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ladybird/Userland/Libraries/LibC/ssp.cpp

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Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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/*
Everywhere: Use bgianf@serenityos.org for my copyright attribution
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* Copyright (c) 2021, Brian Gianforcaro <bgianf@serenityos.org>
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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*
Everything: Move to SPDX license identifiers in all files. SPDX License Identifiers are a more compact / standardized way of representing file license information. See: https://spdx.dev/resources/use/#identifiers This was done with the `ambr` search and replace tool. ambr --no-parent-ignore --key-from-file --rep-from-file key.txt rep.txt *
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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*/
LibC: Convert dbgprintf() => dbgln() in SSP handler
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#include <AK/Format.h>
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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#include <AK/Types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/internals.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined __SSP__ || defined __SSP_ALL__
# error "file must not be compiled with stack protection enabled on it. Use -fno-stack-protector"
#endif
extern "C" {
LibC: Use uintptr_t for __stack_chk_guard We used size_t, which is a type that is guarenteed to be large enough to hold an array index, but uintptr_t is designed to be used to hold pointer values, which is the case of stack guards.
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extern uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard;
LibC+LibELF: Pass information from linker via magic lookup This works by defining a set of weak symbols in dynamic linker whose value would be provided by it. This has the same effect as preloading library that magically knows right addresses of functions shared between dynamic linker and LibC. We were previously passing the same information by rewriting values based on hardcoded library name, so the new approach seems a little nicer to me.
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// Populated by DynamicLinker in shared executables.
[[gnu::weak]] uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard = (uintptr_t)0xc6c7c8c9;
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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LibC: Don't use C++ attribute syntax in C-visible headers Fixes errors when building Clang's compiler-rt, which compiles in C11 more.
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__attribute__((noreturn)) void __stack_chk_fail()
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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{
LibC: Convert dbgprintf() => dbgln() in SSP handler
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dbgln("Error: USERSPACE({}) Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected!", getpid());
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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if (__stdio_is_initialized)
LibC: Convert dbgprintf() => dbgln() in SSP handler
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warnln("Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected!");
Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions. The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`. Details: -fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * A character array larger than 8 bytes. * An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes. * A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes. -fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain: * An array of any size and type. * A call to alloca(). * A local variable that has its address taken. Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test: ``` courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash [+] Starting the stack smash ... Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected! Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted ```
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abort();
}
} // extern "C"
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