Merge pull request #107501 from lawnjelly/3.6_cherrypicks_june_25

Cherry-picks for the 3.6 branch (future 3.6.1) - 2nd batch

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -215,13 +215,13 @@ See the [release announcement](https://godotengine.org/article/godot-3-6-finally
 
 - bullet updated to 3.25.
 - Embree updated to version 3.13.5.
-- libpng updated to version 1.6.39.
+- libpng updated to version 1.6.43.
-- libwebp updated to version 1.2.4.
+- libwebp updated to version 1.3.2.
-- MbedTLS updated to version 2.28.2.
+- MbedTLS updated to version 2.28.8.
-- miniupnpc updated to version 2.2.3.
+- miniupnpc updated to version 2.2.7.
-- zlib/minizip updated to version 1.2.13.
+- zlib/minizip updated to version 1.3.1.
-- zstd updated to version 1.5.2.
+- zstd updated to version 1.5.5.
-- CA root certificates updated to 2022.10 bundle from Mozilla.
+- CA root certificates updated to 2024.03 bundle from Mozilla.
 - SDL GameControllerDB updated to 2023-02-27 git snapshot.
 
 #### XR

core/error_macros.h

@@ -77,15 +77,15 @@ struct ErrorHandlerList {
 void add_error_handler(ErrorHandlerList *p_handler);
 void remove_error_handler(ErrorHandlerList *p_handler);
 
-void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
-void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
-void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
-void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
-void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
-void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
-void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const char *p_message = "", bool fatal = false);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const char *p_message = "", bool fatal = false);
-void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const String &p_message, bool fatal = false);
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const String &p_message, bool fatal = false);
-void _err_flush_stdout();
+_NO_INLINE_ void _err_flush_stdout();
 
 void _physics_interpolation_warning(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, ObjectID p_id, const char *p_warn_string);
 

core/typedefs.h

@@ -69,6 +69,20 @@
 
 #endif
 
+// Should never inline.
+#ifndef _NO_INLINE_
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4)
+#define _NO_INLINE_ __attribute__((noinline))
+#elif defined(__llvm__)
+#define _NO_INLINE_ __attribute__((noinline))
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define _NO_INLINE_ __declspec(noinline)
+#else
+#define _NO_INLINE_
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
 // No discard allows the compiler to flag warnings if we don't use the return value of functions / classes
 #ifndef _NO_DISCARD_
 // c++ 17 onwards

doc/classes/TextureProgress.xml

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 		</member>
 		<member name="radial_initial_angle" type="float" setter="set_radial_initial_angle" getter="get_radial_initial_angle" default="0.0">
 			Starting angle for the fill of [member texture_progress] if [member fill_mode] is [constant FILL_CLOCKWISE] or [constant FILL_COUNTER_CLOCKWISE]. When the node's [code]value[/code] is equal to its [code]min_value[/code], the texture doesn't show up at all. When the [code]value[/code] increases, the texture fills and tends towards [member radial_fill_degrees].
+			[b]Note:[/b] [member radial_initial_angle] is wrapped between [code]0[/code] and [code]360[/code] degrees (inclusive).
 		</member>
 		<member name="stretch_margin_bottom" type="int" setter="set_stretch_margin" getter="get_stretch_margin" default="0">
 			The height of the 9-patch's bottom row. A margin of 16 means the 9-slice's bottom corners and side will have a height of 16 pixels. You can set all 4 margin values individually to create panels with non-uniform borders.

drivers/pulseaudio/audio_driver_pulseaudio.cpp

@@ -708,7 +708,8 @@ Error AudioDriverPulseAudio::capture_init_device() {
 	int input_buffer_frames = closest_power_of_2(input_latency * mix_rate / 1000);
 	int input_buffer_size = input_buffer_frames * spec.channels;
 
-	pa_buffer_attr attr;
+	pa_buffer_attr attr = {};
+	attr.maxlength = (uint32_t)-1;
 	attr.fragsize = input_buffer_size * sizeof(int16_t);
 
 	pa_rec_str = pa_stream_new(pa_ctx, "Record", &spec, &pa_rec_map);

editor/plugins/tile_set_editor_plugin.cpp

@@ -2457,6 +2457,7 @@ void TileSetEditor::_zoom_on_position(float p_zoom, const Vector2 &p_position) {
 
 void TileSetEditor::draw_highlight_current_tile() {
 	Color shadow_color = Color(0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3);
+	Color border_color_red = Color(1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.9);
 	if ((workspace_mode == WORKSPACE_EDIT && get_current_tile() >= 0) || !edited_region.has_no_area()) {
 		Rect2 region;
 		if (edited_region.has_no_area()) {
@@ -2478,6 +2479,7 @@ void TileSetEditor::draw_highlight_current_tile() {
 		if (region.position.y + region.size.y <= workspace->get_rect().size.y) {
 			workspace->draw_rect(Rect2(0, region.position.y + region.size.y, workspace->get_rect().size.x, workspace->get_rect().size.y - region.size.y - region.position.y), shadow_color);
 		}
+		workspace->draw_rect(region.grow_individual(1.0f, 0.0f, 0.0f, 1.0f), border_color_red, false, 2.0f);
 	} else {
 		workspace->draw_rect(Rect2(Point2(0, 0), workspace->get_rect().size), shadow_color);
 	}

main/godotcontrollerdb.txt

@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@ __XINPUT_DEVICE__,XInput Gamepad,a:b12,b:b13,x:b14,y:b15,start:b4,back:b5,leftst
 
 # Android
 Default Android Gamepad,Default Controller,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,dpdown:h0.4,rightstick:b8,rightshoulder:b10,rightx:a2,start:b6,righty:a3,dpleft:h0.8,lefttrigger:a4,x:b2,dpup:h0.1,back:b4,leftstick:b7,leftshoulder:b9,y:b3,a:b0,dpright:h0.2,righttrigger:a5,b:b1,platform:Android,
+58626f7820576972656c65737320436f,Xbox Series X Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e04000091020000ff073f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e04000091020000ff073f80,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e040000e00200000ffe3f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e040000e00200000ffe3f80,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e040000e0020000ffff3f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e040000e0020000ffff3f80,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+050000005e040000fd020000ffff3f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+33356661323266333733373865656366,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+34356136633366613530316338376136,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+35623965373264386238353433656138,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
+36616131643361333337396261666433,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
 
 # Javascript
 standard,Standard Gamepad Mapping,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightx:a2,righty:a3,lefttrigger:b6,righttrigger:b7,a:b0,b:b1,x:b2,y:b3,leftshoulder:b4,rightshoulder:b5,back:b8,start:b9,leftstick:b10,rightstick:b11,dpup:b12,dpdown:b13,dpleft:b14,dpright:b15,guide:b16,leftstick:b10,rightstick:b11,platform:Javascript,

platform/android/java/lib/src/org/godotengine/godot/input/GodotInputHandler.java

@@ -408,6 +408,9 @@ public class GodotInputHandler implements InputManager.InputDeviceListener {
 			case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_SELECT:
 				button = 4;
 				break;
+			case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_MODE: // Home/Xbox Button on Xbox controllers
+				button = 5;
+				break;
 			case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_START:
 				button = 6;
 				break;
@@ -429,6 +432,9 @@ public class GodotInputHandler implements InputManager.InputDeviceListener {
 			case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_DPAD_RIGHT:
 				button = 14;
 				break;
+			case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_MEDIA_RECORD: // Share Button on Xbox controllers
+				button = 15;
+				break;
 			case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_C:
 				button = 17;
 				break;

platform/windows/os_windows.cpp

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const WORD MAX_CONSOLE_LINES = 1500;
 extern "C" {
 __declspec(dllexport) DWORD NvOptimusEnablement = 1;
 __declspec(dllexport) int AmdPowerXpressRequestHighPerformance = 1;
+__declspec(dllexport) void NoHotPatch() {} // Disable Nahimic code injection.
 }
 
 // Workaround mingw-w64 < 4.0 bug

scene/gui/rich_text_label.cpp

@@ -1848,9 +1848,17 @@ void RichTextLabel::push_font(const Ref<Font> &p_font) {
 	ItemFont *item = memnew(ItemFont);
 
 	item->font = p_font;
+	item->owner = get_instance_id();
+	item->font->connect("changed", this, "_invalidate_fonts", Vector<Variant>(), CONNECT_REFERENCE_COUNTED);
+
 	_add_item(item, true);
 }
 
+void RichTextLabel::_invalidate_fonts() {
+	main->first_invalid_line = 0; //invalidate ALL
+	update();
+}
+
 void RichTextLabel::push_normal() {
 	Ref<Font> normal_font = get_font("normal_font");
 	ERR_FAIL_COND(normal_font.is_null());
@@ -2927,6 +2935,8 @@ void RichTextLabel::_bind_methods() {
 	ClassDB::bind_method(D_METHOD("get_effects"), &RichTextLabel::get_effects);
 	ClassDB::bind_method(D_METHOD("install_effect", "effect"), &RichTextLabel::install_effect);
 
+	ClassDB::bind_method(D_METHOD("_invalidate_fonts"), &RichTextLabel::_invalidate_fonts);
+
 	ADD_GROUP("BBCode", "bbcode_");
 	ADD_PROPERTY(PropertyInfo(Variant::BOOL, "bbcode_enabled"), "set_use_bbcode", "is_using_bbcode");
 	ADD_PROPERTY(PropertyInfo(Variant::STRING, "bbcode_text", PROPERTY_HINT_MULTILINE_TEXT), "set_bbcode", "get_bbcode");

scene/gui/rich_text_label.h

@@ -164,7 +164,17 @@ private:
 
 	struct ItemFont : public Item {
 		Ref<Font> font;
+		ObjectID owner;
+
 		ItemFont() { type = ITEM_FONT; }
+		~ItemFont() {
+			if (font.is_valid()) {
+				RichTextLabel *owner_rtl = Object::cast_to<RichTextLabel>(ObjectDB::get_instance(owner));
+				if (owner_rtl) {
+					font->disconnect("changed", owner_rtl, "_invalidate_fonts");
+				}
+			}
+		}
 	};
 
 	struct ItemColor : public Item {
@@ -348,6 +358,8 @@ private:
 	void _add_item(Item *p_item, bool p_enter = false, bool p_ensure_newline = false);
 	void _remove_item(Item *p_item, const int p_line, const int p_subitem_line);
 
+	void _invalidate_fonts();
+
 	struct ProcessState {
 		int line_width;
 	};

scene/gui/texture_progress.cpp

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include "texture_progress.h"
 
 #include "core/engine.h"
+#include "math.h"
 
 void TextureProgress::set_under_texture(const Ref<Texture> &p_texture) {
 	under = p_texture;
@@ -510,7 +511,7 @@ void TextureProgress::_notification(int p_what) {
 							}
 
 							// Draw a reference cross.
-							if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint()) {
+							if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint() && is_inside_tree() && get_tree()->get_edited_scene_root() && get_tree()->get_edited_scene_root()->get_parent()->is_a_parent_of(this)) {
 								Point2 p;
 
 								if (nine_patch_stretch) {
@@ -577,12 +578,12 @@ int TextureProgress::get_fill_mode() {
 }
 
 void TextureProgress::set_radial_initial_angle(float p_angle) {
-	while (p_angle > 360) {
+	ERR_FAIL_COND_MSG(!isfinite(p_angle), "Angle is non-finite.");
-		p_angle -= 360;
+
-	}
+	if (p_angle < 0.0 || p_angle > 360.0) {
-	while (p_angle < 0) {
+		p_angle = Math::fposmod(p_angle, 360.0f);
-		p_angle += 360;
 	}
+
 	rad_init_angle = p_angle;
 	update();
 }

scene/main/viewport.cpp

@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ void Viewport::_notification(int p_what) {
 			gui.mouse_in_window = false;
 			_drop_physics_mouseover();
 			_drop_mouse_over();
+			_gui_cancel_tooltip();
 			// When the mouse exits the window, we want to end mouse_over, but
 			// not mouse_focus, because, for example, we want to continue
 			// dragging a scrollbar even if the mouse has left the window.

thirdparty/README.md

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ Files extracted from upstream source:
 ## certs
 
 - Upstream: Mozilla, via https://github.com/bagder/ca-bundle
-- Version: git (4d3fe6683f651d96be1bbef316b201e9b33b274d, 2024),
+- Version: git (bcc414c5b5282f9321651bf71dc1e254ae87e3f8, 2025),
-  generated from mozilla-release changeset b8ea2342548b8571e58f9176d9555ccdb5ec199f
+  generated from mozilla-release changeset 60d4997d339bb7ac6d033819ac50dcad4b9be09d
 - License: MPL 2.0
 
 Files extracted from upstream source:
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ Files extracted from upstream source:
 ## mbedtls
 
 - Upstream: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls
-- Version: 2.28.9 (5e146adef63b326b04282252639bebc2730939c6, 2024)
+- Version: 2.28.10 (2fc8413bfcb51354c8e679141b17b3f1a5942561, 2025)
 - License: Apache 2.0
 
 File extracted from upstream release tarball:

thirdparty/certs/ca-certificates.crt

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ##
 ## Bundle of CA Root Certificates
 ##
-## Certificate data from Mozilla as of: Sat Oct 19 21:26:09 2024 GMT
+## Certificate data from Mozilla as of: Tue Apr  8 09:28:30 2025 GMT
 ##
 ## Find updated versions here: https://curl.se/docs/caextract.html
 ##
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 ## Just configure this file as the SSLCACertificateFile.
 ##
 ## Conversion done with mk-ca-bundle.pl version 1.29.
-## SHA256: 36105b01631f9fc03b1eca779b44a30a1a5890b9bf8dc07ccb001a07301e01cf
+## SHA256: 620fd89c02acb0019f1899dab7907db5d20735904f5a9a0d3a8771a5857ac482
 ##
 
 
@@ -371,37 +371,6 @@ NU0LbbqhPcCT4H8js1WtciVORvnSFu+wZMEBnunKoGqYDs/YYPIvSbjkQuE4NRb0yG5P94FW6Lqj
 viOvrv1vA+ACOzB2+httQc8Bsem4yWb02ybzOqR08kkkW8mw0FfB+j564ZfJ
 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
 
-SwissSign Silver CA - G2
-========================
------BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIFvTCCA6WgAwIBAgIITxvUL1S7L0swDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwRzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ0gxFTAT
-BgNVBAoTDFN3aXNzU2lnbiBBRzEhMB8GA1UEAxMYU3dpc3NTaWduIFNpbHZlciBDQSAtIEcyMB4X
-DTA2MTAyNTA4MzI0NloXDTM2MTAyNTA4MzI0NlowRzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ0gxFTATBgNVBAoTDFN3
-aXNzU2lnbiBBRzEhMB8GA1UEAxMYU3dpc3NTaWduIFNpbHZlciBDQSAtIEcyMIICIjANBgkqhkiG
-9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAxPGHf9N4Mfc4yfjDmUO8x/e8N+dOcbpLj6VzHVxumK4DV644
-N0MvFz0fyM5oEMF4rhkDKxD6LHmD9ui5aLlV8gREpzn5/ASLHvGiTSf5YXu6t+WiE7brYT7QbNHm
-+/pe7R20nqA1W6GSy/BJkv6FCgU+5tkL4k+73JU3/JHpMjUi0R86TieFnbAVlDLaYQ1HTWBCrpJH
-6INaUFjpiou5XaHc3ZlKHzZnu0jkg7Y360g6rw9njxcH6ATK72oxh9TAtvmUcXtnZLi2kUpCe2Uu
-MGoM9ZDulebyzYLs2aFK7PayS+VFheZteJMELpyCbTapxDFkH4aDCyr0NQp4yVXPQbBH6TCfmb5h
-qAaEuSh6XzjZG6k4sIN/c8HDO0gqgg8hm7jMqDXDhBuDsz6+pJVpATqJAHgE2cn0mRmrVn5bi4Y5
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 SecureTrust CA
 ==============
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-===================
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 ==============================
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-Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4
-=========================================
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 Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017
 =============================================
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+GLOBALTRUST 2020
+================
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 =========================
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-==============================
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 Security Communication ECC RootCA1
 ==================================
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+
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+=========================
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+U9f6QA4w9QAgLABMjDu0ox+2v5Eyq6+SmNMW5tTRVFxDWy6u71cqqLRvpO8NVhTaIasgdp4D/Ca4
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+YQ6qgYF/6FKC0ULn4B0Y+qSFNueG4A3rvNTJ1jxD8V1Jbn6Bm2m1iWKPiFLY1/4nwSPFyysCu7Ff
+/vtDhQNGvl3GyiEm/9cCnnRK3PgTFbGBVzbLZVzRHTF36SXDw7IyN9XxmAnkbWOACKsGkoHU6XCP
+pz+y7YaMgmo1yEJagtFSGkUPFaUA8JR7ZSdXOUPPfH/mvTWze/EZTN46ls/pdu4D58JDUjxqgejB
+WoC9EV2Ta/vH5mQ/u2kc6d0li690yVRAysuTEwrt+2aSEcr1wPrYg1UDfNPFIkZ1cGt5SAYqgpq/
+5usWDiJFAbzdNpQ0qTUmiteXue4Icr80knCDgKs4qllo3UCkGJCy89UDyibK79XH4I9TjvAA46jt
+n/mtd+ArY0+ew+43u3gJhJ65bvspmZDogNOfJA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+D-TRUST EV Root CA 2 2023
+=========================
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIFqTCCA5GgAwIBAgIQaSYJfoBLTKCnjHhiU19abzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADBIMQswCQYDVQQG
+EwJERTEVMBMGA1UEChMMRC1UcnVzdCBHbWJIMSIwIAYDVQQDExlELVRSVVNUIEVWIFJvb3QgQ0Eg
+MiAyMDIzMB4XDTIzMDUwOTA5MTAzM1oXDTM4MDUwOTA5MTAzMlowSDELMAkGA1UEBhMCREUxFTAT
+BgNVBAoTDEQtVHJ1c3QgR21iSDEiMCAGA1UEAxMZRC1UUlVTVCBFViBSb290IENBIDIgMjAyMzCC
+AiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoCggIBANiOo4mAC7JXUtypU0w3uX9jFxPvp1sjW2l1
+sJkKF8GLxNuo4MwxusLyzV3pt/gdr2rElYfXR8mV2IIEUD2BCP/kPbOx1sWy/YgJ25yE7CUXFId/
+MHibaljJtnMoPDT3mfd/06b4HEV8rSyMlD/YZxBTfiLNTiVR8CUkNRFeEMbsh2aJgWi6zCudR3Mf
+vc2RpHJqnKIbGKBv7FD0fUDCqDDPvXPIEysQEx6Lmqg6lHPTGGkKSv/BAQP/eX+1SH977ugpbzZM
+lWGG2Pmic4ruri+W7mjNPU0oQvlFKzIbRlUWaqZLKfm7lVa/Rh3sHZMdwGWyH6FDrlaeoLGPaxK3
+YG14C8qKXO0elg6DpkiVjTujIcSuWMYAsoS0I6SWhjW42J7YrDRJmGOVxcttSEfi8i4YHtAxq910
+7PncjLgcjmgjutDzUNzPZY9zOjLHfP7KgiJPvo5iR2blzYfi6NUPGJ/lBHJLRjwQ8kTCZFZxTnXo
+nMkmdMV9WdEKWw9t/p51HBjGGjp82A0EzM23RWV6sY+4roRIPrN6TagD4uJ+ARZZaBhDM7DS3LAa
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+AZRl62UJxmMiCzNJkkg8/M3OsD6Onov4/knFNXJHAgMBAAGjgY4wgYswDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB
+/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUqvyREBuHkV8Wub9PS5FeAByxMoAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMEkGA1UdHwRC
+MEAwPqA8oDqGOGh0dHA6Ly9jcmwuZC10cnVzdC5uZXQvY3JsL2QtdHJ1c3RfZXZfcm9vdF9jYV8y
+XzIwMjMuY3JsMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAA4ICAQCTy6UfmRHsmg1fLBWTxj++EI14QvBukEdHjqOS
+Mo1wj/Zbjb6JzkcBahsgIIlbyIIQbODnmaprxiqgYzWRaoUlrRc4pZt+UPJ26oUFKidBK7GB0aL2
+QHWpDsvxVUjY7NHss+jOFKE17MJeNRqrphYBBo7q3C+jisosketSjl8MmxfPy3MHGcRqwnNU73xD
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+4U/M5d40VxDJI3IXcI1QcB9WbMy5/zpaT2N6w25lBx2Eof+pDGOJbbJAiDnXH3dotfyc1dZnaVuo
+dNv8ifYbMvekJKZ2t0dT741Jj6m2g1qllpBFYfXeA08mD6iL8AOWsKwV0HFaanuU5nCT2vFp4LJi
+TZ6P/4mdm13NRemUAiKN4DV/6PEEeXFsVIP4M7kFMhtYVRFP0OUnR3Hs7dpn1mKmS00PaaLJvOwi
+S5THaJQXfuKOKD62xur1NGyfN4gHONuGcfrNlUhDbqNPgofXNJhuS5N5YHVpD/Aa1VP6IQzCP+k/
+HxiMkl14p3ZnGbuy6n/pcAlWVqOwDAstNl7F6cTVg8uGF5csbBNvh1qvSaYd2804BC5f4ko1Di1L
++KIkBI3Y4WNeApI02phhXBxvWHZks/wCuPWdCg==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h

@@ -1713,6 +1713,46 @@
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
 
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ *
+ * In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
+ * certificate, the client normally checks three things:
+ * - the certificate chain must be valid;
+ * - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
+ * - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
+ *
+ * Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
+ * malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
+ *
+ * The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
+ * such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
+ * or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
+ * accredited by the root CA.
+ *
+ * You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
+ * before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
+ * set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
+ * host name). This configuration option controls what happens if a TLS client
+ * is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
+ * (default), certificate authentication is enabled and the client does not
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname():
+ *
+ * - If this option is unset (default), the connection attempt is aborted
+ *   with the error #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
+ * - If this option is set, the TLS library does not check the server name
+ *   that the certificate is valid for. This is the historical behavior
+ *   of Mbed TLS, but may be insecure as explained above.
+ *
+ * Enable this option for strict backward compatibility if you have
+ * determined that it is secure in the scenario where you are using
+ * Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This option exists only for backward compatibility and will
+ *             be removed in the next major version of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
  *
@@ -2290,6 +2330,10 @@
  * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual
  * promises of API stability.
  *
+ * \warning In multithreaded applications, you must also enable
+ * #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, unless only one thread ever calls PSA functions
+ * (`psa_xxx()`), including indirect calls through SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK.
+ *
  * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
  *
  * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs.
@@ -3389,6 +3433,14 @@
  *
  * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
  *
+ * \note In multithreaded applications, you must enable #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C,
+ *       unless only one thread ever calls `psa_xxx()` functions.
+ *       That includes indirect calls, such as:
+ *       - indirect calls from PK, X.509 or SSL functions when
+ *         #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled;
+ *       - any other call to a function that requires calling psa_crypto_init()
+ *         beforehand.
+ *
  * Module:  library/psa_crypto.c
  *
  * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
@@ -3605,11 +3657,29 @@
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
  *
- * Enable the threading abstraction layer.
+ * Traditionally, Mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or
- * By default Mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that
+ * that contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts
- * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts
  * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race
- * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading:
+ * conditions.
+ *
+ * The PSA subsystem has an implicit shared context. Therefore, you must
+ * enable this option if more than one thread may use any part of
+ * Mbed TLS that is implemented on top of the PSA subsystem.
+ *
+ * You must enable this option in multithreaded applications where more than
+ * one thread performs any of the following operations:
+ *
+ * - Any call to a PSA function (`psa_xxx()`).
+ * - Any call to a TLS, X.509 or PK function (`mbedtls_ssl_xxx()`,
+ *   `mbedtls_x509_xxx()`, `mbedtls_pkcs7_xxx()`, `mbedtls_pk_xxx()`)
+ *   if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled (regardless of whether individual
+ *   TLS, X.509 or PK contexts are shared between threads).
+ * - Any use of a cryptographic context if the same context is used in
+ *   multiple threads.
+ * - Any call to a function where the documentation specifies that
+ *   psa_crypto_init() must be called prior to that function.
+ *
+ * See also our Knowledge Base article about threading:
  * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading
  *
  * Module:  library/threading.c

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h

@@ -108,16 +108,16 @@
  *
  * This module provides debugging functions.
  */
-#if (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800)
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900)
    #include <inttypes.h>
    #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET     PRIuPTR
    #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG  "I64d"
 #else \
-    /* (defined(__MINGW32__)  && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
+    /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900) */
    #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET     "zu"
    #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG  "lld"
 #endif \
-    /* (defined(__MINGW32__)  && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
+    /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900) */
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
  * ECP       4   10 (Started from top)
  * MD        5   5
  * HKDF      5   1 (Started from top)
- * SSL       5   2 (Started from 0x5F00)
+ * SSL       5   3 (Started from 0x5F00)
  * CIPHER    6   8 (Started from 0x6080)
  * SSL       6   24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000)
  * SSL       7   32

