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Merge pull request #107501 from lawnjelly/3.6_cherrypicks_june_25
Cherry-picks for the 3.6 branch (future 3.6.1) - 2nd batch
This commit is contained in:
commit
ac8b19e5ab
32 changed files with 575 additions and 268 deletions
14
CHANGELOG.md
14
CHANGELOG.md
|
@ -215,13 +215,13 @@ See the [release announcement](https://godotengine.org/article/godot-3-6-finally
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|||
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||||
- bullet updated to 3.25.
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||||
- Embree updated to version 3.13.5.
|
||||
- libpng updated to version 1.6.39.
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||||
- libwebp updated to version 1.2.4.
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||||
- MbedTLS updated to version 2.28.2.
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||||
- miniupnpc updated to version 2.2.3.
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||||
- zlib/minizip updated to version 1.2.13.
|
||||
- zstd updated to version 1.5.2.
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||||
- CA root certificates updated to 2022.10 bundle from Mozilla.
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||||
- libpng updated to version 1.6.43.
|
||||
- libwebp updated to version 1.3.2.
|
||||
- MbedTLS updated to version 2.28.8.
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||||
- miniupnpc updated to version 2.2.7.
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||||
- zlib/minizip updated to version 1.3.1.
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- zstd updated to version 1.5.5.
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||||
- CA root certificates updated to 2024.03 bundle from Mozilla.
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- SDL GameControllerDB updated to 2023-02-27 git snapshot.
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#### XR
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@ -77,15 +77,15 @@ struct ErrorHandlerList {
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void add_error_handler(ErrorHandlerList *p_handler);
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void remove_error_handler(ErrorHandlerList *p_handler);
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void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const char *p_message = "", bool fatal = false);
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void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const String &p_message, bool fatal = false);
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void _err_flush_stdout();
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const char *p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const char *p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, const String &p_error, const String &p_message, ErrorHandlerType p_type = ERR_HANDLER_ERROR);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const char *p_message = "", bool fatal = false);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_print_index_error(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, int64_t p_index, int64_t p_size, const char *p_index_str, const char *p_size_str, const String &p_message, bool fatal = false);
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_NO_INLINE_ void _err_flush_stdout();
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void _physics_interpolation_warning(const char *p_function, const char *p_file, int p_line, ObjectID p_id, const char *p_warn_string);
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@ -69,6 +69,20 @@
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#endif
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// Should never inline.
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||||
#ifndef _NO_INLINE_
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#if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4)
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||||
#define _NO_INLINE_ __attribute__((noinline))
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#elif defined(__llvm__)
|
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#define _NO_INLINE_ __attribute__((noinline))
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#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
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#define _NO_INLINE_ __declspec(noinline)
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#else
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#define _NO_INLINE_
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#endif
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#endif
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// No discard allows the compiler to flag warnings if we don't use the return value of functions / classes
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#ifndef _NO_DISCARD_
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// c++ 17 onwards
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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
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</member>
|
||||
<member name="radial_initial_angle" type="float" setter="set_radial_initial_angle" getter="get_radial_initial_angle" default="0.0">
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Starting angle for the fill of [member texture_progress] if [member fill_mode] is [constant FILL_CLOCKWISE] or [constant FILL_COUNTER_CLOCKWISE]. When the node's [code]value[/code] is equal to its [code]min_value[/code], the texture doesn't show up at all. When the [code]value[/code] increases, the texture fills and tends towards [member radial_fill_degrees].
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[b]Note:[/b] [member radial_initial_angle] is wrapped between [code]0[/code] and [code]360[/code] degrees (inclusive).
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</member>
|
||||
<member name="stretch_margin_bottom" type="int" setter="set_stretch_margin" getter="get_stretch_margin" default="0">
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The height of the 9-patch's bottom row. A margin of 16 means the 9-slice's bottom corners and side will have a height of 16 pixels. You can set all 4 margin values individually to create panels with non-uniform borders.
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@ -708,7 +708,8 @@ Error AudioDriverPulseAudio::capture_init_device() {
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int input_buffer_frames = closest_power_of_2(input_latency * mix_rate / 1000);
|
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int input_buffer_size = input_buffer_frames * spec.channels;
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|
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pa_buffer_attr attr;
|
||||
pa_buffer_attr attr = {};
|
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attr.maxlength = (uint32_t)-1;
|
||||
attr.fragsize = input_buffer_size * sizeof(int16_t);
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||||
|
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pa_rec_str = pa_stream_new(pa_ctx, "Record", &spec, &pa_rec_map);
|
||||
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@ -2457,6 +2457,7 @@ void TileSetEditor::_zoom_on_position(float p_zoom, const Vector2 &p_position) {
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void TileSetEditor::draw_highlight_current_tile() {
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Color shadow_color = Color(0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3);
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Color border_color_red = Color(1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.9);
|
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if ((workspace_mode == WORKSPACE_EDIT && get_current_tile() >= 0) || !edited_region.has_no_area()) {
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||||
Rect2 region;
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||||
if (edited_region.has_no_area()) {
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||||
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@ -2478,6 +2479,7 @@ void TileSetEditor::draw_highlight_current_tile() {
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if (region.position.y + region.size.y <= workspace->get_rect().size.y) {
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workspace->draw_rect(Rect2(0, region.position.y + region.size.y, workspace->get_rect().size.x, workspace->get_rect().size.y - region.size.y - region.position.y), shadow_color);
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}
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workspace->draw_rect(region.grow_individual(1.0f, 0.0f, 0.0f, 1.0f), border_color_red, false, 2.0f);
|
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} else {
|
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workspace->draw_rect(Rect2(Point2(0, 0), workspace->get_rect().size), shadow_color);
|
||||
}
|
||||
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|
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@ -6,6 +6,18 @@ __XINPUT_DEVICE__,XInput Gamepad,a:b12,b:b13,x:b14,y:b15,start:b4,back:b5,leftst
|
|||
|
||||
# Android
|
||||
Default Android Gamepad,Default Controller,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,dpdown:h0.4,rightstick:b8,rightshoulder:b10,rightx:a2,start:b6,righty:a3,dpleft:h0.8,lefttrigger:a4,x:b2,dpup:h0.1,back:b4,leftstick:b7,leftshoulder:b9,y:b3,a:b0,dpright:h0.2,righttrigger:a5,b:b1,platform:Android,
|
||||
58626f7820576972656c65737320436f,Xbox Series X Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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||||
050000005e04000091020000ff073f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
|
||||
050000005e04000091020000ff073f80,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
|
||||
050000005e040000e00200000ffe3f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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||||
050000005e040000e00200000ffe3f80,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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||||
050000005e040000e0020000ffff3f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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||||
050000005e040000e0020000ffff3f80,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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||||
050000005e040000fd020000ffff3f00,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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33356661323266333733373865656366,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
|
||||
34356136633366613530316338376136,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
|
||||
35623965373264386238353433656138,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
|
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36616131643361333337396261666433,Xbox One Controller,a:b0,b:b1,back:b4,misc1:b15,dpdown:b12,dpleft:b13,dpright:b14,dpup:b11,guide:b5,leftshoulder:b9,leftstick:b7,lefttrigger:+a4,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightshoulder:b10,rightstick:b8,righttrigger:+a5,rightx:a2,righty:a3,start:b6,x:b2,y:b3,platform:Android,
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|
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# Javascript
|
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standard,Standard Gamepad Mapping,leftx:a0,lefty:a1,rightx:a2,righty:a3,lefttrigger:b6,righttrigger:b7,a:b0,b:b1,x:b2,y:b3,leftshoulder:b4,rightshoulder:b5,back:b8,start:b9,leftstick:b10,rightstick:b11,dpup:b12,dpdown:b13,dpleft:b14,dpright:b15,guide:b16,leftstick:b10,rightstick:b11,platform:Javascript,
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||||
|
|
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@ -408,6 +408,9 @@ public class GodotInputHandler implements InputManager.InputDeviceListener {
|
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case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_SELECT:
|
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button = 4;
|
||||
break;
|
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case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_MODE: // Home/Xbox Button on Xbox controllers
|
||||
button = 5;
|
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break;
|
||||
case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_START:
|
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button = 6;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
@ -429,6 +432,9 @@ public class GodotInputHandler implements InputManager.InputDeviceListener {
|
|||
case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_DPAD_RIGHT:
|
