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Support for memoryview for SIV
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parent
53be0708d7
commit
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3 changed files with 104 additions and 41 deletions
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
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import struct
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from Crypto.Util.py3compat import *
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from Crypto.Util.py3compat import tobytes, bord, _copy_bytes
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from Crypto.Hash import SHA1, SHA256, HMAC, CMAC
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from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor
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@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ def PBKDF2(password, salt, dkLen=16, count=1000, prf=None, hmac_hash_module=None
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s[0], s[1] = s[1], prf(password, s[1])
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return s[0]
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key = b('')
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key = b''
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i = 1
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while len(key)<dkLen:
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s = [ prf(password, salt + struct.pack(">I", i)) ] * 2
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@ -153,10 +153,10 @@ def PBKDF2(password, salt, dkLen=16, count=1000, prf=None, hmac_hash_module=None
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else:
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# Optimized implementation
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key = b('')
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key = b''
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i = 1
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while len(key)<dkLen:
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base = HMAC.new(password, b(""), hmac_hash_module)
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base = HMAC.new(password, b"", hmac_hash_module)
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first_digest = base.copy().update(salt + struct.pack(">I", i)).digest()
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key += base._pbkdf2_hmac_assist(first_digest, count)
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i += 1
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@ -186,10 +186,10 @@ class _S2V(object):
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A set of extra parameters to use to create a cipher instance.
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"""
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self._key = key
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self._key = _copy_bytes(None, None, key)
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self._ciphermod = ciphermod
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self._last_string = self._cache = bchr(0)*ciphermod.block_size
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self._n_updates = ciphermod.block_size*8-1
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self._last_string = self._cache = b'\x00' * ciphermod.block_size
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self._n_updates = ciphermod.block_size * 8 - 1
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if cipher_params is None:
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self._cipher_params = {}
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else:
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@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ class _S2V(object):
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if not item:
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raise ValueError("A component cannot be empty")
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if self._n_updates==0:
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if self._n_updates == 0:
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raise TypeError("Too many components passed to S2V")
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self._n_updates -= 1
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@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ class _S2V(object):
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ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
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cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
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self._cache = strxor(self._double(self._cache), mac.digest())
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self._last_string = item
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self._last_string = _copy_bytes(None, None, item)
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def derive(self):
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""""Derive a secret from the vector of components.
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@ -247,10 +247,10 @@ class _S2V(object):
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:Return: a byte string, as long as the block length of the cipher.
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"""
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if len(self._last_string)>=16:
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if len(self._last_string) >= 16:
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final = self._last_string[:-16] + strxor(self._last_string[-16:], self._cache)
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else:
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padded = (self._last_string + bchr(0x80)+ bchr(0)*15)[:16]
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padded = (self._last_string + b'\x80' + b'\x00' * 15)[:16]
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final = strxor(padded, self._double(self._cache))
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mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
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msg=final,
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@ -301,24 +301,24 @@ def HKDF(master, key_len, salt, hashmod, num_keys=1, context=None):
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if output_len > (255 * hashmod.digest_size):
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raise ValueError("Too much secret data to derive")
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if not salt:
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salt = bchr(0) * hashmod.digest_size
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salt = b'\x00' * hashmod.digest_size
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if context is None:
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context = b("")
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context = b""
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# Step 1: extract
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hmac = HMAC.new(salt, master, digestmod=hashmod)
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prk = hmac.digest()
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# Step 2: expand
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t = [b("")]
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t = [ b"" ]
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n = 1
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tlen = 0
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while tlen < output_len:
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hmac = HMAC.new(prk, t[-1] + context + bchr(n), digestmod=hashmod)
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hmac = HMAC.new(prk, t[-1] + context + struct.pack('B', n), digestmod=hashmod)
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t.append(hmac.digest())
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tlen += hashmod.digest_size
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n += 1
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derived_output = b("").join(t)
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derived_output = b"".join(t)
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if num_keys == 1:
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return derived_output[:key_len]
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kol = [derived_output[idx:idx + key_len]
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@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ def scrypt(password, salt, key_len, N, r, p, num_keys=1):
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data_out += [ get_raw_buffer(buffer_out) ]
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dk = PBKDF2(password,
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b("").join(data_out),
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b"".join(data_out),
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key_len * num_keys, 1,
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prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
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