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h

@@ -107,10 +107,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
 /**
  * \brief           This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer.
  *
- * \note            For encryption, the output buffer can be the same as the
+ * \note            The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
- *                  input buffer. For decryption, the output buffer cannot be
+ *                  buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
- *                  the same as input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output
+ *                  cannot overlap.
- *                  buffer must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
  *
  * \warning         When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the
  *                  authentication tag and does not verify that the data is
@@ -171,9 +170,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
  * \brief           This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a
  *                  buffer.
  *
- * \note            For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as
+ * \note            The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
- *                  input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
+ *                  buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
- *                  must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
+ *                  cannot overlap. Implementations which require
+ *                  MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT to be enabled may not provide support for
+ *                  overlapping buffers.
  *
  * \param ctx       The GCM context. This must be initialized.
  * \param length    The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also
@@ -243,9 +244,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
  *                  Bytes. Only the last call before calling
  *                  mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes.
  *
- * \note            For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as
+ * \note            The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
- *                  input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
+ *                  buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
- *                  must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
+ *                  cannot overlap. Implementations which require
+ *                  MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT to be enabled may not provide support for
+ *                  overlapping buffers.
  *
  * \param ctx       The GCM context. This must be initialized.
  * \param length    The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
 
 /**
  * \brief          Write at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs,
- *                 the actual amount read is returned.
+ *                 the actual amount written is returned.
  *
  * \param ctx      Socket
  * \param buf      The buffer to read from

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h

@@ -183,6 +183,41 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG                        -0x5E80
 /** Cache entry not found */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND             -0x5E00
+/** Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname.
+ * This is usually insecure.
+ *
+ * In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
+ * certificate, the client normally checks three things:
+ * - the certificate chain must be valid;
+ * - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
+ * - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
+ *
+ * Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
+ * malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
+ *
+ * The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
+ * such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
+ * or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
+ * accredited by the root CA.
+ *
+ * You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
+ * before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
+ * set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
+ * host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not
+ * required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
+ * with \p NULL as the server name.
+ *
+ * This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode
+ *   #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default).
+ * - Certificate authentication is enabled.
+ * - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname().
+ * - The configuration option
+ *   #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ *   is not enabled.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME  -0x5D80
 
 /*
  * Various constants
@@ -1403,8 +1438,36 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
      * User settings
      */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-    char *hostname;             /*!< expected peer CN for verification
+    /** Expected peer CN for verification.
-                                     (and SNI if available)                 */
+     *
+     * Also used on clients for SNI.
+     *
+     * The value of this field can be:
+     * - \p NULL in a newly initialized or reset context.
+     * - A heap-allocated copy of the last value passed to
+     *   mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(), if the last call had a non-null
+     *  \p hostname argument.
+     * - A special value to indicate that mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
+     *   was called with \p NULL (as opposed to never having been called).
+     *
+     * If you need to obtain the value passed to
+     * mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() even if it may have been called with
+     * \p NULL, call mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer().
+     *
+     * If this field contains the value \p NULL and the configuration option
+     * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+     * is unset, on a TLS client, attempting to verify a server certificate
+     * results in the error
+     * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
+     *
+     * If this field contains the special value described above, or if
+     * the value is \p NULL and the configuration option
+     * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+     * is set, then the peer name verification is skipped, which may be
+     * insecure, especially on a client. Furthermore, on a client, the
+     * server_name extension is not sent.
+     */
+    char *hostname;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
@@ -1535,6 +1598,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
  *                 Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even
  *                 if no session is active.
  *
+ * \warning        After setting up a client context, if certificate-based
+ *                 authentication is enabled, you should call
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to specifiy the expected
+ *                 name of the server. Without this, in most scenarios,
+ *                 the TLS connection is insecure. See
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ *                 for more information.
+ *
  * \note           If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
  *                 subsystem must have been initialized by calling
  *                 psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
@@ -3107,16 +3178,29 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
 /**
  * \brief          Set or reset the hostname to check against the received
- *                 server certificate. It sets the ServerName TLS extension,
+ *                 peer certificate. On a client, this also sets the
- *                 too, if that extension is enabled. (client-side only)
+ *                 ServerName TLS extension, if that extension is enabled.
+ *                 On a TLS 1.3 client, this also sets the server name in
+ *                 the session resumption ticket, if that feature is enabled.
  *
  * \param ssl      SSL context
- * \param hostname the server hostname, may be NULL to clear hostname
+ * \param hostname The server hostname. This may be \c NULL to clear
-
+ *                 the hostname.
- * \note           Maximum hostname length MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
  *
- * \return         0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
+ * \note           Maximum hostname length #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
- *                 allocation failure, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ *
+ * \note           If the hostname is \c NULL on a client, then the server
+ *                 is not authenticated: it only needs to have a valid
+ *                 certificate, not a certificate matching its name.
+ *                 Therefore you should always call this function on a client,
+ *                 unless the connection is set up to only allow
+ *                 pre-shared keys, or in scenarios where server
+ *                 impersonation is not a concern. See the documentation of
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ *                 for more details.
+ *
+ * \return         0 if successful, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
+ *                 allocation failure, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
  *                 too long input hostname.
  *
  *                 Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h

@@ -467,7 +467,8 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params {
 
     void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
     void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-    void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+    MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+    int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
     mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
@@ -1214,6 +1215,16 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
     return 4;
 }
 
+/** Get the host name from the SSL context.
+ *
+ * \param[in]   ssl     SSL context
+ *
+ * \return The \p hostname pointer from the SSL context.
+ *         \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has never been called on
+ *         \p ssl or if it was last called with \p NULL.
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
 void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);

thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h

@@ -26,16 +26,16 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR  2
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  28
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  9
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  10
 
 /**
  * The single version number has the following structure:
  *    MMNNPP00
  *    Major version | Minor version | Patch version
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x021C0900
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x021C0A00
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "2.28.9"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "2.28.10"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 2.28.9"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 2.28.10"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
 

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c

@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
          "movdqu    %%xmm0, (%4)    \n\t" // export output
          :
          : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output)
-         : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1");
+         : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "0", "1");
 
 
     return 0;
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk,
          AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x36")      "call 1b \n\t"
          :
          : "r" (rk), "r" (key)
-         : "memory", "cc", "0");
+         : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "0");
 }
 
 /*
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk,
 
          :
          : "r" (rk), "r" (key)
-         : "memory", "cc", "0");
+         : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "0");
 }
 
 /*
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk,
          AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40")      "call 1b \n\t"
          :
          : "r" (rk), "r" (key)
-         : "memory", "cc", "0");
+         : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "0");
 }
 
 #endif  /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c

@@ -3125,7 +3125,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
         /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */
         if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 0) != 0 ||
             mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 1) != 0 ||
-            mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(d) - 1 != grp->nbits) {  /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */
+            mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(d) != grp->nbits + 1) {  /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */
             return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
         }
 

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c

@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code)
             return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" );
         case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND):
             return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" );
+        case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME):
+            return( "SSL - Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname. This is usually insecure.  In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its certificate, the client normally checks three things: - the certificate chain must be valid; - the chain must start from a trusted CA; - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.  Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.  The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios, such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks, or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are accredited by the root CA.  You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with \\p NULL as the server name.  This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:  - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default). - Certificate authentication is enabled. - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). - The configuration option #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME is not enabled" );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_connect(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host,
             break;
         }
 
-        close(ctx->fd);
+        mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED;
     }
 
@@ -242,13 +242,13 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *
         n = 1;
         if (setsockopt(ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
                        (const char *) &n, sizeof(n)) != 0) {
-            close(ctx->fd);
+            mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
             continue;
         }
 
         if (bind(ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen) != 0) {
-            close(ctx->fd);
+            mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED;
             continue;
         }
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *
         /* Listen only makes sense for TCP */
         if (proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP) {
             if (listen(ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG) != 0) {
-                close(ctx->fd);
+                mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
                 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED;
                 continue;
             }
@@ -529,8 +529,8 @@ void mbedtls_net_usleep(unsigned long usec)
 #else
     struct timeval tv;
     tv.tv_sec  = usec / 1000000;
-#if defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \
+#if (defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \
-    (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
+    (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
     tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000;
 #else
     tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000;

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c

@@ -83,19 +83,20 @@ static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                   size_t *olen)
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const char *hostname = mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(ssl);
     size_t hostname_len;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
-    if (ssl->hostname == NULL) {
+    if (hostname == NULL) {
         return 0;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                           ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
-                           ssl->hostname));
+                           hostname));
 
-    hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname);
+    hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9);
 
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0);
     p += 2;
 
-    memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len);
+    memcpy(p, hostname, hostname_len);
 
     *olen = hostname_len + 9;
 

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c

@@ -38,6 +38,92 @@
 #include "mbedtls/oid.h"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+
+/* A magic value for `ssl->hostname` indicating that
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called with `NULL`.
+ * If mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has never been called on `ssl`, then
+ * `ssl->hostname == NULL`. */
+static const char *const ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification = "";
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+/** Whether mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called.
+ *
+ * \param[in]   ssl     SSL context
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called on \p ssl
+ *         (including `mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(ssl, NULL)`),
+ *         otherwise \c 0.
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ssl_has_set_hostname_been_called(
+    const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    return ssl->hostname != NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    if (ssl->hostname == ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return ssl->hostname;
+}
+
+static void mbedtls_ssl_free_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    if (ssl->hostname != NULL &&
+        ssl->hostname != ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification) {
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname));
+        mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname);
+    }
+    ssl->hostname = NULL;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname)
+{
+    /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */
+    size_t hostname_len = 0;
+
+    /* Check if new hostname is valid before
+     * making any change to current one */
+    if (hostname != NULL) {
+        hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
+
+        if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname,
+     * so we can free it safely */
+    mbedtls_ssl_free_hostname(ssl);
+
+    if (hostname == NULL) {
+        /* Passing NULL as hostname clears the old one, but leaves a
+         * special marker to indicate that mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
+         * has been called. */
+        /* ssl->hostname should be const, but isn't. We won't actually
+         * write to the buffer, so it's ok to cast away the const. */
+        ssl->hostname = (char *) ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification;
+    } else {
+        ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1);
+        if (ssl->hostname == NULL) {
+            /* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called, but unsuccessfully.
+             * Leave ssl->hostname in the same state as if the function had
+             * not been called, i.e. a null pointer. */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len);
+
+        ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0';
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
@@ -538,6 +624,23 @@ exit:
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static int mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
+{
+    switch (status) {
+        case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+        case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
+        case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        default:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 
@@ -806,25 +909,25 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned ch
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
 static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+static int ssl_calc_finished_ssl(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
 static void ssl_calc_verify_tls(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
 static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
 static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
 static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
 static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
 #endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
@@ -2521,13 +2624,33 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED;
 }
 
