record, each with its own record header that we need to remove.
+ * Note that the reassembled record size may not equal the size of the message,
+ * there may be more messages after it, complete or partial.
+ */
+ unsigned char *in_first_hdr = ssl->in_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
+ unsigned char *p = in_first_hdr, *q = NULL;
+ size_t merged_rec_len = 0;
+ do {
+ mbedtls_record rec;
+ ret = ssl_parse_record_header(ssl, p, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl), &rec);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ merged_rec_len += rec.data_len;
+ p = rec.buf + rec.buf_len;
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ memmove(q, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len);
+ q += rec.data_len;
+ } else {
+ q = p;
+ }
+ } while (merged_rec_len < ssl->in_hslen);
+ ssl->in_hdr = in_first_hdr;
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
+ ssl->in_msglen = merged_rec_len;
+ /* Adjust message length. */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(merged_rec_len, ssl->in_len, 0);
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = 0;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "reassembled record",
+ ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + merged_rec_len);
+ }
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
return 0;
@@ -4640,6 +4702,16 @@ static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
+ if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen != 0) {
+ /* Not all handshake fragments have arrived, do not consume. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("waiting for more fragments (%u of %"
+ MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " left)",
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen, ssl->in_hslen,
+ ssl->in_hslen - ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/*
* Get next Handshake message in the current record
*/
@@ -4665,6 +4737,7 @@ static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen;
memmove(ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen,
ssl->in_msglen);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_len, 0);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "remaining content in record",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen);
@@ -4967,10 +5040,12 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
return ret;
}
- if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 &&
- ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
+ if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0) {
+ ++ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen;
+ if (ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
+ }
}
/* As above, invalid records cause
@@ -5345,7 +5420,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
} else
#endif
{
- ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
+ ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_buf;
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len;
@@ -5361,24 +5436,35 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
* Setup an SSL context
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ {
+ ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
+ }
+
+ /* Derive other internal pointers. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
- ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf;
- ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
- ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8;
+ ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
}
-
/* Derive other internal pointers. */
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */);
- mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
}
/*
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
index c773365bf6..7f74248252 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -344,12 +344,13 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing,
size_t out_buf_new_len)
{
int modified = 0;
- size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0;
+ size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0, hdr_in = 0;
size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0;
if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) {
written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf;
len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf;
+ hdr_in = ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf;
if (downsizing ?
ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len :
ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len) {
@@ -381,7 +382,10 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing,
}
if (modified) {
/* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */
- mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl);
+ ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + hdr_in;
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(ssl);
+
/* Fields below might not be properly updated with record
* splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */
ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out;
@@ -1409,7 +1413,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
goto error;
}
- mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info));
@@ -1474,7 +1479,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* Cancel any possibly running timer */
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0);
- mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(ssl);
/* Reset incoming message parsing */
ssl->in_offt = NULL;
@@ -1485,6 +1491,12 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
ssl->transform_in = NULL;
+ /* TLS: reset in_hsfraglen, which is part of message parsing.
+ * DTLS: on a client reconnect, don't reset badmac_seen. */
+ if (!partial) {
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = 0;
+ }
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_epoch = 0;
@@ -5014,7 +5026,7 @@ static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = {
* uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value
* uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use
* // fields from ssl_context
- * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC
+ * uint32 badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC
* uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num
* uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection
* uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram
@@ -5156,7 +5168,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
*/
used += 4;
if (used <= buf_len) {
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen, p, 0);
p += 4;
}
@@ -5386,7 +5398,7 @@ static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- ssl->badmac_seen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0);
+ ssl->badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0);
p += 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 03722ac33c..67df4284a4 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -1057,28 +1057,6 @@ read_record_header:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
- {
- size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u",
- (unsigned) handshake_len));
-
- /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and
- * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */
- if (buf[1] != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0",
- (unsigned) buf[1]));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
- }
-
- /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
- if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u",
- (unsigned) msg_len,
- (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl),
- (unsigned) handshake_len));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
- }
- }
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {