The heuristics run to detect PES streams are much laxer than mp3/ac3 ones,
which check for valid headers, so it should not have a higher score than the
latter.
Fixes misdetection of some mp3 files with big id3v2 tags at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
When AV_PKT_DATA_HEVC_CONF is present on an HEVC track, write
an hvcE BlockAdditionMapping alongside the existing dvcC/dvvC one,
carrying the raw HEVCDecoderConfigurationRecord for the enhancement layer.
Handle MATROSKA_BLOCK_ADD_ID_TYPE_HVCE in mkv_parse_block_addition_mappings
and store the raw HEVCDecoderConfigurationRecord as
AV_PKT_DATA_HEVC_CONF on the stream's coded side data, mirroring
the existing dvcC/dvvC handling.
When AV_PKT_DATA_HEVC_CONF is present on a MODE_MP4 HEVC
track, write it as an hvcE box alongside hvcC and dvcC. Like dvcC,
writing requires -strict unofficial.
The hvcE box carries the HEVCDecoderConfigurationRecord for the Dolby
Vision enhancement layer in ISOM-based containers. Store its raw
contents as AV_PKT_DATA_HEVC_CONF on the stream's coded side data,
mirroring the existing dvcC/dvvC handling.
ftp_connect() interpolates the URL path into SIZE/RETR/STOR/CWD/DELE/RMD/RNFR
commands without checking for CR/LF, although it already rejects CR/LF in the
user and password fields. Reject CR/LF in s->path the same way.
Reported and reviewed by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Śmigielski.
WHIP relies on the SDP a=fingerprint to bind the peer identity to
the SRTP keying material (RFC 8842 §§ 5.1, 5.3). parse_answer()
walks the SDP body looking for `a=ice-lite`, `a=ice-ufrag:`,
`a=ice-pwd:`, and `a=candidate:` lines and ignores everything else,
including `a=fingerprint`. WHIP intentionally runs the OpenSSL DTLS
backend with s->verify=0 (DTLS-SRTP uses self-signed certs by
design, so a CA chain check would be meaningless); the peer cert is
accepted regardless of identity. The spec's compensating identity
control — verifying the DTLS peer cert against the SDP a=fingerprint
hash — is missing, so the SRTP keys are derived from a session
whose peer identity was never authenticated. Any on-path attacker,
or a malicious WHIP server URL, can substitute their own DTLS
material and the publisher's RTP stream will be encrypted to them.
The full fix is a two-step process:
(a) Require a=fingerprint to be present in the SDP answer
(RFC 8842 § 5.3 MUST).
(b) After DTLS handshake, compute the peer-cert hash and compare
against the stored fingerprint (RFC 8842 § 5.1 MUST); tear
down the session on mismatch.
This patch implements step (a) only; step (b) requires plumbing
the cert hash out of dtls_start() through the openssl TLS context
and is left as a follow-up.
Add a remote_fingerprint field to WHIPContext, extract the
a=fingerprint value from the SDP answer in parse_answer(), and
return AVERROR(EINVAL) when it is absent. This raises the bar from
"no fingerprint required" to "any fingerprint required"; the
follow-up patch will raise it again to "fingerprint MUST hash-match
the DTLS peer cert."
Found-by: Claude (Anthropic). Human-verified and reported by
Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>.
Signed-off-by: Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>
These codecs cannot self-report layout in the bitstream, and
are known or expected to use a libavutil-compatible channel
order, and as such can use mov_ch_layouts_wav for tag lookup.
ff_udp_get_last_recv_addr and ff_udp_set_remote_addr are defined in
udp.c which only compiles under CONFIG_UDP_PROTOCOL. Building with
--disable-everything plus a protocol whitelist that excludes UDP
left these references unresolved at link time, even though TLS
itself uses TCP. Wrap the DTLS UDP-remote-addr blocks accordingly
When ffmpeg whip client takes up dtls_active role when using gnutls,
it tries to connect to the server over udp and intermittently crashes.
This is because s->host is NULL, and ffmpeg is in ice controlling mode.
The gnutls api - gnutls_server_name_set() crashes if the hostname is NULL.
This commit assigns valid value to s->host in such scenarios.
Signed-off-by: Aditya Banavi <adityabanavi@gmail.com>
Mirror the HLS demuxer's max_reload pattern
Reported as a DoS finding by Xueqing. Verified with the supplied PoC
server: a 30s ffmpeg run that previously generated ~10000 requests
without termination now exits in ~100ms after exactly max_reload
fragment-open failures.
libavformat/mov.c read the APV AU length field directly from the
sample without sanity-checking against the remaining sample size or
a documented maximum. The patch validates that au_size is bounded by
the remaining sample bytes and that the AU envelope (4 bytes plus
au_size) fits inside the declared sample size.
Validate the access unit length at the demuxer boundary so that the
decoder is not handed an attacker-controllable buffer size. Returns
AVERROR_INVALIDDATA on the bound failure with an explicit log line.
Found-by: Claude (Anthropic). Human-verified and reported by
Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>.
Signed-off-by: Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>
When a tmcd or similar metadata track references multiple source
tracks, the per-iteration assignment overwrote track->track_duration
on each loop step, leaving it set to whatever the last source happened
to be.
A tref stream group lists the metadata stream (e.g. tmcd) alongside the
streams it references. The init loop iterated over every stream in the
group and added it to the metadata track's src_track array, which made
the tmcd track reference itself.
Regression since 4444a755.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhili <quinkblack@foxmail.com>
Fixes: ada-4-poc.ty
change is based on the suggested fix
Found-by: Claude and Ada Logics. This issue was found by Anthropic from using agents to study security of open source projects
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
- Prevent integer overflow when summing header lengths; add bounds check.
- Re-initialize priv->vp with the new stream's extradata once all chained
stream headers are collected.
Signed-off-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
celt_header() reads a uint32 `extra_headers` field from the CELT identification
header and stores `1 + extra_headers` into the signed int extra_headers_left.
With extra_headers = 0x7FFFFFFE this becomes INT_MAX and the OGG parser
consumes every subsequent page as a CELT "extra header" without ever reaching
audio data, hanging on any streaming input. A value of 0xFFFFFFFE wraps the
signed addition negative, with the same family of consequences.
Reject any extra_headers count above a small fixed cap (16, well above any
real CELT-over-Ogg stream).
Verified with the audit PoC (a crafted file plus an infinite-page FIFO):
without the patch, ffmpeg consumes pages forever; with the patch it logs
"Too many CELT extra headers (...)" and exits in ~70 ms with
AVERROR_INVALIDDATA.
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
When extradata_size == 0, ff_rtp_send_aac() does `size -= 7` to skip the
ADTS header without checking size >= 7. A short packet makes size negative,
and the value is later passed to memcpy() as size_t, reading past the buffer
end. Bail out instead.
The vulnerable branch is not reached when using the built-in AAC encoder
(which always emits extradata), but an application that feeds raw
ADTS-stripped AAC packets through the libavformat RTP muxer can hit it. The
fix is a one-line lower-bound check and compiles/runs cleanly; see audit
PoC for the static analysis and reachable-by-API write-up.
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