+static int get_hostname_for_verification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         const char **hostname)
+{
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_has_set_hostname_been_called(ssl)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Certificate verification without having set hostname"));
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME)
+        if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+            ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME;
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+
+    *hostname = mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(ssl);
+    if (*hostname == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Certificate verification without CN verification"));
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                         int authmode,
                                         mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
                                         void *rs_ctx)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
     const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
         ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
     int have_ca_chain = 0;
@@ -2549,6 +2672,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
         p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
     }
 
+    const char *hostname = "";
+    int ret = get_hostname_for_verification(ssl, &hostname);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "get_hostname_for_verification", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Main check: verify certificate
      */
@@ -2563,7 +2693,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
             ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
             ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
             ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-            ssl->hostname,
+            hostname,
             &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
             f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
     } else
@@ -2591,7 +2721,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
             chain,
             ca_chain, ca_crl,
             ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-            ssl->hostname,
+            hostname,
             &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
     }
@@ -3023,7 +3153,7 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
-static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(
+static int ssl_calc_finished_ssl(
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
 {
     const char *sender;
@@ -3105,11 +3235,13 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc  finished"));
+
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls(
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
 {
     int len = 12;
@@ -3165,12 +3297,14 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc  finished"));
+
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
 {
     int len = 12;
@@ -3201,13 +3335,13 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
     status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
-        return;
+        return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
     }
 
     status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
-        return;
+        return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
     }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32);
 #else
@@ -3241,12 +3375,14 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc  finished"));
+
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
 
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
 {
     int len = 12;
@@ -3277,13 +3413,13 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
     status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
-        return;
+        return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
     }
 
     status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
-        return;
+        return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
     }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48);
 #else
@@ -3328,6 +3464,8 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc  finished"));
+
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
@@ -3422,7 +3560,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 
     mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate);
 
-    ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4,
+                                        ssl->conf->endpoint);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     /*
      * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites
@@ -3551,7 +3694,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 #endif
     hash_len = 12;
 
-    ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret);
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
@@ -4617,49 +4764,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname)
-{
-    /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */
-    size_t hostname_len = 0;
-
-    /* Check if new hostname is valid before
-     * making any change to current one */
-    if (hostname != NULL) {
-        hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
-
-        if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname,
-     * so we can free it safely */
-
-    if (ssl->hostname != NULL) {
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname));
-        mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname);
-    }
-
-    /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */
-
-    if (hostname == NULL) {
-        ssl->hostname = NULL;
-    } else {
-        ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1);
-        if (ssl->hostname == NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
-        }
-
-        memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len);
-
-        ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0';
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                           int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *,
@@ -6816,10 +6920,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-    if (ssl->hostname != NULL) {
+    mbedtls_ssl_free_hostname(ssl);
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname));
-        mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname);
-    }
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
@@ -7559,17 +7660,8 @@ exit:
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                        MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        switch (status) {
+
-            case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+        return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-            case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
-            case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-            case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED;
-            default:
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
-        }
     }
     return 0;
 }

thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c

@@ -486,6 +486,9 @@ static const char * const features[] = {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
     "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE",
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME)
+    "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME",
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
     "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION",
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */

thirdparty/minizip/patches/godot-seek.patch

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ index ea05b7d62a..981ba3c0cb 100644
  
      s->pfile_in_zip_read = pfile_in_zip_read_info;
                  s->encrypted = 0;
-@@ -1510,6 +1544,85 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzOpenCurrentFile3(unzFile file, int* method,
+@@ -1510,6 +1544,87 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzOpenCurrentFile3(unzFile file, int* method,
      return UNZ_OK;
  }
  
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ index ea05b7d62a..981ba3c0cb 100644
 +                        pfile_in_zip_read_info->extra_size + pos;
 +
 +        pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
++        pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = pos;
 +        pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = pos;
 +
 +        return ZSEEK64(pfile_in_zip_read_info->z_filefunc,
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ index ea05b7d62a..981ba3c0cb 100644
 +
 +            pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
 +            pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = 0;
++            pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = 0;
 +            pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.next_in = 0;
 +        }
 +

thirdparty/minizip/unzip.c

@@ -1573,6 +1573,7 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzSeekCurrentFile(unzFile file, int pos) {
                         pfile_in_zip_read_info->extra_size + pos;
 
         pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
+        pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = pos;
         pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = pos;
 
         return ZSEEK64(pfile_in_zip_read_info->z_filefunc,
@@ -1597,6 +1598,7 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzSeekCurrentFile(unzFile file, int pos) {
 
             pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
             pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = 0;
+            pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = 0;
             pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.next_in = 0;
         }