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button = 14;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_MEDIA_RECORD: // Share Button on Xbox controllers
|
||||
button = 15;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BUTTON_C:
|
||||
button = 17;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const WORD MAX_CONSOLE_LINES = 1500;
|
|||
extern "C" {
|
||||
__declspec(dllexport) DWORD NvOptimusEnablement = 1;
|
||||
__declspec(dllexport) int AmdPowerXpressRequestHighPerformance = 1;
|
||||
__declspec(dllexport) void NoHotPatch() {} // Disable Nahimic code injection.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Workaround mingw-w64 < 4.0 bug
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1848,9 +1848,17 @@ void RichTextLabel::push_font(const Ref<Font> &p_font) {
|
|||
ItemFont *item = memnew(ItemFont);
|
||||
|
||||
item->font = p_font;
|
||||
item->owner = get_instance_id();
|
||||
item->font->connect("changed", this, "_invalidate_fonts", Vector<Variant>(), CONNECT_REFERENCE_COUNTED);
|
||||
|
||||
_add_item(item, true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RichTextLabel::_invalidate_fonts() {
|
||||
main->first_invalid_line = 0; //invalidate ALL
|
||||
update();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RichTextLabel::push_normal() {
|
||||
Ref<Font> normal_font = get_font("normal_font");
|
||||
ERR_FAIL_COND(normal_font.is_null());
|
||||
|
@ -2927,6 +2935,8 @@ void RichTextLabel::_bind_methods() {
|
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ClassDB::bind_method(D_METHOD("get_effects"), &RichTextLabel::get_effects);
|
||||
ClassDB::bind_method(D_METHOD("install_effect", "effect"), &RichTextLabel::install_effect);
|
||||
|
||||
ClassDB::bind_method(D_METHOD("_invalidate_fonts"), &RichTextLabel::_invalidate_fonts);
|
||||
|
||||
ADD_GROUP("BBCode", "bbcode_");
|
||||
ADD_PROPERTY(PropertyInfo(Variant::BOOL, "bbcode_enabled"), "set_use_bbcode", "is_using_bbcode");
|
||||
ADD_PROPERTY(PropertyInfo(Variant::STRING, "bbcode_text", PROPERTY_HINT_MULTILINE_TEXT), "set_bbcode", "get_bbcode");
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -164,7 +164,17 @@ private:
|
|||
|
||||
struct ItemFont : public Item {
|
||||
Ref<Font> font;
|
||||
ObjectID owner;
|
||||
|
||||
ItemFont() { type = ITEM_FONT; }
|
||||
~ItemFont() {
|
||||
if (font.is_valid()) {
|
||||
RichTextLabel *owner_rtl = Object::cast_to<RichTextLabel>(ObjectDB::get_instance(owner));
|
||||
if (owner_rtl) {
|
||||
font->disconnect("changed", owner_rtl, "_invalidate_fonts");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct ItemColor : public Item {
|
||||
|
@ -348,6 +358,8 @@ private:
|
|||
void _add_item(Item *p_item, bool p_enter = false, bool p_ensure_newline = false);
|
||||
void _remove_item(Item *p_item, const int p_line, const int p_subitem_line);
|
||||
|
||||
void _invalidate_fonts();
|
||||
|
||||
struct ProcessState {
|
||||
int line_width;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
|
|||
#include "texture_progress.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "core/engine.h"
|
||||
#include "math.h"
|
||||
|
||||
void TextureProgress::set_under_texture(const Ref<Texture> &p_texture) {
|
||||
under = p_texture;
|
||||
|
@ -510,7 +511,7 @@ void TextureProgress::_notification(int p_what) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Draw a reference cross.
|
||||
if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint()) {
|
||||
if (Engine::get_singleton()->is_editor_hint() && is_inside_tree() && get_tree()->get_edited_scene_root() && get_tree()->get_edited_scene_root()->get_parent()->is_a_parent_of(this)) {
|
||||
Point2 p;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nine_patch_stretch) {
|
||||
|
@ -577,12 +578,12 @@ int TextureProgress::get_fill_mode() {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void TextureProgress::set_radial_initial_angle(float p_angle) {
|
||||
while (p_angle > 360) {
|
||||
p_angle -= 360;
|
||||
}
|
||||
while (p_angle < 0) {
|
||||
p_angle += 360;
|
||||
ERR_FAIL_COND_MSG(!isfinite(p_angle), "Angle is non-finite.");
|
||||
|
||||
if (p_angle < 0.0 || p_angle > 360.0) {
|
||||
p_angle = Math::fposmod(p_angle, 360.0f);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rad_init_angle = p_angle;
|
||||
update();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ void Viewport::_notification(int p_what) {
|
|||
gui.mouse_in_window = false;
|
||||
_drop_physics_mouseover();
|
||||
_drop_mouse_over();
|
||||
_gui_cancel_tooltip();
|
||||
// When the mouse exits the window, we want to end mouse_over, but
|
||||
// not mouse_focus, because, for example, we want to continue
|
||||
// dragging a scrollbar even if the mouse has left the window.
|
||||
|
|
6
thirdparty/README.md
vendored
6
thirdparty/README.md
vendored
|
@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ Files extracted from upstream source:
|
|||
## certs
|
||||
|
||||
- Upstream: Mozilla, via https://github.com/bagder/ca-bundle
|
||||
- Version: git (4d3fe6683f651d96be1bbef316b201e9b33b274d, 2024),
|
||||
generated from mozilla-release changeset b8ea2342548b8571e58f9176d9555ccdb5ec199f
|
||||
- Version: git (bcc414c5b5282f9321651bf71dc1e254ae87e3f8, 2025),
|
||||
generated from mozilla-release changeset 60d4997d339bb7ac6d033819ac50dcad4b9be09d
|
||||
- License: MPL 2.0
|
||||
|
||||
Files extracted from upstream source:
|
||||
|
@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ Files extracted from upstream source:
|
|||
## mbedtls
|
||||
|
||||
- Upstream: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls
|
||||
- Version: 2.28.9 (5e146adef63b326b04282252639bebc2730939c6, 2024)
|
||||
- Version: 2.28.10 (2fc8413bfcb51354c8e679141b17b3f1a5942561, 2025)
|
||||
- License: Apache 2.0
|
||||
|
||||
File extracted from upstream release tarball:
|
||||
|
|
212
thirdparty/certs/ca-certificates.crt
vendored
212
thirdparty/certs/ca-certificates.crt
vendored
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
##
|
||||
## Bundle of CA Root Certificates
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Certificate data from Mozilla as of: Sat Oct 19 21:26:09 2024 GMT
|
||||
## Certificate data from Mozilla as of: Tue Apr 8 09:28:30 2025 GMT
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Find updated versions here: https://curl.se/docs/caextract.html
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
|
|||
## Just configure this file as the SSLCACertificateFile.
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Conversion done with mk-ca-bundle.pl version 1.29.
|
||||
## SHA256: 36105b01631f9fc03b1eca779b44a30a1a5890b9bf8dc07ccb001a07301e01cf
|
||||
## SHA256: 620fd89c02acb0019f1899dab7907db5d20735904f5a9a0d3a8771a5857ac482
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -371,37 +371,6 @@ NU0LbbqhPcCT4H8js1WtciVORvnSFu+wZMEBnunKoGqYDs/YYPIvSbjkQuE4NRb0yG5P94FW6Lqj
|
|||
viOvrv1vA+ACOzB2+httQc8Bsem4yWb02ybzOqR08kkkW8mw0FfB+j564ZfJ
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
SwissSign Silver CA - G2
|
||||
========================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
DgEj8Z+7fNzcbBGXJbLytGMU0gYqZ4yD9c7qB9iaah7s5Aq7KkzrCWA5zspi2C5u
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
SecureTrust CA
|
||||
==============
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
@ -584,27 +553,6 @@ NwUASZQDhETnv0Mxz3WLJdH0pmT1kvarBes96aULNmLazAZfNou2XjG4Kvte9nHfRCaexOYNkbQu
|
|||
dZWAUWpLMKawYqGT8ZvYzsRjdT9ZR7E=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
SecureSign RootCA11
|
||||
===================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIDbTCCAlWgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBYMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDErMCkGA1UEChMi
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
lgeLKBObjBmNQSdJQO7e5iNEOdyhIta6A/I=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
@ -2319,40 +2267,6 @@ hcErulWuBurQB7Lcq9CClnXO0lD+mefPL5/ndtFhKvshuzHQqp9HpLIiyhY6UFfEW0NnxWViA0kB
|
|||
dBb9HxEGmpv0
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4
|
||||
=========================================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
kcpG2om3PVODLAgfi49T3f+sHw==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017
|
||||
=============================================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
@ -2602,6 +2516,36 @@ vLtoURMMA/cVi4RguYv/Uo7njLwcAjA8+RHUjE7AwWHCFUyqqx0LMV87HOIAl0Qx5v5zli/altP+
|
|||
CAezNIm8BZ/3Hobui3A=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
GLOBALTRUST 2020
|
||||
================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
gqispdNpQ80xiEmEU5LAsTkbOYMBMMTyqfrQA71yN2BWHzZ8vTmR9W0Nv3vXkg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
ANF Secure Server Root CA
|
||||
=========================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
@ -3140,36 +3084,6 @@ AwMDaAAwZQIxALGOWiDDshliTd6wT99u0nCK8Z9+aozmut6Dacpps6kFtZaSF4fC0urQe87YQVt8
|
|||
rgIwRt7qy12a7DLCZRawTDBcMPPaTnOGBtjOiQRINzf43TNRnXCve1XYAS59BWQOhriR
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
Security Communication RootCA3
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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|
||||
6Vwdp6POXiUyK+OVrCoHzrQoeIY8LaadTdJ0MN1kURXbg4NR16/9M51NZg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
Security Communication ECC RootCA1
|
||||
==================================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
@ -3664,3 +3578,65 @@ AgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTrQciu/NWeUUj1vYv0hyCTQSvT9DAKBggqhkjOPQQDAwNoADBlAjEA2S6J
|
|||
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|
||||
SwdLZrWeqrqgHkHZAXQ6bkU6iYAZezKYVWOr62Nuk22rGwlgMU4=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
D-TRUST BR Root CA 2 2023
|
||||
=========================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIFqTCCA5GgAwIBAgIQczswBEhb2U14LnNLyaHcZjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADBIMQswCQYDVQQG
|
||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
n/mtd+ArY0+ew+43u3gJhJ65bvspmZDogNOfJA==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
D-TRUST EV Root CA 2 2023
|
||||
=========================
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIFqTCCA5GgAwIBAgIQaSYJfoBLTKCnjHhiU19abzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADBIMQswCQYDVQQG
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
+KIkBI3Y4WNeApI02phhXBxvWHZks/wCuPWdCg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
|
78
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
vendored
78
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
vendored
|
@ -1713,6 +1713,46 @@
|
|||
*/
|
||||
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
|
||||
|
||||
/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
*
|
||||
* In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
|
||||
* certificate, the client normally checks three things:
|
||||
* - the certificate chain must be valid;
|
||||
* - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
|
||||
* - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
|
||||
* malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
|
||||
* such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
|
||||
* or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
|
||||
* accredited by the root CA.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
|
||||
* before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
|
||||
* set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
|
||||
* host name). This configuration option controls what happens if a TLS client
|
||||
* is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
|
||||
* (default), certificate authentication is enabled and the client does not
|
||||
* call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname():
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - If this option is unset (default), the connection attempt is aborted
|
||||
* with the error #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
|
||||
* - If this option is set, the TLS library does not check the server name
|
||||
* that the certificate is valid for. This is the historical behavior
|
||||
* of Mbed TLS, but may be insecure as explained above.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Enable this option for strict backward compatibility if you have
|
||||
* determined that it is secure in the scenario where you are using
|
||||
* Mbed TLS.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \deprecated This option exists only for backward compatibility and will
|
||||
* be removed in the next major version of Mbed TLS.
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -2290,6 +2330,10 @@
|
|||
* That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual
|
||||
* promises of API stability.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \warning In multithreaded applications, you must also enable
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, unless only one thread ever calls PSA functions
|
||||
* (`psa_xxx()`), including indirect calls through SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs.
|
||||
|
@ -3389,6 +3433,14 @@
|
|||
*
|
||||
* Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note In multithreaded applications, you must enable #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C,
|
||||
* unless only one thread ever calls `psa_xxx()` functions.
|
||||
* That includes indirect calls, such as:
|
||||
* - indirect calls from PK, X.509 or SSL functions when
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled;
|
||||
* - any other call to a function that requires calling psa_crypto_init()
|
||||
* beforehand.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Module: library/psa_crypto.c
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
|
||||
|
@ -3605,11 +3657,29 @@
|
|||
/**
|
||||
* \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Enable the threading abstraction layer.
|
||||
* By default Mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that
|
||||
* contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts
|
||||
* Traditionally, Mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or
|
||||
* that contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts
|
||||
* between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race
|
||||
* conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading:
|
||||
* conditions.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The PSA subsystem has an implicit shared context. Therefore, you must
|
||||
* enable this option if more than one thread may use any part of
|
||||
* Mbed TLS that is implemented on top of the PSA subsystem.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* You must enable this option in multithreaded applications where more than
|
||||
* one thread performs any of the following operations:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - Any call to a PSA function (`psa_xxx()`).
|
||||
* - Any call to a TLS, X.509 or PK function (`mbedtls_ssl_xxx()`,
|
||||
* `mbedtls_x509_xxx()`, `mbedtls_pkcs7_xxx()`, `mbedtls_pk_xxx()`)
|
||||
* if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled (regardless of whether individual
|
||||
* TLS, X.509 or PK contexts are shared between threads).
|
||||
* - Any use of a cryptographic context if the same context is used in
|
||||
* multiple threads.
|
||||
* - Any call to a function where the documentation specifies that
|
||||
* psa_crypto_init() must be called prior to that function.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See also our Knowledge Base article about threading:
|
||||
* https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Module: library/threading.c
|
||||
|
|
6
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h
vendored
6
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h
vendored
|
@ -108,16 +108,16 @@
|
|||
*
|
||||
* This module provides debugging functions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800)
|
||||
#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900)
|
||||
#include <inttypes.h>
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d"
|
||||
#else \
|
||||
/* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
|
||||
/* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900) */
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld"
|
||||
#endif \
|
||||
/* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
|
||||
/* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900) */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
||||
extern "C" {
|
||||
|
|
2
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h
vendored
2
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h
vendored
|
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
|
|||
* ECP 4 10 (Started from top)
|
||||
* MD 5 5
|
||||
* HKDF 5 1 (Started from top)
|
||||
* SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00)
|
||||
* SSL 5 3 (Started from 0x5F00)
|
||||
* CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080)
|
||||
* SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000)
|
||||
* SSL 7 32
|
||||
|
|
23
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
vendored
23
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
vendored
|
@ -107,10 +107,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
|
|||
/**
|
||||
* \brief This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note For encryption, the output buffer can be the same as the
|
||||
* input buffer. For decryption, the output buffer cannot be
|
||||
* the same as input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output
|
||||
* buffer must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
|
||||
* \note The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
|
||||
* buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
|
||||
* cannot overlap.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \warning When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the
|
||||
* authentication tag and does not verify that the data is
|
||||
|
@ -171,9 +170,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
|
|||
* \brief This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a
|
||||
* buffer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as
|
||||
* input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
|
||||
* must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
|
||||
* \note The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
|
||||
* buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
|
||||
* cannot overlap. Implementations which require
|
||||
* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT to be enabled may not provide support for
|
||||
* overlapping buffers.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
|
||||
* \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also
|
||||
|
@ -243,9 +244,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
|
|||
* Bytes. Only the last call before calling
|
||||
* mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as
|
||||
* input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
|
||||
* must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
|
||||
* \note The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
|
||||
* buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
|
||||
* cannot overlap. Implementations which require
|
||||
* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT to be enabled may not provide support for
|
||||
* overlapping buffers.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
|
||||
* \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
|||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* \brief Write at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs,
|
||||
* the actual amount read is returned.
|
||||
* the actual amount written is returned.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param ctx Socket
|
||||
* \param buf The buffer to read from
|
||||
|
|
102
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
vendored
102
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
vendored
|
@ -183,6 +183,41 @@
|
|||
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80
|
||||
/** Cache entry not found */
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x5E00
|
||||
/** Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname.
|
||||
* This is usually insecure.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
|
||||
* certificate, the client normally checks three things:
|
||||
* - the certificate chain must be valid;
|
||||
* - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
|
||||
* - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
|
||||
* malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
|
||||
* such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
|
||||
* or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
|
||||
* accredited by the root CA.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
|
||||
* before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
|
||||
* set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
|
||||
* host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not
|
||||
* required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
|
||||
* with \p NULL as the server name.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default).
|
||||
* - Certificate authentication is enabled.
|
||||
* - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname().
|
||||
* - The configuration option
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
* is not enabled.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME -0x5D80
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Various constants
|
||||
|
@ -1403,8 +1438,36 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
|
|||
* User settings
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||||
char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification
|
||||
(and SNI if available) */
|
||||
/** Expected peer CN for verification.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Also used on clients for SNI.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The value of this field can be:
|
||||
* - \p NULL in a newly initialized or reset context.
|
||||
* - A heap-allocated copy of the last value passed to
|
||||
* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(), if the last call had a non-null
|
||||
* \p hostname argument.
|
||||
* - A special value to indicate that mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
|
||||
* was called with \p NULL (as opposed to never having been called).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If you need to obtain the value passed to
|
||||
* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() even if it may have been called with
|
||||
* \p NULL, call mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer().
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If this field contains the value \p NULL and the configuration option
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
* is unset, on a TLS client, attempting to verify a server certificate
|
||||
* results in the error
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If this field contains the special value described above, or if
|
||||
* the value is \p NULL and the configuration option
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
* is set, then the peer name verification is skipped, which may be
|
||||
* insecure, especially on a client. Furthermore, on a client, the
|
||||
* server_name extension is not sent.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *hostname;
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
||||
|
@ -1535,6 +1598,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|||
* Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even
|
||||
* if no session is active.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \warning After setting up a client context, if certificate-based
|
||||
* authentication is enabled, you should call
|
||||
* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to specifiy the expected
|
||||
* name of the server. Without this, in most scenarios,
|
||||
* the TLS connection is insecure. See
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
* for more information.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
|
||||
* subsystem must have been initialized by calling
|
||||
* psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
|
||||
|
@ -3107,16 +3178,29 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received
|
||||
* server certificate. It sets the ServerName TLS extension,
|
||||
* too, if that extension is enabled. (client-side only)
|
||||
* peer certificate. On a client, this also sets the
|
||||
* ServerName TLS extension, if that extension is enabled.
|
||||
* On a TLS 1.3 client, this also sets the server name in
|
||||
* the session resumption ticket, if that feature is enabled.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param ssl SSL context
|
||||
* \param hostname the server hostname, may be NULL to clear hostname
|
||||
|
||||
* \note Maximum hostname length MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
|
||||
* \param hostname The server hostname. This may be \c NULL to clear
|
||||
* the hostname.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
|
||||
* allocation failure, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
|
||||
* \note Maximum hostname length #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note If the hostname is \c NULL on a client, then the server
|
||||
* is not authenticated: it only needs to have a valid
|
||||
* certificate, not a certificate matching its name.
|
||||
* Therefore you should always call this function on a client,
|
||||
* unless the connection is set up to only allow
|
||||
* pre-shared keys, or in scenarios where server
|
||||
* impersonation is not a concern. See the documentation of
|
||||
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
||||
* for more details.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \return 0 if successful, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
|
||||
* allocation failure, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
|
||||
* too long input hostname.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -467,7 +467,8 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params {
|
|||
|
||||
void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
||||
void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
|
||||
void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
||||
int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
|
||||
|
@ -1214,6 +1215,16 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|||
return 4;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Get the host name from the SSL context.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \return The \p hostname pointer from the SSL context.
|
||||
* \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has never been called on
|
||||
* \p ssl or if it was last called with \p NULL.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||||
void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
||||
void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
||||
|
|
8
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
vendored
8
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
vendored
|
@ -26,16 +26,16 @@
|
|||
*/
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 9
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 10
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The single version number has the following structure:
|
||||
* MMNNPP00
|
||||
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0900
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.9"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 2.28.9"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0A00
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.10"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 2.28.10"
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
8
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c
vendored
8
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c
vendored
|
@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
|
|||
"movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output
|
||||
:
|
||||
: "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output)
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1");
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "0", "1");
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk,
|
|||
AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x36") "call 1b \n\t"
|
||||
:
|
||||
: "r" (rk), "r" (key)
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "0");
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "0");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk,
|
|||
|
||||
:
|
||||
: "r" (rk), "r" (key)
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "0");
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "0");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk,
|
|||
AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
|
||||
:
|
||||
: "r" (rk), "r" (key)
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "0");
|
||||
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "0");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
|
||||
|
|
2
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
vendored
2
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
vendored
|
@ -3125,7 +3125,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
|
|||
/* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */
|
||||
if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 0) != 0 ||
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 1) != 0 ||
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(d) - 1 != grp->nbits) { /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(d) != grp->nbits + 1) { /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
2
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c
vendored
2
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c
vendored
|
@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code)
|
|||
return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" );
|
||||
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND):
|
||||
return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" );
|
||||
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME):
|
||||
return( "SSL - Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname. This is usually insecure. In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its certificate, the client normally checks three things: - the certificate chain must be valid; - the chain must start from a trusted CA; - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client. Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server. The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios, such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks, or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are accredited by the root CA. You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with \\p NULL as the server name. This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met: - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default). - Certificate authentication is enabled. - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). - The configuration option #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME is not enabled" );
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
|
||||
|
|
12
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c
vendored
12
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c
vendored
|
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_connect(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host,
|
|||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
close(ctx->fd);
|
||||
mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -242,13 +242,13 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *
|
|||
n = 1;
|
||||
if (setsockopt(ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
|
||||
(const char *) &n, sizeof(n)) != 0) {
|
||||
close(ctx->fd);
|
||||
mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (bind(ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen) != 0) {
|
||||
close(ctx->fd);
|
||||
mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *
|
|||
/* Listen only makes sense for TCP */
|
||||
if (proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP) {
|
||||
if (listen(ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG) != 0) {
|
||||
close(ctx->fd);
|
||||
mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -529,8 +529,8 @@ void mbedtls_net_usleep(unsigned long usec)
|
|||
#else
|
||||
struct timeval tv;
|
||||
tv.tv_sec = usec / 1000000;
|
||||
#if defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \
|
||||
(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
|
||||
#if (defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \
|
||||
(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
|
||||
tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000;
|
||||
|
|
9
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c
vendored
9
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c
vendored
|
@ -83,19 +83,20 @@ static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
size_t *olen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||||
const char *hostname = mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(ssl);
|
||||
size_t hostname_len;
|
||||
|
||||
*olen = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
if (hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
|
||||
("client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
|
||||
ssl->hostname));
|
||||
hostname));
|
||||
|
||||
hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname);
|
||||
hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9);
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0);
|
||||
p += 2;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len);
|
||||
memcpy(p, hostname, hostname_len);
|
||||
|
||||
*olen = hostname_len + 9;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
242
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
vendored
242
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
vendored
|
@ -38,6 +38,92 @@
|
|||
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||||
|
||||
/* A magic value for `ssl->hostname` indicating that
|
||||
* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called with `NULL`.
|
||||
* If mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has never been called on `ssl`, then
|
||||
* `ssl->hostname == NULL`. */
|
||||
static const char *const ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification = "";
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||||
/** Whether mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \return \c 1 if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called on \p ssl
|
||||
* (including `mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(ssl, NULL)`),
|
||||
* otherwise \c 0.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int mbedtls_ssl_has_set_hostname_been_called(
|
||||
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return ssl->hostname != NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname == ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification) {
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ssl->hostname;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void mbedtls_ssl_free_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname != NULL &&
|
||||
ssl->hostname != ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification) {
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname));
|
||||
mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ssl->hostname = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */
|
||||
size_t hostname_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if new hostname is valid before
|
||||
* making any change to current one */
|
||||
if (hostname != NULL) {
|
||||
hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
|
||||
|
||||
if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) {
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname,
|
||||
* so we can free it safely */
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_free_hostname(ssl);
|
||||
|
||||
if (hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
/* Passing NULL as hostname clears the old one, but leaves a
|
||||
* special marker to indicate that mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
|
||||
* has been called. */
|
||||
/* ssl->hostname should be const, but isn't. We won't actually
|
||||
* write to the buffer, so it's ok to cast away the const. */
|
||||
ssl->hostname = (char *) ssl_hostname_skip_cn_verification;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1);
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
/* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called, but unsuccessfully.
|
||||
* Leave ssl->hostname in the same state as if the function had
|
||||
* not been called, i.e. a null pointer. */
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len);
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
||||
|
@ -538,6 +624,23 @@ exit:
|
|||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
static int mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (status) {
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -806,25 +909,25 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned ch
|
|||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_ssl(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_verify_tls(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
|
||||
static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
|
||||
static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -2521,13 +2624,33 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int get_hostname_for_verification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||||
const char **hostname)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!mbedtls_ssl_has_set_hostname_been_called(ssl)) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Certificate verification without having set hostname"));
|
||||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME)
|
||||
if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
|
||||
ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*hostname = mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer(ssl);
|
||||
if (*hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Certificate verification without CN verification"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
||||
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||||
int authmode,
|
||||
mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
|
||||
void *rs_ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||||
int have_ca_chain = 0;
|
||||
|
@ -2549,6 +2672,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const char *hostname = "";
|
||||
int ret = get_hostname_for_verification(ssl, &hostname);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "get_hostname_for_verification", ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Main check: verify certificate
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -2563,7 +2693,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
|
||||
ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
|
||||
ssl->conf->cert_profile,
|
||||
ssl->hostname,
|
||||
hostname,
|
||||
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
|
||||
f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
@ -2591,7 +2721,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
chain,
|
||||
ca_chain, ca_crl,
|
||||
ssl->conf->cert_profile,
|
||||
ssl->hostname,
|
||||
hostname,
|
||||
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
|
||||
f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -3023,7 +3153,7 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_ssl(
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *sender;
|
||||
|
@ -3105,11 +3235,13 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(
|
|||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum));
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished"));
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_tls(
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len = 12;
|
||||
|
@ -3165,12 +3297,14 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(
|
|||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished"));
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len = 12;
|
||||
|
@ -3201,13 +3335,13 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
|
|||
status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
|
@ -3241,12 +3375,14 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
|
|||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished"));
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
|
||||
|
||||
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
|
||||
static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len = 12;
|
||||
|
@ -3277,13 +3413,13 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
|
|||
status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
|
@ -3328,6 +3464,8 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
|
|||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished"));
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
||||
|
@ -3422,7 +3560,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|||
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate);
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint);
|
||||
ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4,
|
||||
ssl->conf->endpoint);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites
|
||||
|
@ -3551,7 +3694,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|||
#endif
|
||||
hash_len = 12;
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1);
|
||||
ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
|
||||
|
@ -4617,49 +4764,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||||
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */
|
||||
size_t hostname_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if new hostname is valid before
|
||||
* making any change to current one */
|
||||
if (hostname != NULL) {
|
||||
hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
|
||||
|
||||
if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) {
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname,
|
||||
* so we can free it safely */
|
||||
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname != NULL) {
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname));
|
||||
mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */
|
||||
|
||||
if (hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
ssl->hostname = NULL;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1);
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname == NULL) {
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len);
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||||
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
||||
int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *,
|
||||
|
@ -6816,10 +6920,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||||
if (ssl->hostname != NULL) {
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname));
|
||||
mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname);
|
||||
}
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_free_hostname(ssl);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
|
||||
|
@ -7559,17 +7660,8 @@ exit:
|
|||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||||
switch (status) {
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
||||
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return mbedtls_ssl_md_error_from_psa(status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -486,6 +486,9 @@ static const char * const features[] = {
|
|||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||||
"MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE",
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME)
|
||||
"MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME",
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
|
||||
"MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION",
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
|
||||
|
|
4
thirdparty/minizip/patches/godot-seek.patch
vendored
4
thirdparty/minizip/patches/godot-seek.patch
vendored
|
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ index ea05b7d62a..981ba3c0cb 100644
|
|||
|
||||
s->pfile_in_zip_read = pfile_in_zip_read_info;
|
||||
s->encrypted = 0;
|
||||
@@ -1510,6 +1544,85 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzOpenCurrentFile3(unzFile file, int* method,
|
||||
@@ -1510,6 +1544,87 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzOpenCurrentFile3(unzFile file, int* method,
|
||||
return UNZ_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ index ea05b7d62a..981ba3c0cb 100644
|
|||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->extra_size + pos;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = pos;
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = pos;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return ZSEEK64(pfile_in_zip_read_info->z_filefunc,
|
||||
|
@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ index ea05b7d62a..981ba3c0cb 100644
|
|||
+
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = 0;
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = 0;
|
||||
+ pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.next_in = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
|
|
2
thirdparty/minizip/unzip.c
vendored
2
thirdparty/minizip/unzip.c
vendored
|
@ -1573,6 +1573,7 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzSeekCurrentFile(unzFile file, int pos) {
|
|||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->extra_size + pos;
|
||||
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = pos;
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = pos;
|
||||
|
||||
return ZSEEK64(pfile_in_zip_read_info->z_filefunc,
|
||||
|
@ -1597,6 +1598,7 @@ extern int ZEXPORT unzSeekCurrentFile(unzFile file, int pos) {
|
|||
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.avail_in = (uInt)0;
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.total_out = 0;
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->total_out_64 = 0;
|
||||
pfile_in_zip_read_info->stream.next_in = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue